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Chapter	1:	
Introduction	
1. The Making and Re-making of the Mediterranean 
In their acclaimed The Corrupting Sea, Peregrine Horden and Nicolas Purcell argue 
that the Mediterranean survived until the late nineteenth century, after which the advent 
of motorized sailing destroyed the sea’s integrity.1 Historians of the early modern period, 
however, believe that the sea died much earlier – around the turn of the seventeenth 
century – as is reflected by the near absence of studies of the seventeenth-century 
Mediterranean.2 The commercial waning of the Mediterranean at the turn of the 
seventeenth century, the increasing volume of captives, and the violence associated with 
captivity serve as signs for these scholars that the sea had lost its earlier characteristic 
unity, and subsequently began a long decline. 
Rather than a postmortem on the early modern Mediterranean, this project argues 
that the rumors about the sea’s death may be premature.  I argue here that in the century 
and a half between the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and the fall of Oran (1708), the 
Mediterranean continued to play an influential role in the histories of Spain and the 
Maghrib by providing charged zones of contact. I demonstrate how the “Mediterranean” 
was created and recreated throughout the long seventeenth century through the 
interaction between cross-boundary maritime practices and a process of region formation 
                                                 
1
 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, Blackwell Publishing, 2000, pp. 3, 34. 
2
 Maria Fusaro, “After Braudel: A Reassessment of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion 
and the Caravane Maritime,” in Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and Mohamed-Salah Omro, Eds., Trade and 
Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean, Braudel’s Maritime Legacy, London, New York: I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2010, pp. 1-22, esp. 1-5. 
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through which the contact zone between the Maghrib and the Habsburg Empire was 
shaped. I examine how Christian and Muslim captives engaged with social practices that 
included the spread of rumors and news, the writing of letters of recommendation, the 
compiling of intelligence reports, and the sending of complaints and requests to their 
respective sovereigns. I argue that the circulation of captives as well as exchanges by 
captives of different forms of information in a variety of textual genres across the sea, 
and the interactions of captives with institutions such as the family, the Inquisition, and 
Maghribi and Spanish political bureaucracies, brought the two Mediterranean coasts into 
creative contact.. Yet, as I show, the bottom-up manner through which the sea was 
formed by captives was intertwined with competing region-making projects launched by 
Algerian, Moroccan, and Spanish sovereigns. I explore the charged relations between 
these sovereigns, by reconstructing in the process the shifting ways in which the 
sovereigns influenced the shaping of the sea. The Mediterranean, however, was not a 
space dominated exclusively by political actors. I highlight the role of the networks of 
ransom, trust, and credit of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian intermediaries, networks that 
the sovereigns had to negotiate carefully as they in turn tried to impose their vision of 
political interaction and exchange in the Mediterranean. 
By examining the ways in which the sea was created through interaction between an 
ensemble of individuals and institutions, practices, textual genres, and representational 
artifacts, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the western Mediterranean and 
challenges historiographic accounts haunted by the specter of Samuel Huntington and his 
idea of the Clash of Civilizations, which is projected backwards in a search of both origin 
and justification. A historically grounded understanding of region formation requires that 
we attend not only to often conflicting attempts of political actors seeking to shape the 
region but also to the host of social actors who engaged with, opposed, or promoted such 
attempts. To this end, the dissertation consists of two thematic parts: the first examines 
the role of Christian and Muslim captives as mediators who circulated information 
between institutions in Spain, Algiers, and Morocco and the ways in which captives 
employed such information to negotiate their captivity; the second (1) explores the small-
scale networks of ransom, credit, and trust that facilitated the return of captives and how 
the intermediaries who formed these networks interacted with ecclesiastical-royal ransom 
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institutions, and (2) historicizes the ways in which political authorities – Mahgribi and 
Spanish – tried to regulate the working of such networks, even as these authorities were 
often forced to follow the rhythms and models of exchange and interaction initiated and 
driven by those networks. Throughout the dissertation, I shift between various analytic 
scales – local and trans-Mediterranean – and political perspectives – Spanish, Ottoman, 
Algerian and Moroccan. I reconstruct and analyze how captives employed resources from 
their communities of origin to improve their living conditions, while I explore how such 
processes transformed the Mediterranean into a space of contiguities in which Spanish 
institutions had dense links to the Maghrib and Maghribi institutions to the Habsburg 
Empire.  
2. The Mediterranean in the Historiography 
Although Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 
the Age of Phillip II established the Mediterranean as a field of study,3 as Horden and 
Purcell note, Braudel’s work, “can also be seen as bringing to summation and close an 
entire epoch in Mediterranean scholarship.”4 Since the second edition of The 
Mediterranean in 1966 until two decades ago, only a few studies focusing on the 
Mediterranean region, either as a whole or about certain aspects of it, have been 
published.5 While historians gave up on the endeavor in the late 1960’s, social 
anthropologists continued to examine the sea, searching for shared social and cultural 
values that united the peoples of the Mediterranean.6 Since the early eighties, however, 
with the deconstruction of Mediterranean anthropology launched by Michael Herzfeld, 
even anthropologists have turned their backs on the sea.7  Spain, the Maghrib, and the 
                                                 
3
 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Vols. 1 & 2. 
New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
4
 Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, p. 39. 
5
 Ibid. More specifically on the reception of Braudel in the US, see: Anthony Molho, "Like Ships Passing in 
the Dark: Reflections on the Reception of La Mediterranée in the U.S." Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 
24 (2001): 139-62.  
6
 While very few historians were writing on the Mediterranean during these years, a few continued to 
produce longue durée, situated studies of social institutions employing a comparative Mediterranean 
framework, see: Diane Owen Hughes, "From Brideprice to Dowry in Mediterranean Europe." Journal of 
the History of the Family 3 (1978): 262-96.  
7
 For Herzfeld’s critique, responses and counter responses see: Michael Herzfeld, “The Horns of the 
Mediterraneanist Dilemma.” American Ethnologist 11 (1984): 439-54; Anthony Galt, “Does the 
Mediterraneanist Dilemma Have Straw Horns?” American Ethnologist 12 (1985): 369-71; and Michael 
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seventeenth century have especially suffered from these trends, partly because of the way 
Braudel represented the seventeenth century both in The Mediterranean and in other 
previous works. For example, in a famous article in the Revue Africaine, Braudel 
explained that in 1577, Philip II had given up on any North African imperialist policy.8 In 
his later magnum opus, he demonstrated that the Spanish monarch, seeking to become the 
ruler of the Atlantic, reoriented Spanish politics northwards and westwards.9 According 
to Braudel, the “shared common destiny” on the one hand, and the religious divide and 
imperialism expressed in “the Hispanic and the Ottoman bloc” on the other, which 
characterized the sea in the sixteenth century, withered away, to be replaced by an 
internationalized sea created by the “northern invasion,” namely by the Dutch and 
English merchants and corsairs which flooded the Mediterranean.10 As if this eulogy 
were not enough, in The Forgotten Frontier, Ottomanist Andrew Hess claimed that 
Mediterranean unity, at least as far as it concerned the western side of the sea between the 
Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, had shrunk much earlier.11 Ironically, then, Braudel’s 
Mediterranean on the one hand, and critics of Mediterraneanism on the other, reoriented 
scholars away from the sea, leading them to focus on apparently more ‘real’ objects of 
study like nations and states. Faruk Tabak, the author of The Waning of the 
Mediterranean, 1550-1870, a Geohistorical Approach, a rare, recent study of early 
modern Mediterranean history, has succinctly summarized it thus: “in historical studies 
that investigate the waning of the Mediterranean, the ecumenical setting of the golden age 
                                                                                                                                                 
Herzfeld, “Of Horns and History: The Mediterraneanist Dilemma Again.” American Ethnologist 12 (1985): 
778-80.  
8
 Fernand Braudel, “Les Espagnols et I'Afrique du Nord, 1492-1577,” Revue Africaine, LXIX (1928): 184-
233, 351-428, especially p. 192. 
9
 Braudel, The Mediterranean, Vol. II, p. 1187 
10
 Braudel has famously and poetically claimed that in the sixteenth century, “the Turkish Mediterranean 
lived and breathed with the same rhythms as the Christian, that the whole sea shared a common destiny…” 
Ibid, p. 14. Scholars who make reference to his work tended to stress “unity” and ignore how Braudel has 
perceived the sea as comprised of two religious imperial blocs. On the “northern invasion,” Ibid, pp. 615-
42, on smaller states, Ibid. pp. 701-703. It is important to stress that Braudel has never claimed that the sea 
ceased to exist in the seventeenth century. The waning of the sea, Braudel has acknowledged, was 
accompanied by a cultural revival but “events of world-wide importance,” of the kind the archival sources 
report of, took place elsewhere, Ibid, pp. 14, 1186. 
11
 Andrew Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
5 
 
of the basin fades into the background, only to be supplanted by differential and singular 
settings from the seventeenth century.”12 
In the last two decades, however, the Mediterranean has been experiencing a 
renaissance,13 for which Horden and Purcell’s The Corrupting Sea is largely 
responsible.14 Shifting the Braudelian paradigm of unity in favor of one that stresses 
difference, and justifying Mediterraneanism against Herzfeld’s critique, Horden and 
Purcell have characterized the Mediterranean as a place characterized by a combination 
of extreme environmental fragmentation, instability, and risk managed by diversification, 
storage, and redistribution, which are all enabled by extreme connectivity.15 Against 
histories in the region, which can only contingently be termed Mediterranean, the authors 
of The Corrupting Sea call for the writing of histories of the sea that focus on the whole 
sea or an aspect of it to which the whole is crucial.16 Ian Morris, one of the participants in 
the debate that followed the publication of the book, claimed that the model should be 
further historicized by shifting the terms of the discussion from Mediterraneanism to 
Mediterraneanization.17 Stressing process, Morris’ suggestion points out how seas, or 
spaces in general, do not simply exist or cease to exist, but are rather made and unmade 
by an ensemble of individuals, institutions, practices, and representations. When the 
interactions between these instances changed, becoming more or less intensive, as was 
the case in 1581 when the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires signed a peace treaty, then the 
sea was “mediterraneanized” or “de-mediterraneanized.”18 By focusing on the process, 
                                                 
12
 Faruk Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870, a Geohistorical Approach, Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 8. 
13
 Susan E. Alcock, “Alphabet Soup in the Mediterranean Basin: The Emergence of the Mediterranean 
Serial,” in William V. Harris, Ed. Rethinking the Mediterranean, Oxford, 2005, pp. 314-336. 
14
 To claim, however, that Horden and Purcell, or for the sake of the matter, any other scholar is responsible 
for rebranding of the sea is to attribute too much power to intellectual projects while ignoring social, 
economic and political ones. Doubtlessly, clandestine migrants who risk their lives on the way to Europe, 
the European Union attempts to curb arms smuggling into zones of conflict in the region or European and 
North African governments’ initiative to promote new Mediterranean economic agendas have an important 
role in the rising academic prestige of the study of the sea. 
15
 The work has sparked a debate about the Mediterranean, see: William V. Harris, Ed. Rethinking the 
Mediterranean, Oxford, 2005; Mediterranean Historical Review, 18 (2003); Gadi Algazi, “Diversity 
Rules.” Mediterranean Historical Review 20 (2005): 227-45.  
16
 Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, p. 2. 
17
 Ian Morris, “Mediterraneanization,” Mediterranean Historical Review, 18 (2003): 30-55.  
18
 See for example a new study of Mediterraneanization between Tunisia and Sicily, Naor Ben-Yehoyada, 
“Mediterranean, Becoming and Unbecoming: Fishing, Smuggling, and Region Formation between Sicily 
and Tunisia since WWII,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2011. 
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then, and demonstrating how specific places in the Mediterranean became more or less 
mediterraneanized, one can bridge the distinction made by Horden and Purcell between 
histories in and histories of. This project combines these two histories: by focusing on 
relations that captives maintained with their home communities and on how these 
relations helped them to negotiate their captivity, I demonstrate the ways in which 
captives wove Mediterranean webs of connectivity; similarly, through the reconstruction 
of the political negotiations over ransoms procedures of captives in the Maghrib, I show 
how political actors struggled to shape the western Mediterranean. 
3. Studies of Captivity 
Studies of early modern captivity in the Mediterranean, a theme that has recently 
drawn much scholarly attention,  to some extent follow general trends in Mediterranean 
historiography. These studies demonstrate some of the problems in writing a history in 
the region that does not account for the way the local operates on a regional or 
Mediterranean scale. Literary critics and historians have examined captivity narratives, 
focusing on their reception and audiences, and the ways in which such narratives 
constituted national identity and advanced or subverted imperial projects.19  Many of 
these scholars have focused on the figure of the renegade, a Christian who converted to 
Islam during his captivity, as a way to write early modern transnational history.20 Other 
                                                 
19
 Early studies conducted by literary scholars focused on the structure and the textual conventions of 
captivity narratives and have traced the formation of a new, more realist treatment of captivity in literature 
and in captivity narratives, see: George Camamis, Estudios Sobre el Cautiverio en el Siglo de Oro. Madrid: 
Editorial Gredos, 1977; Margarita Levisi, Autobiografías del Siglo de Oro: Jerónimo de Pasamonte, 
Alonso de Contreras, Miguel de Castro, Sociedad General Española de Librería, 1984. See also an older 
work by a French scholar: Albert Mas, Les turcs dans la littérature espagnole du Siècle d'Or, recherches 
sur l'évolution d'un thème littéraire. Paris: Centre de recherches hispaniques, 1967. Scholars who picked up 
the theme of captivity in the nineties have analyzed captivity narratives in terms of the audiences their 
authors addressed and the literary strategies their authors employed for purposes of identity construction. 
Barbara Fuchs has argued that the figure of the renegade, on the one hand, and the staging of faked 
captivity performances on the other, worked against the project of constituting a unified Catholic Spanish 
identity. See: Barbara Fuchs, Mimesis and Empire: the New World, Islam, and European Identities. 
Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001. In contrast, Nabil Matar and Linda 
Colley have claimed that narratives of captivity and conversion which former captives often employed to 
show gratitude to the Queen and others who ransomed them were crucial in the formation of British 
imperial identity. See: Nabil I. Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689. Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2005 and Idem, “English Accounts of Captivity in North Africa and the Middle East: 1577-1625,” 
Renaissance Quarterly, 54 (2001): 553-572; Linda Colley, Captives, Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-
1850, New York: Pantheon Books, 2002.  
20
 For an overview of this trend, see: Gordon M. Sayre, “Renegades from Barbary: The Transnational Turn 
in Captivity Studies,” American Literary History, 22 (2010): 347-359. 
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critics have revealed the constructedness of categories such as ‘captives’ and ‘renegades’ 
articulated in narratives and plays and how such categories subverted ideas of national or 
catholic identity. These studies, however, have taken for granted, at least implicitly, a 
monolithic preexisting official point of view against which cultural representations 
operated. However, in the early modern period, contrasting articulations of what captives 
and renegades were circulated constantly within and among institutions and textual 
genres. Moreover, such studies, in their stress on religious boundary transgressions, as 
demonstrated by the mass conversion of Christian captives to Islam, focused exclusively 
on a single early modern religious discourse, one out of a few competing discourses 
relating to renegades, thus de-socializing conversion and the history of captivity.21  
Until a decade ago, surprisingly few works focused on ransom procedures and on 
the system of enslavement that managed the lives and labors of early modern captives.22 
                                                 
21
 Moreover, what may seem like religious boundary crossing can function at the same time as boundary 
making, or be predicated upon clear and safe religious boundaries. See for example the case of medieval 
Muslim knights who fought for the Aragonese kings or Jewish trading communities whose commerce with 
Muslims and Hindis was partly facilitated by the establishment of clear religious boundaries: Hussein 
Anwar Fancy, “Mercenary logic: Muslim soldiers in the service of the Crown of Aragon, 1265—1309,” 
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Princeton University, 2008; Francesca Trivelato, The Familiarity of 
Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period, Yale 
University Press, 2009. 
22
 Surprisingly Ottoman historians did not engage with the topic of captivity of Christians in the Maghrib 
despite the fact that many of the captives were held in Tunis and Algiers, Ottoman semi-independent 
regencies. For a long time this was part of a larger neglect of the theme of slavery referred to as 
“‘conspiracy of silence,” see: Gordon Murray. Slavery in the Arab World. New York: New Amsterdam, 
1989, p. x. In the last two decades, the silence has been broken and scholars have developed elaborated 
models for examining Ottoman slavery. This is reflected in Ehud Toledano’s recent call to understand 
Ottoman Slavery “as a social relationship, that is the dynamic take-and-give between owner and slave in a 
variety of changing situations,” see: Ehud Toledano, “The Concept of Slavery in Ottoman and Other 
Muslim Societies: Dichotomy or Continuum?,” in Miura Toru and John Edward Philips (eds), Slave Elites 
in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study, London and NY: Kegan Paul International, 2000, pp. 
159-176. Most scholarship, however, has focused on the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century, see: 
W. G. Clarence-Smith Islam and the Abolition of Slavery. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; Erdem 
Y. Hakan. Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800-1909, St. Antony's series. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1996; Ehud Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1998. The few works that do examine an earlier period tend to focus on 
the more structured forms of slavery such as the devşirme system, the mukātaba system, and the 
agricultural system, to the exclusion of enslaved Christian captives and the Maghrib, see: Jan S. 
Hogendorn, "The Location of the 'Manufacture' of Eunuchs." In Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa - 
a Comparative Study, edited by Miura Toru and John Edward Philip, 248. London and New York: Kegan 
Paul Internationl, 2000, pp. 41-68; Halil İnalcik, “Servile labor in the Ottoman Empire,” in Abraham 
Ascher, Tibor Halasi-Kun, and Béla K. Király, Eds. The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian 
Worlds: the East European Pattern, New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979, pp. 25-52; İ Metin Kunt, 
“Transformation of Zimmi into Askerî,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Eds. Christians and Jews 
in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982, 
pp. 55-67; Bernard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle East: an Historical Enquiry. New York: Oxford 
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The earliest among these are studies of Annales historians who approached Christian 
slavery in North Africa from an economic angle, examining the traffic of people across 
the Mediterranean by looking at slave prices and markets, and examining the profitability 
of the trade, as well as its role in the economy of the Maghrib.23  More recently, Ellen 
Friedman, Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo and José Antonio Martínez Torres have analyzed 
the redemptive labor of the Trinitarians and Mecredarians, religious orders charged with 
liberating captives form the Maghrib, from an institutional perspective while adding to 
our knowledge of the life of captives.24 Such studies have shed light on the fund-raising 
procedures of Trinitarians and Mercedarians and on aspects of the mechanics that 
characterized the ransom expeditions these Orders sent to the Maghrib. The richest and 
most comprehensive account, especially as far as the life of enslaved captives is 
concerned, is Robert Davis’ Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the 
Mediterranean.  Davis has studied almost every aspect of the life and employment of 
Christian slaves in the Maghrib.  Moreover, he has taken upon himself the task of 
quantifying the presence of Christian slaves, claiming that between 1500 and 1800 more 
than a million Christians were imprisoned in the Maghrib, arguing that thus, 
“Mediterranean slaving out-produced the trans-Atlantic trade during the sixteenth and 
into the seventeenth century.”25  
At the same time, however, such studies imply that the captivity of Christians in the 
Maghrib and the enslavement of Muslims in the south of Europe are distinct and 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1990; Yvonne Seng, “A Liminal State: Slavery in Sixteenth-Century Istanbul.” In Shaun 
Elizabeth Marmon, Ed. Slavery in the Islamic Middle East, Princeton: M. Wiener, 1999, pp. 25-42. An 
exceptional example, as the author herself indicates, is Suraiya Faroqhi’s study of war captivity, examining 
Christian and Ottoman war captives during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see: Suraiya Faroqhi, 
The Ottoman Empire and the world around it. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 
23
 Jean Mathiex, “Trafic et Prix de l'Homme en Méditerranée  aux XVII° et XVIII° siècles.” Annales. 
E.S.C. 9 (1954): 157-64 and Lucette Valensi, “Esclaves Chrétiens et Esclaves Noirs à Tunis au XVII° 
Siècle.” Annales. E.S.C (1967): 1267-88. For a recent analysis of ransom prices of captives in the early 
modern Mediterranean. See: Attila Ambrus and Eric Chaney, “Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical 
Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 9.14.2010,” 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/chaney/files/barbary.pdf, accessed on July 10th 2011. 
24
 Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age Madison, Wis.: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1983; Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo, Esclavos y cautivos: Conflicto entre la cristiandad 
y el islam en el siglo XVIII, Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2006; José Antonio Martínez Torres, 
Prisioneros de los infieles: vida y rescate de los cautivos cristianos en el Mediterráneo musulmán (siglos 
XVI-XVII), Colección Alborán Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2004. 
25
 Robert Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary 
Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. xxvi. 
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disconnected phenomena. Moreover, rather than thinking about these phenomena as 
interconnected they implicitly take a comparative point of view, explaining that the living 
conditions of the slaves in Spain were either better or worse than that of slaves in the 
Maghrib. In doing so, such studies reproduce the dichotomy of 
Islamophobia/Islamophilia.26 In some cases, the engagement with Islamophobia is 
explicit, for instance, when writers attribute the practice of captive-taking to a trans-
historical Jihad, or employ the metaphor of a concentration camp to describe the life of 
captives in the Maghrib.27  In other cases, Islamophilia is implicit when, for example, 
scholars criticize Islamophobic positions, claiming that the treatment of Muslim slaves in 
Europe was equal to that of Europeans in North Africa, or that Muslim slave owners were 
more benevolent masters.28 In either case, these studies disconnect what I will show are 
two interrelated phenomena in constant making and unmaking. They do so by examining 
captivity of Muslims and of Christians as independent of each other, and thereby reify 
them as self-contained phenomena rather than elements forming a process. This enables 
moral judgments upon what are seen as independent systems. My work brackets such 
judgments, highlighting instead the formation of links, which connected slavery in the 
Maghrib and that in Europe, and demonstrating the mutual constitution of these systems 
rather than reiterating their portrayal as self-contained. 
Less than a decade ago, scholars began to examine captivity and ransom from the 
fresh perspective of ransom networks and the intermediaries that formed them. In a series 
of articles, Wolfgang Kaiser redefined the redemption of captives as part of an “economy 
of ransom” created by piracy, corso, and the traffic of people.29 The actors, practices, and 
                                                 
26
 On Islamphobia and Islamophila in scholarly production and ways of breaking with that dichotomy, see:   
Jocelyne Dakhlia Islamicités, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2005 and Andrew Shryok, 
“Introduction: Islam as an Object of Fear and Affection,” in Ed. Andrew Shryock, 
Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press, 2010, pp. 1-28. 
27
 Davis’ double characterization of captivity in North Africa as a trans-historical Jihad and at the same 
time as a concentration camp is somewhat contradictory. The first adjective evokes irrationality while the 
second instrumental rationality, see: Robert Davis, Holy war and Human Bondage: Tales of Christian-
Muslim Slavery in the Early-modern Mediterranean, Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 2009 and 
Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters, p. xxv. 
28
 Martínez Torres, Prisioneros de los infieles, pp. 59-60; Godfrey, Fisher, Barbary Legend; War, Trade, 
and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 8. 
29
 Wolfgang Kaiser, “La excepción permanente. Actores, visibilidad y asimetrías en los intercambios 
comerciales entre los países europeos y el Magreb (siglos XVI-XVII),” in José Antonio Martínez Torres 
(Ed.) Circulación de personas e intercambios en el Mediterréneo y en el Atlántico (siglos XVI, XVII, 
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norms that formed this ransom economy, Kaiser has argued, regulated religious violence 
and rationalized commerce with Muslims as a means for redemption of captives. The 
merit of this approach is in that it avoids a reading of captivity or ransom in oppositional 
terms while bringing into relief webs of connectivities that would have otherwise gone 
unnoticed. A few of the contributions to a volume on the economy of ransom that Kaiser 
has edited have demonstrated the results of this approach in the Spanish context.30 Their 
corrective emphasis on intermediaries, at the expense of the well-studied Orders of 
Redemption, however, risks divorcing two kinds of actors who either worked together or 
competed with each other. Moreover, while the term “the economy of ransom” does not 
necessarily reduce the field to economics, some of the scholars who focused on that 
economy were not always sensitive enough to the role of politics, religion and society in 
the shaping of that economy.31 This project builds on Kaiser’s new formulation of 
captivity and ransom, but insists, on the one hand, on the need to account for non-
economic factors whose de-contextualized product might give the mistaken impression of 
impersonal market forces, and, on the other, on accounting for the ways in which the 
work of ransom networks and intermediaries was intertwined with that of institutional 
actors. 
4. Context 
What kind of a political arena was the seventeen century Mediterranean? 
Throughout the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century, in the continuation of the 
Crusade, the Spaniards tried to execute the crusaders’ ideal or fantasy of conquering, 
                                                                                                                                                 
XVIII), CSIC, 2008, pp. 171-189. Wolfgang Kaiser, “L’économie de la rançon en Méditerranée occidentale 
(XVIe-XVIIe siècle), in Simonetta Cavaciocchi, Ed., Ricchezza dal mare, secc. XIII-XVIII, Florence, 2006, 
vol. 2, p. 689-701. 
30
 For the first half of the sixteent century, see: Juan Francisco Pardo Molero, “Mercaderes, frailes, 
corsarios y cautivos: intercambios entre el reino de Valencia y el norte de Africa en la primera mitad del 
siglo XVI,” in Wolfgang Kaiser, Ed. Le commerce des captifs: les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le 
rachat des prisonniers en Méditerraneé, XVe-XVIIIe siècle, École française de Rome: Rome, 2008, pp. 
165-192. For the second half of the century, see: Francisco Andújar Castillo,” Los rescates de cautivos en 
las dos orillas del Mediterráneo y en el mar (alafías) en el siglo XVI,” in ibid, pp. 135-164. For the 
seventeenth century, see: Natividad Planas, “Acteurs et mécanismes du rachat d’esclaves dans l’archipel 
Baléare au XVIIe siècle,” in ibid, pp. 65-81. 
31
 According to Bunes Ibarra, for example, “money is the reason that explains whole of this system of 
living [i.e. captivity],” Miguel Ángel de Bunnes Ibarra, La imagen de los musulmanes y del norte de África 
en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: los caracteres de una hostilidad, Madrid: CSIC, 1989, p. 142. 
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colonizing, and Christianizing North Africa.32 As the century advanced, however, the 
project lost steam, and the Spaniards acknowledged their inability to continue the 
crusade. Instead, according to Braudel, in 1577, Philip II gave up on a North African 
colonial policy, and in 1581, the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires signed a peace 
agreement, both of which collectively transformed the nature of Mediterranean warfare. 
Following the agreement, piracy, which had been endemic for centuries in the 
Mediterranean, came to dominate maritime wartime practices.33 The signing of the 
agreement coincided with the transformation of Algiers, an Ottoman regency in the 
Maghrib, to what Braudel called its “second brilliant age” (1580-1620). Together with La 
Valetta (Malta), the city became one of the central capitals of Mediterranean corsairs..34   
After Philip II’s death, however, his son, Philip III (1598-1621) exhibited a renewed 
interest in the region. He signed the twelve years’ truce with the Dutch rebels,”” but at 
the same time also executed the order that expelled Moriscos from Spain (1609-1614). 
The idea of the expulsion had circulated for decades in Spanish political corridors, but its 
simultaneous execution with the signing of the truce compensated for Spain’s loss of 
prestige in the Dutch republic.35 Many of the expelled Moriscos arrived in Salé and 
Tétouan, and the cities were also transformed into important centers of corso. The 
corsairs were aided by English and Dutch corsairs, the newcomers in the Mediterranean, 
whose arrival is often referred to as the “Northern Invasion.”36 In addition to the 
expulsion of the Moriscos, and partly in response to the increase of corso activity created 
by the expulsion throughout his reign, Phillip III made several other attempts, some more 
successful than others, to occupy Algiers and ,El Araich (Larache), and Mehadía (La 
                                                 
32
 Braudel “Les Espagnols et I'Afrique du Nord, 1492-1577.” 
33
 John H Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War-Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 
649-1571, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 153. 
34
 On “the second brilliant age of Algiers,” see: Braudel, The Mediterranean, pp. 882-886. For an overview 
of the rise of Algiers during the sixteenth century into a Mediterranean power, see:  María Antonia Garcés,  
Cervantes en Argel, Gredos: Madrid, 2005. On Maltese corso, especially in relation to its Greek victims, 
see: Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
35
 For a discussion of these debates and the ways in which the expulsion strengthened Spain’s image as the 
defender of Catholicism, see Antonio Feros, El Duque de Lerma, Realeza y Privanza en la España de 
Felipe III, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002, pp. 353-372. 
36
 For Braudel, the “Northern Invasion,” the arrival of the Dutch, English and French, led to the 
internationalization of the Mediterranean and as part of larger processes which eliminated the importance 
of religion. On the “Northern Invasion” and a powerful critique of the argument, see: Molly Greene, 
"Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the 17th Century." Past and Present 174 (2002): 42-
71. 
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Mamora) in Atlantic Morocco and to attack Tunis and even Alexandria in Egypt.37  
Algiers was never conquered, but Spain managed to take over El Araich and Mehadía, 
and dominated them for a century, after which it lost them. 
 And yet, excluding the decades of Philip III’s reign, the overall trend during the 
seventeenth century was a Spanish shift toward defensive politics.38 The large 
Mediterranean fleet consequently shrank: from seventy-five vessels in 1619, to forty-two 
in 1634, and, finally, to twenty-six in 1649.39   In 1640, Portugal, which had formed part 
of the Habsburg Empire since 1580, rebelled and opened a war against Spain that ended 
in 1668 with Spanish recognition of Portugal’s independence. During that war, Spain’s 
major Mediterranean naval concern was to maintain control over the straits of Gibraltar. 
The other interested parties were the English and the Dutch, who sought a way to secure 
their share of the Mediterranean trade. Three cities which Spain dominated were crucial 
for control over the straits: Gibraltar, Tangiers or Ceuta. The last two were originally 
Portuguese colonies that the Spaniards had dominated since the annexation of Portugal.   
 
                                                 
37
 On the attacks and plans to attack Algiers in the early seventeen century, see: I. A. A. Thompson, War 
and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620, London: the Athlone Press, 1976, pp. 36-37 and Miguel 
Angel de Bunes Ibarra, “Felipe III y la defensa del Mediterráneo: la conquista de Argél,” in Guerra y 
sociedad en la monarquía hispánica: política, estrategia y cultura en la Europa moderna (1500-1700), 
Eds. Enrique García Hernán And Davide Maffi, Vol. I, Ediciones del Laberinto: Fundación Mapfre: CSIC: 
2006, pp. 921-946. On Spanish seventeenth century poltical conduct in relation to Atlantic Morocco, see: 
Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra and José Antonio Martínez Torres , “La república de Salé y el duque de 
Medina Sidonia: notas sobre la política Atlántica en el siglo XVII,” in IV Centenario del ataque de Van der 
Does a las Palmas de Gran Canaria (1999): Coloquio Internacional "Canarias y el Atlántico, 1580-1648,”  
Ed. Antonio de Bethencourt Massieu, Cabildo de Gran Canaria:  Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2001 pp. 
187-206 and Luis Salas Almela, Colaboración y conflicto: la Capitanía General del Mar Océano y Costas 
de Andalucía, 1588-1660, Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002.  On the plans to conquer Alexandria, 
see the document titled “A Plan for the Conquest of Alexandria,” was issued in Naples in February 1605, 
quoted by Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra, “Avis du Levant: le réseau d’espionnage espagnol dans l’empire 
ottoman à partir du sud de l’Italie, à la charnière des XVIe et XVIIe siècles,” in: Ed. Béatrice Perez, 
Ambassadeurs, apprentis espions et maitres comploteurs - Les systèmes de renseignement en Espagne à 
l'époque moderne, PUPS : Paris, 2010, p. 217.  On its other territorial fronts, the Spanish Empire 
consolidated its power through peaceful means, see: William Sachs Goldman, “The political culture of 
empire: The Spanish Council of State and foreign policy under Philip III, 1598-1621, “ Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2009. 
38
 José Contreras Gay, “La defensa de la frontera marítima,” Francisco Andújar Castillo, Ed. Historia del 
reino de Granada, Vol. III, Universidad de Granada: Fundación El Legado Andalusí, 2000, pp. 145-178. 
39
 I. A. A. Thompson, “Aspectos de la organización naval y militar durante el ministerio de Olivares,” in 
Ángel García Sanz and John H. Elliott, Eds. La España del Conde Duque de Olivares: Encuentro 
Internacional sobre la España del Conde Duque de Olivares celebrado en Toro los días 15-18 de 
septiembre de 1989, Universidad de Valladolid: Servicio de Publicaciones, 1990, pp. 249-274, esp. 253. 
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The Portuguese rebellion threatened Spanish control over them.40 Eventually, 
Portuguese independence resulted in the loss of Tangiers for Spain in 1640, but Spain 
succeeded in securing control over Ceuta.41 Soon after, in 1661, the English won 
Tangiers through a dynastic union with Portugal.42 During the last third of the 
seventeenth century, Spain was hesitant to send forces to North Africa, even when the 
governors of Oran, Spain’s most important stronghold in the Maghreb, claimed that the 
city was in danger. Eventually in 1708, Spain lost the city to Ottoman Algiers.43  
Several recent studies have demonstrated that the loss of political interest did not 
entail Spanish economic withdrawal from the Mediterranean. In his The Waning of the 
Mediterranean, Faruk Tabak has delineated the shifting economic relations between the 
Ottoman Empire and Venice, and the Habsburg Empire and Genoa, and how each of 
these was influenced by long-term environmental trends throughout the early modern 
period.44 More specifically, Eloy Martín Corrales has demonstrated how the volume of 
direct and indirect Catalan commerce with the Maghrib grew between the sixteenth and 
the eighteenth centuries, suggesting that Castile experienced similar growth.45 Natividad 
Planas, in a focused study of Majorca and its relations with the government in Castile, 
and with the Maghrib, has studied the system of trade permits with the Maghrib that was 
developed in order to detour official discourses that prohibited commerce with 
Muslims.46 Further research is necessary to establish the precise nature of the commercial 
ties between Spain and the Maghrib and the ways these shifted in the early modern 
                                                 
40
 Rafael Valladares Ramírez, “Inglaterra, Tánger y el ‘estrecho compartido.’ Los inicios del asentamiento 
inglés en el Mediterráneo occidental durante la guerra Hispano-Portuguesa (1614-1661),” Hispania, 51:179 
(1991): 965-991. 
41
 Santiago de Luxán Meléndez, “Política Ceutí de Felipe IV (1641-1644), Hispania, 36 (1976): 175-182 
and idem, “Contribución al estudio de los presidios españoles del norte de África. Las dificultades de la 
plaza de Ceuta para abastecerse de trigo (1640-1668)” Hispania, 35 (1975): 320-342. 
42
 Linda Colley, Captives, pp.23-41.  
43
 Often, the governors of Oran demanded more troops to protect the garrison from the Council of War. in 
the 1660’s, these calls for help were motivated by the fear that the fort would suffer from the military 
tensions between the Ottoman Algiers and Morocco, see: Jean-Frédéric Schaub, Les Juifs du roy 
d’Espagne, 1509-1669, Paris: Hachettre Littératures, 1999, pp. 161-172. 
44
 Tabak, The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870. 
45
 Martín Corrales Eloy, Comercio de Cataluña con el Mediterráneo musulmán (siglos XVI-XVIII): El 
Comercio con los ‘enemigos de la fe’,” Ediciones Bellaterra, Barcelona, 2001. 
46
 Natividad Planas, “La frontière franchissable: normes et pratiques dans les échanges entre le royaume de 
Majorque et les terres d’Islam au XVIIe siècle,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 48-2 (2001): 
123-147. 
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period. Existing scholarship, however, certainly demonstrates that commerce continued 
to thrive for centuries after the sixteenth century. 
However, the ties between the Maghrib and Spain that made the Mediterranean an 
important space for the people who populated its shores were not produced exclusively 
through commerce. Despite Spain’s loss of imperial interest in the Mediterranean, the sea 
did not cease to exist; it continued to be produced and reproduced as a social space for 
centuries after its alleged ‘death.’ In fact, the processes of Mediterraneanization on which 
this dissertation focuses were, to a large degree, the result of the 1581 Ottoman-Habsburg 
Peace treaty. As mentioned earlier, the treaty transformed the nature of warfare in the 
Mediterranean, effectively making piracy and corso more important than ever. In earlier 
periods, spectacular maritime battles like Lepanto (1571) saw thousands of captives lose 
their liberty, and others regain it, often within the course of a few short hours. In Lepanto, 
the Holy League captured over three thousand Muslims, while fifteen thousand Christian 
slaves were rescued; in Alcazarquivir, or the Battle of the Three Kings (1578), fourteen 
thousand Portuguese – among them almost the entire Portuguese nobility – were taken 
captive by Ahmed Al-Mansur; and the Ottomans captured thousands of imperial soldiers 
when they re-conquered Tunis from the Spaniards.47 It is worth putting these numbers in 
context: estimates of the number of Christians held captive at Algiers, the city that 
boasted the largest numbers in captivity, varied greatly between five thousand and thirty 
thousand. The numbers of prisoners taken in these famous battles, then, were significant 
in measure. Many captives would change hands again in the ceasefire, and peace treaties 
that followed such large-scale and violent encounters.  
The shift to piracy, or maritime guerilla tactics, increased the absolute number of 
Christian and Muslim captives while radically transforming the pace and annual 
distribution of captives.  Corsairs took captives before 1581, especially from 1560 to 
1565, but “by 1574, the age of war by armada, expeditionary force and heavy siege was 
practically over.”48 This meant that from 1581 on, with the beginning of the “second 
                                                 
47
 On Lepanto, see: Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, La batalla de Lepanto: cruzada, guerra santa e identidad 
confesional, Silex: Madrid, 2008, p. 366, On Alcazarquivir, see: Mercedes García-Arenal, Ahmad al-
Mansur, The Beginning of Modern Morocco, One World: Oxford, 2009, p. 7.; cf.: Lucette, Valensi, Fables 
de la mémoire: La glorieuse bataille des Trois Rois (El-Ksar el-kébir, 1578), Éditions Chandeigne: Paris, 
1992, p. 141; On Tunis and la Goleta, see: Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters, p. xiv. 
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 Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 865. 
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brilliant age of Algiers,” corsairs captured more captives than imperial armadas did, and 
among the captives there were more civilians than soldiers.49 Mercedarian records of 
ransom attest to this shift. These sources, which refer only to those captives that the order 
had rescued, suggest that seventy percent of the captives taken between 1572 and 1574 
were captured in 1574 in Tunis. The majority of these were most likely soldiers. Only 
eighteen percent were captured at sea and only five percent along the Spanish littoral. 
From then on, the number of soldiers among the rescued captives drops. Among the 
captives that the Mercedarians rescued and who had been captured between 1575 and 
1581, only a little more than thirty percent were taken captive in North Africa and the 
majority of those individuals had lost their liberty in the Battle of the Three Kings. The 
rest were captured at sea or along the Spanish coasts.50 After the peace agreement of 
1581, seldom did more than a few hundred soldiers lose or regain their liberty within 
such short intervals.  Instead, corsairs might often capture a small numbers of civilians: a 
few fishermen, or a few peasants; a few travelers, or some sailors on ships. Small 
numbers of captives thus circulated widely in the Maghrib, and their distribution 
approached geographic equilibrium in the years immediately following the peace accord. 
In other words, piracy produced a more long-lasting and stable population of captives and 
of patterns of circulation of captives across the imperial map than had been the situation 
before 1581. The shift in the distribution of captives and the declining number of soldiers 
among them enhanced the importance of small-scale longue durée networks of ransom, 
credit, and trust, as well as the institutionalization of the Mercedarians and the 
Trinitarians, the two religious orders charged with liberating Christians from the 
Maghrib. The fact that on a daily or weekly basis Christian captives arrived in Algiers as 
did Muslims in Majorca revolutionized the production and transmission of strategic 
knowledge in the Mediterranean, transformed the ways in which the Mediterranean 
connected the Maghrib and the Habsburg Empire, and the manner in which it was 
imagined by the people populating the lands that bordered the sea.  
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5. Sources and Methodology 
Based on twenty four months of archival research in Spain and in manuscript 
collections in the US and in Jerusalem, the project draws an eclectic body of sources 
composed by Christians, Jews, and Muslims consisting of ego documents, various forms 
of letters that captives, former captives, and captives kin had written, literary works, 
intelligence reports, inquisitorial documents, and religious and popular images. In my 
analysis of the sources and in the reconstruction of the dynamics examined, I take into 
account that “silences… enter the process of historical production at … the moment of 
fact making (the making of the sources).”51 Therefore, I neither went ‘shopping’ in the 
archives without accounting for the conditions of the production of the documents nor do 
I assume that the records were written and archived for the historian. All the chapters, 
thus, are attuned not only to the history represented by the sources analyzed but also to 
the institutional contexts in which the sources were written, their related genres, and the 
goals their authors sought to achieve. Recent scholarship that examines captivity 
narratives and captives’ autobiographies has analyzed them, for example, as elements in 
processes of identification in which former captives reasserted a religious identity they 
were suspected of abandoning in captivity.52 Similarly, in a recent important work on 
Spanish, Portuguese, and English captivity narratives, Lisa Voigt has argued that 
captives’ textual production was important in the construction of Empire, a fact that 
transformed captives into crucial sources of information about the Other while making 
the documents they produced a source of power for the captives.53 In both cases, the 
textual production of former captives was examined was part of their authors’ attempts to 
reinsert themselves into their home communities or seek favors and not merely as a 
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 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston, Mass.: 
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representation of the reality of life in captivity. Administrative sources of the kind that 
this dissertation is focused on should receive similar treatment. Namely, they should be 
read not only for the information they purport to provide about the Mediterranean and the 
relations between Spain, Morocco and Algiers, but also as constitutive of both the 
Mediterranean and the relations between these three polities. The second and third 
chapters in particular, examine the contrasting institutional and group interests and 
differing logics and goals embedded in various genres of archival sources.54 This is not 
merely a methodological principle. Writing is acting and the texts that captives produced 
formed part of repertoires of actions which constituted the experience of captivity while 
also shaping the Mediterranean. Only by reading sources both for the dynamics to which 
they referred and for the ways in which they formed elements in the very same dynamics 
that their authors sought to influence, can we understand captivity and the role of captives 
in Mediterranean history.  
6. Structure 
The first three chapters after the introduction focus on captivity, and reconstruct 
and analyze the structures of mobility created by the increasing volume of captives, and 
the shape that their circulation took. The second chapter builds upon the work of captivity 
studies in examining how Christians and Muslims lost their liberty and were subsequently 
enslaved in the Mediterranean. The focus, however, is on Christian captives in the 
Maghrib. I examine slaves’ occupations and the informal economies in which they were 
involved, as well as the forms of ownerships over slaves. In contrast to previous 
scholarship, however, I argue that dynamism rather than stasis was a central feature of 
captivity in North Africa. By reconstructing the professional trajectories of slaves, 
understood as the movement of captives between masters and occupations through 
various forms of exchange, temporary and permanent, I demonstrate how such 
trajectories characterized the life of many enslaved captives. Further, I show that 
occupational mobility entailed spatial mobility throughout the Mediterranean and within 
Mediterranean cities, resulting in multiple social networks. Mobility and such networks 
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 The model example of such reading is Natalie Davis Zemon. Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and 
their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France, The Harry Camp lectures at Stanford University. Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987. 
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made captives into substantial actors in the production and transmission of knowledge 
and information.  
The following two chapters venture into hitherto uncharted scholarly territories on 
the life of both Muslim and Christian captives and of Mediterranean history. For 
centuries, piracy and captivity were endemic in the Mediterranean. However, the 
equilibrium that the circulation of captives reached after the signing of the Ottoman-
Habsburg peace treaty in 1581 made the circulation of captives an important factor in the 
production and reproduction of webs of connectivity between the Maghrib and the 
Habsburg Empire. The third chapter follows the circulations of three kinds of information 
that traversed the sea: (1) rumors and news about the identity of Christian captives and 
renegades (Christians who converted to Islam) that were spread by Muslim and Christian 
captives; (2) letters of recommendation that captives wrote on behalf of renegades who 
wanted to return to Spain, but were afraid of the Inquisition’s punishment; and, (3) 
requests for help that Muslims enslaved in Spain sent to their kin in the Maghrib 
whenever they felt that they were being mistreated by their owners. Each of these 
traveling pieces of news operated simultaneously on two interrelated levels: at the local 
one, and the trans-Mediterranean one. Locally, spreading rumors, sending 
recommendations, and submitting requests formed social practices that captives 
employed in order to improve their living conditions by using resources that might be 
tapped within their home communities. The writing and circulation of these textual 
artifacts suggests that captives thought of the sea as a space across which information 
traveled with relative ease; the information they circulated, however, greased the wheels 
of mobility that facilitated circulation and exchange which captives have taken as given. 
In the process, captives extended the reach of the Inquisition, and of the family beyond 
territorial boundaries and initiated diplomatic interactions between enemy sovereigns 
from below.  
The massive presence of captives in the sea and the shape that their circulation 
took, then, placed captives in a somewhat contradictory position. On the one hand, the 
fact that so many Christians were living among Muslims and that a large number of them 
converted to Islam made captives an object of fear and threatened the unity of the 
Christian community. On the other hand, captives were in a privileged position and in the 
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right location to produce and transmit information about other captives as well as about 
the Maghrib and the military plans of the Muslims. Captives, in other words, facilitated 
not only the political management of the Mediterranean as a belligerent arena, but also, 
via their communication with their kin and with the Inquisition and by delineating the 
boundaries between those who left the community and those that remained within its 
limits, of the threat posed by captivity and conversion. In that sense captives not only 
played a part in the shaping of communities in Spain but also of the image of Islam and 
of the Mediterranean. 
While the third chapter focuses on information about individuals, the fourth 
examines in detail how, traversing the sea, captives – Muslim and Christian; captured, 
ransomed, or runaways – played an instrumental role in the production and circulation of 
strategic information and knowledge (applicable to questions of military defense, offense 
or conquest). They did so in five forms: (1) a few ex-captives wrote and published 
systematic treatises on the Maghrib; (2) captives warned their kin of corsairs’ attacks in 
the letters they sent home; (3) upon arrival at ports, captives were questioned about 
enemies’ plans and maritime strategic movements; (4) former captives compiled detailed, 
topographic urban narratives of Maghribi cities, which, often accompanied by plans and 
maps, pretended to point out the cities’ “Achilles’ heels” – the key to conquests; and, (5) 
captives wrote long, detailed urban diaries during their captivity, chronicling the main 
political – local and international – events they had experienced. Ironically, while the 
information that the chapter is focused on, and the flow of its transmission, attested to the 
links that the sea had enabled, the information articulated the sea as a political-belligerent 
space fought over by self-contained entities. These two chapters shift between exploring 
the importance of writing, textuality, and knowledge in the life of captives on the one 
hand, and how the circulation of news created and recreated the Mediterranean as a social 
and political space on the other. Despite the fact that the noun ‘Mediterranean’ was 
hardly ever employed in the texts I analyze, the production, manipulation, employment, 
and circulation of different forms of knowledge both rested on assumptions and 
expectations regarding what the stretch of sea between the Iberian Peninsula and the 
Maghrib was, and, at the same time, continuing to (re)create it.  
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 Captives, however, were operating within a space, which formed the object of 
competing region-making projects launched by Algerian, Moroccan, and Spanish 
sovereigns, as well as by a host of ransom intermediaries and merchants. The last three 
chapters focus on ransom networks, the ransom expeditions of the Orders of Redemption, 
and the attempts of Mediterranean sovereigns to regulate ransom. The fifth chapter traces 
forgotten networks of credit, ransom, and trust that Muslim and Christian captives and 
their kin employed to obtain ransom. I analyze the mechanics of these networks, the 
modalities of exchanges they facilitated, how captives obtained credit, and what 
happened when one of the parties to ransom agreement tried to avoid filling in his or her 
obligations.  I demonstrate that by acknowledging the validity of ransom agreement that 
Christian captives cut with ransom intermediaries, the Spanish Crown implicitly became 
a party to negotiations with Jews and Moriscos, social groups that it had expelled from 
the Peninsula in 1492, and 1609-1614 respectively.  
The sixth chapter charts the history of the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians, 
church Orders that specialized in the redemption of Christians from the Maghrib, from 
their formation in the Middle Ages to the early modern period when the Spanish Crown 
began inspecting their work and regulating many of its aspects. It focuses on the struggle 
between the Orders over the monopoly over ransom, and on the coalitions they formed 
whenever critics claimed their redemptive labor was inefficient, and that their funds 
should be employed differently. As part of these struggles, the Orders launched 
propaganda campaigns that stressed their success and importance in the redemption of 
Christian souls. I demonstrate how these campaigns also shaped an image of the 
Mediterranean as a religious and environmental space dominated by God and by nature. 
The image, I claim, corresponded to the sea the way it emerged from their ransom 
procedures and the rhythms and number of ransom expeditions Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians sent to the Maghrib. 
The small-scale ransom networks and the Orders of Redemption formed part of the 
same history, operating within the same space, which was also populated by Spanish and 
Maghribi sovereigns. That space, the western Mediterranean, cannot be understood, 
however, in isolation from these political actors that operated within it and tried to 
articulate it according to competing agenda. Chapter seven reconstructs the shifting 
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relations between the Spanish Crown, Algerians, and Moroccan governors, the Ottoman 
Sultan, the Orders, and the ransom networks. I demonstrate that the monopolization of 
the Orders by the Crown did not bring an end to the latter’s collaboration with Jewish and 
Muslim ransom intermediaries or lead to the elimination of the ransom networks formed 
by the intermediaries. Rather, the collaboration between the Crown and the 
intermediaries was formalized, and thus legitimated, in the second decade of the 
seventeenth century. In the process, Phillip III transformed Jews and Muslims into royal 
agents in North, and Algerian and Moroccan governors, seeking a cartel over the selling 
of captives, did all they could to oppose that. The struggle between these actors was one 
of negotiating competing region-making projects, which sought to shape the 
Mediterranean in oppositional ways. While Algerians and Moroccans sought direct 
interaction and exchange with the Spanish Crown, the Crown preferred a pluralized sea, 
in which neither polity held a monopoly over exchange and mediation. 
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Chapter	2:	
The	Social	Life	of	Enslaved	Captives	
1. Introduction 
After being employed for a few years, during the 1590’s, as a slave in the household 
of the Pasha of Algiers, Diego Galán, accused of attempting flight, was sentenced by his 
master to be whipped. Minutes before the execution of punishment, Mamí Napolitano, a 
renegade who was negotiating a debt with the Pasha, offered to take Galán instead.  After 
the exchange had taken place, the grateful slave kissed the hands of his new master, who 
responded with these words – “but be good and loyal, and I will treat you well!”55  This 
anecdote which recounts a moment of simultaneous hardship and relative good fortune, 
illuminates the relational aspects of slavery as well as the potential for professional 
mobility available to enslaved captives in the Ottoman Empire. Mamí promises 
comfortable employment and good treatment, but conditions it upon industriousness and 
loyalty.  Galán, quick to learn languages, to make friends, to ingratiate himself with 
authorities, and to mobilize these resources to his advantage, played the game well. A 
highly skilled consumer of cultural and social resources, he managed to transform 
himself in a few years from a marginal figure in his master’s household into a near 
member of its kinship structure.56 
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 Diego Galán, Relación del Cautiverio y Libertad de Diego Galán, Natural de la Villa de Consuegra y 
Vecino de la Ciudad de Toledo, Bunes, Miguel Ángel de and Matías Barchino, Toledo: Diputación 
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 Galán wrote his Relación in the third decade of the seventeenth century and the fifth of his life, about 
thirty years after his return to Spain. A decade later, he wrote a second longer and more ‘literary’ version 
titled Cautiverio y Trabajos de Diego Galán: Diego Galán, Edición Crítica de Cautiverio y Trabajos de 
 24 
 
Galán, who eventually took advantage of the circumstances, escaped, and returned 
home after a decade in captivity, was one of more than a million Christians enslaved in 
the Maghrib in the early modern period.57  This chapter presents the state of our 
knowledge of the life of captives and of captivity as a system of enslavement. Rather than 
reproducing the excellent work others have already conducted, I limit myself only to 
those aspects of captivity that will serve the rest of the project’s chapters.  I build upon 
previous studies in examining the contexts in which captives lost their liberty in 
analyzing how they were sold in a spectacular and traumatic sale at the slave market and 
in exploring what occupations they filled.  The reconstruction and analysis I offer, 
however, differ from other studies in the sources that I am employing and in my 
emphasis.  The vast majority of the captivity scholarship produced by literary critiques 
and historians relies almost exclusively on captivity narratives, namely autobiographies 
written by former captives and captivity plays.58  While I too make ample use of 
autobiographies, comedies, and other works written by former-captives, I read them 
along with inquisitorial sources, petitions, and other archival documents, many of which 
were compiled by captives during their captivity.  This eclectic corpus enables me to 
avoid the reconstruction of captivity as a static system that an analysis that relies 
exclusively on narrative sources tends to produce.  Rather than stasis, I stress dynamism. 
I demonstrate how captives moved between masters and occupations through multiple 
forms of exchange – temporary and final.  I reconstruct professional trajectories that 
channeled the life of enslaved captives and their involvement in informal economies. 
While captives usually had little power to influence such trajectories, conversion and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Diego Galán, Matías Barchino, Ed. Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2001. 
Neither account was published during his lifetime. The later account was published in 1913 (Diego Galán, 
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57Robert C. Davis, "Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast," Past and Present, no. 172 (2001): 
87-124. 
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 Among these, historians who have focused on captivity and ransom also use the important corpus of 
records produced by the Trinitarian and Mercedarian Orders. 
 25 
 
establishment of trust-based-relations were ways in which they could manipulate them.  
Occupational and spatial mobility, I argue, formed central features of captivity in the 
Maghrib.  Mobility was important as it enabled captives to establish social networks with 
other captives, their overseers, masters, and free Christians not only within urban centers 
in the Maghrib and the rest of the Ottoman Empire but also between these cities across 
the Mediterranean.  
1. ‘Captives’ or ‘Slaves’? A Misplaced Question 
Two key terms in the study of enslaved captives in North African are ‘captives’ 
and ‘slaves.’  Were Europeans held prisoners in the Maghrib captives or slaves?  And 
what is the difference? Some claim that they were slaves while others insist that they 
were captives.  The disagreement is based on an analytic, exclusionary use of the terms 
‘captive’ and ‘slave.’ Christians imprisoned in the Maghrib, Robert Davis has argued, 
were slaves and should be studied as such.  Atlantic slavery, he has added, was “above all 
a matter of business,” slavery in the Maghrib of “passion… almost of jihad.”59  In 
contrast, Fontenay has insisted that in the study of Mediterranean slavery, one needs to 
distinguish between ‘slaves’ and ‘captives.’  Captives had an exchange value, while 
slaves had a use value; the majority of the captives were purchased by business-oriented 
traders who bought them as a shrewd investment, slaves were bought by slave owners 
who solely sought to benefit from the fruits of their slaves’ labor.  Christians in the 
Maghrib, Fontenay has explained, were captured, but eventually retrieved their freedom; 
in contrast black slaves lived and died as slaves.60  With a small variation, Davis has 
reproduced a long-criticized dichotomy in studies of slavery according to which slavery 
in America was economic, while in Africa it was social.61 Fontenay, on the other hand, 
has reduced the religious aspects of captive-taking to logic of market economy 
disregarding the fact that the majority of captives were not ransomed and died as slaves. 
The insistence on the exclusionary nature of the terms, however, not only masks the 
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complexity of the social trajectories that managed the life of enslaved captives in North 
Africa but also creates the appearance of two separate classes of bondage and of masters.  
The statuses of slave and captive, I argue, coexisted potentially in the same 
persons, i.e. those marked as ‘for ransom’ were put to work with others, and some of 
those ‘enslaved’ managed to ransom themselves even after years of slavery.62 Part of the 
analytic confusion stems from the fact that these were also categories of practice: 
contemporaries used both, and references to ‘captives’ (cautivo, ‘captif’) and ‘slaves’ 
(esclavo, esclave) abound in the sources.63 Early modern authors like Antonio de Sosa 
and Gabriel de Losada who dedicated many pages to historical-juridical discussions of 
the bondage of Christians in the Maghrib used the term ‘slavery’ but in the same breath, 
in other sections of their work, termed Christians enslaved in the Maghrib ‘captives.’64 
For example, in his authoritative Topography and General History of Algiers, Antonio de 
Sosa wrote that “although there is an infinite number of them [Christians] of every stripe 
and nation, because they ordinarily arrive here as captives and slaves” thereby collapsing 
the distinction between the terms.65 Thus, in this project, I employ the terms ‘captive,’ 
‘slave,’ or ‘enslaved captives’ interchangeably with a preference for the term ‘captive’ 
when discussing ransom and ‘slave’ when discussing labor. 
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2. Captivity and Enslavement 
For most slaves, captivity began in a violent maritime clash in the high seas.  As the 
ship on which the soon-to-be-captives sailed across the waters of the Mediterranean a 
hostile sail was seen at the horizon.  Once the suspicions were verified and the strangers 
identified as corsairs, fear took over the passengers who populated the decks.  In his 
autobiography, An Account of the Captivity and Liberty of Diego Galán, the author, a 
Toledan boy captured in 1589 and  held captive for eleven years in the Ottoman Empire, 
captured the moment: 
Finally, after more than twenty days of embarkation we left the port of Malaga 
with favorable wind and [after] two days of navigation to Oran, facing Barbary, 
close to the three gallows’ cape, the wind calmed. [And] eight large slave galleys 
of Turks from Algiers captained by Arnaut Mami, an Albanese renegade left [the 
cape]. And as the patron of our ship discovered the rowboats, he said – ‘we are 
lost.’66  
 
While there are hardly any first-voice accounts of Muslim captives, Christian sources 
suggest that Muslims lost their liberty in the exact same way.  Alonso de Contreras, the 
Spanish knight of Malta and corsair, described how around 1600, he chased a Turkish 
merchant ship (caramuzal), forced its crew to harbor in Lampeduza seeking refuge on the 
island.  Then, Contreras and other knights hunted and enslaved them.67   
Hoping to escape the corsairs, the captain and his crew did all they could to increase 
speed and escape.  Meanwhile, the passengers began hiding their precious belongings and 
getting rid of marks which identified them as rich and hence raised their future ransom 
price.68  This moment of capture features in numerous autobiographies ex-captives wrote 
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after their return home.  Such descriptions, though, were not limited to elaborated 
published captivity accounts.  They also appear in short ‘bureaucratic autobiographies’ 
that captives, former captives and their kin drafted and submitted to the crown in hope of 
receiving some compensation.69  A key element in these autobiographical petitions is the 
depiction of the moment of capture.  Petitioners always recounted how they had been 
captured.  In most cases, this radical interruption of the normal course of life leading to 
captivity began as a disruption of a movement across maritime space, usually during a 
journey on a ship.  Sergeant Domingo Álvarez, for example, described in the petition he 
submitted to the crown how “crossing [the Mediterranean] to Oran with [the company] in 
the year 1611 he was captured by the Turks of Algiers.”70  This was not only a soldiers’ 
fate.  Maria Hernández, Maria Alfonso, and Gregorio de Olveyra y Alonso Núñez, all 
from Galicia, described in their petition to the Council of Castile (Consejo de Castilla) 
how their husbands and sons were captured while out fishing at sea.71  
For others, however, the moment of capture was even more disruptive.  The mere 
fact of boarding a ship and sailing embodied the risk of an encounter with corsairs and 
thus passengers should have been, perhaps, better prepared for such a tragedy.  The 
corsairs, however, did not limit their playground to the high seas and often attacked and 
pillaged villages along the Mediterranean littoral.  Peasants and fishermen, men and 
women living along the shores of Andalusia, the Balearics, the Canary Islands, Tunis, 
Algiers or Morocco were a potential prey for Muslim or Christian corsairs. Portuguese, 
Sicilians, Sardinians, Neapolitans and other Italians suffered the same fate.  Muslim 
corsairs reached as far as Galicia, Cantabria, the Basque Country, and the British shores 
in their attacks.  In 1631 they attacked Baltimore in West Cork, Ireland; four years 
earlier, in 1627, they raided Iceland!72  Christian corsairs raided Greek Ottomans in the 
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eastern Mediterranean and others near the Maghribi coasts.73 Christians were also taken 
captive in the Maghrib.  Soldiers who manned the Spanish presidios – literally garrison 
but also a penitentiary institution or a prison – in the Maghrib risked their liberty in 
military encounters with Janissaries.  A few of these soldiers, however, did not lose their 
liberty in the battlefield but rather defected.74  Life in the presidio was hard, and food 
shortages were common.75  The desperate soldiers and residents that defected hoped for 
better life in Algiers. Some planned to convert to Islam and settle down in Algiers, others 
to escape from there to Spain.  Those who “made it” and arrived in Algiers discovered 
that the Pasha was not interested in them as Muslims preferring to sell them as Christian 
captives.76  
According to Robert Davis more than a million Christians lost their liberty at sea or 
in land and were enslaved in the Ottoman Maghrib and in Morocco between 1530 and 
1780.77  The calculation excludes Christians enslaved in Istanbul or other regions of the 
Ottoman Empire, a population which would have raised these figures.  This may be a 
large number but if we compare it to the number of slaves held in the Iberian Peninsula in 
these years, it no longer seems inflated.  Alessandro Stella estimated that between 1450 
and 1750 around 700,000 or 800,000 black slaves passed through the Portugal and Spain.  
To this figure, he added 300,000 to 400,000 Ottoman and Moroccan slaves.  When 
adding the slaves born on Iberian soil, the Balearics, and the Canary Islands, the number 
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jumps to 2,000,000.78  Bono has conjectured that during the early modern period, at least 
two million Muslims from the Mediterranean were enslaved in Christian territories.79  
Despite the fact that more Christians were ransomed than Muslims, the majority of the 
slaves had not been ransomed; they had become an integral part of the society that 
captured them.80  
Christians who lost their liberty to corsairs in the high seas or in attacks on their 
village belonged to the reis (arraez in Spanish), the corsairs’ captain, and to those who 
funded the raid.81 Upon their return to the home port, the corsairs had to submit to the 
governor the list of the booty that the ship’s scribe prepared.  The governor was eligible 
for a share, slightly different in size in Algiers, Tunis, La Valette (Malta) or Majorca, but 
nearly ten percent of the total.82  In contrast, soldiers-turned-prisoners-of-war became the 
property of the governor or of others who funded the attack.83  The rest of the captives 
were sold in a public bid in the slave market.  This was a spectacular moment and became  
a commonplace in captivity narratives: slaves were made to march like cattle under the 
trained gaze of potential buyers who examined their bodies and teeth while the voices of 
criers who announced their age, profession, community of origin and price roared.  
Emanuel d’Aranda described his own sale in the slave market in Algiers in 1640 in the 
following words: 
A half dead old person, a stick in his hand, took my arm and walked me several 
times around the market; those who were interested in buying me questioned for 
my origin, my name and profession… they touched my hands to see [if the skin] 
was hard and callous due to work. Other than that they made me open my mouth 
to examine my teeth, to see if they could chew the biscuit provided on the 
galleys.84 
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James Amelang has noted the great attention paid to social classes in Spanish captivity 
literature.85  The fact that so many former captives narrated in detail their first sale 
reflects his claim.  In the slave market, as former captive João Mascarenhas recounted, 
nobles and priests found themselves treated as African slaves were in the Iberian 
Peninsula – “like new blacks (nègres) made to march from the ship to the customs 
house.”86  Pedro, one of the three protagonists in A Journey to Turkey (1557), put it in 
different words when he described the captives’ clothes: “the dress of the slaves is the 
same for good and for bad [people], like the monks’.”87  In other words, enslavement, to 
some extent, effaced previous social differences. The moment of the first sale, however, 
might have been exceptional in the degree to which it was ritualized and staged and in the 
extent to which it was stylized by redeemed captives; nonetheless, scholars have ignored 
the fact that it was part of a process and for most slaves only the first of several 
exchanges.  In that sense, Christian captives in the Maghrib constantly moved between 
what Igor Kopytof has termed commoditization and singularization.  In the moment of 
their sale, slaves were transformed into a commodity, but soon they were inserted into a 
household or some kind of a host group where they were partly re-socialized and re-
humanized until the next time they changed hands.88 
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Mercedarian and Trinitarian records, literary accounts, and Sosa’s Topography 
distinguish between three kinds of slaves owners on the basis of the prospects their slaves 
had to be ransomed.  One of the first, and certainly the most famous, to make that 
distinction was Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, whose narrator in the three chapters from 
Don Quixote forming the unit known as the ‘Captive’s Tale,’ described his days in the 
bagnio in Algiers: 
Those [slaves] that belong to the King as well as some [slaves] that belong to 
private individuals, and the ones they call ‘stockpiled,’ which is like saying 
‘public prisoners,’ who serve the city in public works and in other employment 
for the general good.89  
 
Cervantes described three classes of slave owners – [1] governors; [2] the aristocracy, 
including the nobility, wealthy corsairs, renegades and small proprietors; and [3] the 
common-wealth – and associated each to slaves’ prospects of regaining their liberty. 
While many captives of the governor and of other individuals were eventually ransomed, 
“These captives [the ‘stock piled’] find it very difficult to obtain their freedom, because 
they have no individual master, and there is no one with whom to negotiate their ransom 
even if ransom is available.”90  The records of the Orders of Redemption reiterate the link 
between owners’ identity and captives’ prospects of ransom.  These documents 
distinguished between the Pasha or Dey, other individual slave owners, and the Divan 
and also linked each of these classes with captives’ chances of ransom.91 The ransom 
expeditions the Orders sent to the Maghrib, however, were dependent on the cooperation 
of Ottoman pashas or Moroccan governors.  The latter issued passports that protected the 
friars on their way to Africa and during their stay there, and in return, Maghribi officials 
imposed their ransom agenda upon the Orders.  That meant that the Maghribi pashas and 
governors forced the friars to buy their own captives and those of their confidants first 
and only then captives of others in the city.  The Orders’ depiction of a tripartite division 
of slave owners, therefore, reflects their positionality in the “economy of ransom,” an 
economy stimulated by violence, piracy, selling of booty and ransom, which I analyze in 
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the last two chapters.92  This tripartite division of ownership will be further complicated 
but I first examine how slaves were employed, the professional stratification among 
them, and their involvement in an array of informal economies. 
3. Captivity and “Social Death” 
One of the main features of slavery, it has been argued, was the condition of 
foreignness. The slave,” Finley has argued, “was also a deracinated outsider – an outsider 
first in the sense that he originated from outside the society into which he was introduced 
as a slave, second in the sense that he was denied the most elementary of social bonds, 
kinship.”93  Orlando Patterson has put it in somewhat different words claiming that the 
slave, by definition was “a socially dead person… he was truly a genealogical isolate.”94  
Do these features characterize slavery of Christians in the Maghrib or even of Muslims in 
the Habsburg Empire? 
Captives must have experienced their captivity differently according to where they 
came from.  The captivity experience of a resident of Majorca, coastal Andalusia, or 
Mazara del Vallo in Sicily must have been very different from that of a Castilian from 
Valladolid or Salamanca.  Islanders and residents of Andalusia, which housed a large 
population of Muslim slaves, must have been used to interact with Muslims and hear 
Arabic.  Many islanders had extended commercial relations with the Maghrib and sailed 
back and forth between Spain and North Africa trading, ransoming Christians, and 
enslaving Muslims.  For some Majorcans, Canarians and Andalusians, the positions of 
pirate, ransomer, or captive meant different stages in complex professional trajectories 
often linked with commerce.  More than one Majorcan was taken captive two or even 
three times.95  “The risk of captivity,” as Fontenay has argued, “[was] normalized by the 
mentality of the period [and perceived] as an inevitable misfortune in the order of 
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things.”96 For such figures, the reality of life in the Maghrib in general and of the life of 
captives in particular was not unknown. In contrast, for a bourgeois from Madrid, or even 
a Galician fisherman, life in Algiers as a slave must have come as a total shock. 
And yet, even Madrileño captives were not denied claims on living kin across the 
sea.  On the contrary, as long as their masters believed they could sell them for profit, 
they encouraged their captives to contact their friends and relatives and arrange for 
ransom.  As chapters two and three make clear, even slaves who, due to their poverty, 
had no prospects of paying ransom or Muslims enslaved in Spain, who were ransomed in 
smaller numbers than Christians held captive in the Maghrib, could maintain contact with 
home by sending letters. Even if slaves had no relatives, they were not alone. Within 
prisons captives were grouped together into nationes (Spaniards with Spaniards, Italians 
with Italians and so on) like medieval university students or imperial soldiers.  Beyond 
the relative similarity of Romance languages, the Lingua Franca, the language slave 
owners often used to communicate with their slaves, served captives to bridge linguistic 
differences and form social ties.  Religious services were legal, and a variety of churches 
existed in the slaves’ prisons.  At any given moment one could find priests or friars from 
any possible religious order or creed in the slaves’ prisons.  Moreover, from the second 
decade of the seventeenth century, a Trinitarian hospital operating in Algiers provided 
captives with basic medical care.  French, English and Dutch consuls established 
consulates in the Maghrib throughout the seventeenth century, complementing the 
presence of the Trinitarians. This by no means denies that the trial of captivity was 
among the worst experiences early modern Christians could suffer.  Numerous texts 
recount the hellish living conditions captivity suffered by  their authors.  And yet, “natal 
alienation” does not capture the experience of captivity in the Maghrib.  Not only did 
many captives maintain kinship relations but ironically captivity enabled the formation of 
new social ties in the Maghrib and across the Mediterranean.  
4. Slave Labor and Informal Economies 
Slaves in North Africa and in the Ottoman metropolis were employed in a variety of 
labors depending on their skills, their ability to pay ransom, public and private need, and 
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the season.  Slaves trained in ship building professions – oar and sail makers, carpenters, 
and others – were employed in shipyards.97  Others, such as barbers, tailors, or 
shoemakers were employed in artisans’ workshops.  Unskilled slaves rowed in the 
galleys, chopped wood, and performed other kinds of manual labor.  Emanuel d’Aranda 
who was held captive in Algiers in the 1640’s, recounted in his autobiography how he 
pretended to be a poor soldier in order to avoid paying a large sum for his ransom.  That, 
however, marked him as unprofessional manpower and he was sent to work first in 
making ropes and later pounding wheat in a stone mortar.98  Others slaves toiled in the 
fields of their owners away from the bustle of the city and its port.  
In all of these jobs, slaves were inserted into new social hierarchies.  Even rowing 
in the galleys, a hard labor that “came to epitomize slavery for white Europeans in 
Barbary for Christians,” was professionally stratified, carried varying privileges and 
obligations, and placed its holders, the captives, in complicated hierarchies of power.99  
Robert Davis has pointed out two privileged positions on the galleys that slaves coveted – 
the scrivani, or slave secretary, who was responsible for keeping the ship log, and the 
vogavan (lingua franca) or bogavante (Spanish), the oar pace-setters.100  The pace-setters 
established and coordinated the rhythm of rowing, and acted as the leaders of their bench.  
But social and professional stratification was much more complex. Even among slaves 
who pulled the same oar there were better and worse positions.  This is suggested in 
Galán’s description of the circumstances in which he befriended Augustín, another 
captive, who later helped him: 
He [Agustin] was a very good friend of mine because since we left Algiers, the 
Pasha ordered me to pull the back oar, [the same] as Augustín’s, doing me a 
favor, because [normally] it was the veterans and the most spirited guys who 
pulled that oar. And this position is free from punishments and repeated 
castigations that are common on the galleys when bad things are done, [when] the 
[Muslims] give so many blows to everyone except those who pull the back oar, 
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who sit in the first bench near the stern, that forms the back of the galley; and for 
that, they call the rower of that bench the stern rower (espalder). And bogavante 
means ‘rows ahead,’ because he pulls the oar before the four or five or more who 
sit behind the [same] oar; and they call the first bogavante, the second outrigger, 
the third tercerol and the fourth cuarterol. And I, they bestowed me with the 
dignity of the fourth, because I was a boy, [and] because the fourth works less 
than the rest…101 
 
The appearance of professional sameness in references to work on the galleys conceals 
the differentiation revealed by Galán’s thick description of the four or five slaves that 
pulled each of the galley’s oars.  First, oarsmen pulling the last oar were exempted of the 
regular punishments to which others were subject.  Second, even among the oarsmen of 
the same bench there was a complex division of labor.  The pace-setter worked harder 
than the rest, had a greater responsibility, and received more privileges.  Others, like the 
fourth rower, had the benefits of a lighter workload.  Despite the fact that the pace-setter 
enjoyed more privileges than the fourth rower, from Galán’s point of view his position 
was better since it fitted his young age and physical shape at the time and saved him from 
beatings endured by other slaves.  If, as Galán shows, galley slaves perceived and 
experienced such close positions in the galleys as radically different, social stratification 
must have characterized other labors.  
Slaves also engaged in an array of informal economies producing goods and 
services, stealing, giving charity, and more.  Entrepreneurs could earn additional sums of 
money by opening small businesses such as producing brandy. Galán recounted how “the 
slaves who were most esteemed by the masters, like the galley’s stern rower, the barber 
and others… with some money that they obtain, make brandy and from that they make 
profit.”102  Pasamonte also mentioned a Christian captive who distilled brandy in a castle 
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near Biserta.103  The Englishman Hugo Ferez was captured on a ship that left Málaga for 
Alicante, and was taken to Algiers.  During the two years he was held captive, he saved 
money selling “wine, beer, cheese and other things,” and eventually ransomed himself.  
He saved so much that after paying his ransom, he still had at least “a thousand and two 
hundred reales in cash, and a quantity of cheese, clothes, and other goods in the value of 
a thousand reales.”104 Edward Webbe, who lost his liberty to the “Turks” in 1573, 
mentioned in his captivity account that he used his skills as an expert gunner to work in a 
fireworks display in the princely circumcision festivities of 1582.  Michael Heberer, a 
German from Heidelberg held captive by the Ottomans in the 1580’s, gained money 
during the winter by composing congratulatory poems for European dignitaries visiting 
the Ottoman capital.105  Others sewed and mended underpants or socks.  D’Aranda 
described how he sewed himself a shirt, but he was clueless about sewing underpants 
from the remnants.  “Seeing that, a Portuguese knight, also a slave, told [d’Aranda]: ‘my 
friend, I see clearly that you are not a tailor by profession.’ As he was saying that, he 
gave three or four aspers (a coin of little value of that country) to another slave who cut 
and made my underpants.”106  Captives later sold the clothes and little things they made 
investing the profits in social alliances and in improving their living conditions.107  
Jerónimo de Pasamonte, an Aragonese of the lower gentry’s ranks taken captive in 1574, 
recounted in his autobiography how captives in his company decided to send a letter to 
their owner complaining about Chafer Arráiz, their overseer, blaming him for stealing from 
the owner and from the Sultan.  Why did the captives care about the theft and how did they 
know about it?  According to Pasamonte, who objected to sending the letter, Chafer Arráiz 
“prevented the captives from practicing their petty theft and dirty tricks.”108  The captives 
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must have known that Chafer Arraíz stole from their master because of their involvement 
in the theft.  Pasamonte said little about the relations between the captives and Chafer 
Arraíz but mentioned that they used to bribe him in return for greater freedom of 
movement and the right to move unchained.109  Chafer Arráiz then cooperated with the 
captives until they felt that he had become a menace and consequently decided to try to 
eliminate him by contacting their owner directly. Captivity accounts are replete with 
similar stories.110  The basic food portions were not always enough to live on, and slaves 
had to steal in order to complement their diet, a practice overlooked by their owners.111 
Stealing and smuggling were not the only exchanges in which captives participated.  
Captives and renegades paid the priests who provided captives with religious services.  
Captives in Algiers gave charity to the Trinitarian hospital in the city.112  Christian 
captives also ransomed religious images that they later carried with them to Spain.  The 
former-captive Pedro Munjo de Nobero, for example, in testimony submitted in the 
inquisitorial tribunal of Majorca, complained that a local Majorcan thug stole from him 
“an altarpiece of our Lady which six years ago he had ransomed for six reales of eight in 
Algiers” and which he carried with him from North Africa planning to donate it to the 
shrine of the Lady of Aránzazu.113 Stealing, smuggling, and giving gifts were some of the 
informal economic practices in which captives were involved.  Often, these were survival 
strategies, ways of complementing food rations, arranging for protection, or gaining their 
liberty.  
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5. Professional Mobility 
5.1 Multiple Sales 
Occupational mobility does not only characterize the career of free individuals but 
also of enslaved captives.  In section three, I focused on two elements of captivity 
transformed into commonplaces in captivity narratives: (1) the stress on the initial sale in 
the slave market at the expense of later exchanges, and (2) the tripartite division of slaves 
based on who their owners and what their chances to retrieve their liberty were.  While 
that description is not completely incorrect, it suggests a static system that did not allow 
much room for mobility.  Yet dynamism rather than stasis characterized slaves’ life and 
labor.  The first sale did not determine slaves’ position for the rest of their bondage, and it 
was not the only modality of exchange through which slaves moved between owners and 
occupations.  Usually, slaves had little influence on the way they changed hands but in 
some cases, as we will see, they were in a position to affect their future.114  
The first master of Jerónimo de Pasamonte was a captain of a galley who bought him 
badly wounded, along with other captives at death’s door, as a second rate commodity for 
the ridiculously low price of 15 ducats.  He took him to Istanbul where Pasamonte recovered 
from his wounds and worked in his master’s garden hoeing the earth.  According to 
Pasamonte, he enjoyed freedom of movement in the city, but this was not enough for him.  
After talking with captives who worked in the dockyards, he became convinced that as a 
galley slave he would have greater chances of running away and returning to his land.  
Taking advantage of his master’s intention to sell two of his slaves, Pasamonte convinced 
his owner to sell him to Rechepe Baja, who had been recently nominated next Pasha of 
Tunis.115  He travelled with his new master for more than fifteen years to Tunis, Biserta, 
back to Istanbul, Alexandria, Istanbul again, the west of the Peloponnesus, Istanbul, Algiers, 
and Rhodes.  Then, Pasamonte switched hands and became property of Hasan Aga.  The 
latter married his daughter to Rechepe Baja’s son. When Hasan Aga died, only two years 
after he came to own Pasamonte, Rechepe Baja’s son inherited all his property, including 
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Pasamonte.116  The reconstruction of Pasamonte’s chain of masters suggests that he had five 
masters if we include the person who first sold him after his capture. It serves as a reminder 
how the stress of former captives in their autobiographies on their first sale, and the 
following scholarly stress on this first instance of enslavement, risks ignoring the dynamic 
processes of sales and re-sales which entailed transformations in the social status of 
captives.  
Inquisition records suggest that Pasamonte’s story was typical.  Cristóbal Benítez, for 
example, was twice held captive in the Maghrib: first, for ten years in Morocco and later 
in Algiers. While practically nothing is known about his first captivity, he described the 
second in detail to the Majorcan inquisitors, after his escape from Algiers and return to 
Spain.  This second captivity began in 1608, when, at the age of thirty-eight, Benítez was 
seized on his way from Cartagena, his home town, to Oran.  He does not indicate where 
but he was sold into slavery for twenty-five pieces of eight (reales de a ocho).  In 
circumstances that remain unclear, Benítez took advantage of the Arabic he had acquired 
during the years he spent in Morocco, stole clothes from a Muslim, and fled to Algiers 
where he lived as an Arab for a year as he sought an opportunity to escape to Oran.  At 
some point, he decided to execute his plan and left Algiers heading west. Less than fifty 
miles from Oran, near Mostaganem, a Morisco from Lorca (Spain) recognized, captured, 
and handed him over to Turks, who returned him to Algiers.  There he became the 
Pasha’s property, but the latter soon sold him to a Morisco from Valencia.  A little later 
he converted to Islam and escaped to Majorca with other captives.117  Not counting the 
number of times Benítez must have been sold and resold during his first captivity, he 
changed at least four hands during his second. Jacobo de Maqueda, a peasant from a little 
village near Calais, presented the inquisitors of Majorca with a similar trajectory. In 1620, as 
a child, he was taken captive by Saletan corsairs.  They sold him into slavery, and within a 
year his master sold him to a Morisco merchant from Algiers.  The latter soon sold him 
again to another Morisco from Tunis whose fields Maqueda worked for twelve years.118  
Years later, in 1689, the confession that the Castilian Bartholomé Martín de Castro gave in 
the same inquisitorial tribunal echoed a similar trajectory and long chain of masters.  Castro 
                                                 
116
 Ibid, pp. 73-74. 
117
 AHN, Inquisición, Libro 863, fol. 61, 9.16.1611. 
118
 AHN, Inquisición, Libro 862, fols. 81L-83, 5.4.1634. 
 41 
 
was taken captive at the age of twelve and sold in Algiers to a Turk who held him for eight 
months.  Then, his master sold him to his brother whom Castro served for a year.  Around 
that time Castro failed to arrange his ransom and his master forced him to convert. 
Conversion did not bring an end to his bondage but led to another sale.  Castro’s new owner 
was a barber and a tailor and after only seven years he freed Castro, probably in a mukātaba 
agreement.119 Slaves’ careers then did not end once they were sold at the slave market. 
Instead, they barely began there.  Through sales and re-sales slaves positions’ were 
worsened or improved as their status shifted.  Only by accounting for these multiple shifts 
can we understand the operation of this system of slavery as well as its meaning for slaves. 
5.2 Exchanging Captives: between Commodities and Gifts 
The previous examples demonstrate how slaves’ professional trajectories continued 
to develop between the moment of their initial sell and their ransom.  But the examples 
also indicate that sale was not the only mode through which slaves circulated.  One of 
Pasamonte’s owners inherited him. Other slaves also found themselves forming part of an 
inheritance. Jiovanni-Battista Castellano, a Sicilian mariner and later a Christian corsair 
taken captive in the last years of the sixteenth century, was enslaved by Solimán, a Sardinian 
renegade, whom he served for twenty years.  When his master died, Castellano, with the rest 
of Solimán’s household, became the property of one of the Solimán’s sons.120  Cristóbal 
Benítez was handed over to the Turks by Moriscos interested in the prize that they 
received for capturing a runaway slave.  Commoditization means the transformation of 
humans into commodity.  In the process, however, slaves also turned into a currency, and 
masters used them to pay debts or buy other things.  Diego Galán’s owner passed him on to 
Mamí Napolitano instead of a payment of a debt. From Galán’s point of view, as he 
indicated in his autobiography, his life improved under the new master who provided him 
with more freedom, responsibility and power.  But masters who passed their slaves on to 
others knew that this could mean a demotion for their slaves.  This is illustrated by the 
case of the Portuguese mulatto slave, Simón Gonzalves. In 1548 or 1549, as Gozalves 
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recounted to his Portuguese inquisitors, his owner, the corsair Caralym, threatened that if 
Gozalves did not convert, Caralym would give him to the corsair Arguiti as a payment for 
a debt Caralym owed Arguiti.121  The fact that the exchange was framed as a threat 
suggests that both master and slave knew the latter would suffer from the shift of owners. 
In other cases, slaves were exchanged for goods or services. Guillermo Roger, as the 
records call this Englishman, testified in his trial at the Inquisition how the Turk who 
bought him in 1633 in Sale held him for six months and then bartered him (“le trocó”) 
with a Morisco from Algiers.122  Often, masters gave slaves as gifts or bequeathed them.  
Gozalves eventually succumbed to his master’s pleadings and threats and converted to 
Islam.  Immediately afterwards, Caralym, his owner, gave him two Christian slaves as a 
gift.  In this case, as is apparent from Gozalves’ depositions, the gift formed part of a 
larger cycle of reciprocity that had begun with the conversion of Gozalves, and continued 
with the mentioned gift of the slaves and his inclusion in Caralym’s clientele.123  A later 
but not ultimate step in this reciprocal exchange was Gozalves’ later manumission.124  
The sources also mention cases of Muslims who bought captives with the hope of 
convincing them to convert and then adopting them.  In a letter that the Jesuit Blas Vayllo 
wrote from Algiers in 1609, he mentioned how an Algerian captain purchased his fellow 
Jesuit intending to convert and adopt him.  Vayllo frames this vignette within the context 
of Christian fear of forced conversions imposed by Muslim masters.  However, read 
along with Caralym and Gonzalves’ story, it seems like a part of an interactive dynamic 
of adoption and inclusion within a clan or a household.  
These dynamics complicate a binary perception of exchange in this system 
according to which slaves were sold and bought only for profit from their ransom or for 
their labor force.  They also demonstrate some of the reasons for which masters bought 
slaves.  While the prospects of profit and labor motivated many slave owners, others had 
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different agendas in mind.  As we have seen, slave owners bought slaves as an 
investment attempting to accumulate property which later they could pass on to their 
heirs; as a way of extending their households or networks of clients; or as markers of 
one’s power and wealth.125  Sale, the exchange of captives for money, cannot sum up the 
multiplicity of ways in which slaves changed hands nor the ways in which such changes 
affected their status, privileges and obligations.  
5.3 Short- and Mid-Term Exchanges 
The exchanges I have examined so far were final or long-term ones.  Slaves, 
however, also changed hands in cyclical, temporary exchanges. Such shifts were seasonal 
or daily.  In his Topography and General History of Algiers, Sosa described corsairs who 
did not own enough slaves to man their vessels and therefore hired others from merchants: 
The captain who does not own a quantity of Christians, enough to arm the 
vessel… can rent Christians from merchants who have them especially for hire. 
And from one merchant, he may rent two, four, six and eight and from another 
ten, twelve, twenty, thirty or however many he wants from among those who most 
please him and seem to be the most robust.126 
 
According to the description of Laugier de Tassy this was still a common practice in 
the early eighteenth century.  In the account this chancellor of the French consulate 
composed in 1724, he wrote that “masters who have many slaves rent them to the reis for 
work in the arsenals or for sailing.”127  Renters, he added, confiscated part of the plunder 
their slaves received instead of charging daily rent from the corsairs who hired them.128  The 
dey, for example, took two-thirds of the salary gained by the slaves he rented out.129  Slave 
owners “also rent them [their slaves] to foreigners established in the towns in order that the 
slaves would serve as servants in their houses.”130  Tassy referred to Christian consuls and 
merchants who provided the slaves with meals and paid their owners a piaster per month.131  
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Artisans and owners of small workshops also hired slaves.  The Venetian Antonio Chillier 
taken captive in 1638 was sold in Tunis to the son of a Corsican renegade who leased Villier 
to a tailor’s workshop.  Villier who probably passed on to his owner at least part of his 
salary, worked eight years with one artisan, another year with a second, and three more with 
a Majorcan tailor.132  
Seasonal cycles also played an important role in structuring slaves’ life and 
professional and geographical mobility.  This is most noticeable in the work of galley slaves 
as demonstrated in the following quote from Sosa’s Topography:  
It is true that certain corsairs sometimes have their own particular captives, 
masters of shipbuilding, and they use them at sea to arrange certain things. But 
once they are back in Algiers, these captives serve for nothing more than to help 
the foremen of the commonwealth, and they are charged with building and 
provisioning all the ships.133 
 
This quote reflects the dynamic nature of slaves’ labor.  Oarsmen pulled the oar and were 
placed within the social hierarchies that characterized work in the galleys during the 
summer season.  In the winter, they were reinserted into new social milieus and worked 
in shipbuilding in the public arsenals.  In his Account of Captivity and Liberty, Diego 
Galán made the same point explaining that summer and winter tasks, pulling an oar on 
the one hand, and serving food and cleaning on the other, were not exclusive, but rather 
complementary.  Many slaves were well acquainted with maritime and urban labor, only 
in different periods of the year.  Galán, for example, was in charge of his second master’s 
household in Istanbul but however well based and comfortable his position seemed to be, 
it was not fixed, and it experienced regular fluctuations with the change of seasons. 134  
Leaving North Africa for Istanbul, Galán was placed at the benches with the rest of the 
oarsmen and he occasionally referred to his workload.135  While all the captives could 
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rest upon reaching the harbor, Galán had to take care of his master’s needs, and thus the 
summer season meant more work for him.  Galán was not the only one to live this double 
life, and he dedicated a full chapter titled “On what the Captives Do during the Winter 
Time” (“De lo que hacen los cautivos en tiempo de invierno”) to this unique division of 
labor. 
At the same time, however, Sosa complicates the account of Cervantes and of the 
Trinitarians and the Mercedarians about ownership-based division of slaves.  In the 
beginning of this chapter, we have seen how Cervantes and the Orders delineated three 
groups of slaves according to their prospects for liberty: (1) slaves of the King or the 
Pasha, (2) of individuals, and (3) of the common wealth (public slaves).  While the first 
two categories of slaves had good prospects of being ransomed, slaves pertaining to the 
third often rotted in captivity until they died.  According to the above quote from Sosa’s 
Topography, however, membership in the second and third groups was at least partly 
seasonal and cyclical, namely slaves became “public” in the winter and “private” in the 
summer.  Seasonal displacement then entailed new kinds of labor, but perhaps more 
importantly, a shift in ownership.  Cervantes explained that public slaves were never 
ransomed because they had no owners with who to negotiate their ransom. The quote 
from Sosa, however, suggests that this was only true for the summer time and that at least 
some public slaves became slaves of individuals and as such could be ransomed.  While 
this quote shows the flexibility of the system it also points out the limited extent to which 
slaves could influence their living and working conditions, a theme examined in the next 
subsection. 
5.4 Forming Trust-Based Relationships 
To what degree could slaves influence their own movements between masters and 
positions?  And to what degree could they shape their working and living conditions? In 
their autobiographies, Galán, Pasamonte, Mascarenhas and others recounted instances in 
which they influenced their masters to sell them or others to buy them.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, Galán’s service under his second owner, Mamí Napolitano, had begun 
                                                                                                                                                 
cautivos del amo, porque como yo era lavandero de la ropa de mi amo, aunque llegase a un Puerto hecho 
pedazos de remar, mientras los otos descansaban iba yo a lavar, y con el jabón se me ablandaban los callos 
de las manos y luego volvía a hacer callos nuevos renovándose los dolores…”) Ibid, p. 103. 
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badly, when Galán’s credibility was at its lowest state.  And yet, according to Galán, the 
first words Mamí uttered to Galán after he had concluded the deal with the Pasha were: 
“be good and loyal, and I will treat you well!”136  Being aware of the potential benefits 
and advantages his new position promised, Galán dedicated himself to his job and tried to 
perform his duties as best as he could.  He testified: “I was trying to do it with much 
diligence.”137  He also learned to master Turkish, a skill that should have advanced his 
socialization.  His efforts were fruitful insofar as his owner and his sons came to like him 
a great deal: “and for that the owner, his sons and the rest of the staff paid me back with 
so much affection.”138  The affection Galán was awarded had concrete, material 
manifestations.  He had as much food as he wanted and after securing his own position in 
the household, he could create his own social network of dependents, friends and allies 
by distributing abundant food leftovers: 
And as far as it concerned the food, there was always plenty of it for me from the 
leftovers of their table, and [enough] to help some Spanish friends that were in the 
house, and particularly one from San Martin de Valdeiglesias, for being closer to 
Toledo than the rest…139   
A short while before Galán fled, slaves of Mamí’s household planning to flee invited him 
to join them, an invitation that might reflect the power Galán had gained in the house.  In 
addition, as guardian of his owner’s sons, Galán was free to move throughout the city: “I 
even got the liberty of leaving the house whenever I wanted to, and [I went] to wash the 
house clothing without chains or a guard guarding me until I return home.”140  Earlier, I 
mentioned that Galán complained about the extra chores that were his due in the summer.  
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However, it should be noted that the chores were also a reflection of exceptional trust and 
liberty.  Galán was allowed to disembark for his tasks with hardly any watch.  Later, he 
took advantage of this privilege and escaped.  On other expeditions, Mamí would go 
down with him to the shore and show him unique views and sights, as if he were his tour 
guide. 
The relationship between Galán, Mamí and his family was not fixed but rather 
developed over time as Galán’s status shifted and he earned more and more privileges.  
This development was not prescribed, but rather the result of the way he played his role 
as a household slave and wisely calculated his steps.  Galán gives the impression that 
Mamí and his sons came to depend upon him: “[a]ll the times that my owner’s sons went 
to certain celebrations or country parties with lunches they took me with them to serve 
them…,” an impression that is intensified in the second version of the account.141  
Galán’s status in the household challenges the popular image of slavery and slaves, as he 
seems more like a relative of his master rather than a slave.  It was a reciprocal process – 
Galán adopted Turkish language and probably Turkish manners, and in return Mamí and 
his family adopted him.  This relationship recalls Kopytoff and Miers’ portrayal of West-
African slavery in which the realm of kinship was intertwined with that of slavery.  “This 
chattel like position” of the slaves, they have argued “nevertheless lay on a continuum of 
marginality whose progressive reduction led in the direction of quasi kinship, and finally 
kinship.”142  While Galán’s trajectory is similar, it differs in the radical transformations of 
status Galán experienced each season.  From the status of a distant, but beloved relative, 
he was exiled to the oarsmen’s benches as if he had never been part of the family.143  
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5.5 Conversion 
In his Topography and General History of Algiers, Antonio de Sosa opens his 
discussion of renegades, Christians who ‘turned Turk’ in Algiers in the following words: 
‘Turks by profession’ are all those renegades of Christians blood and parentage 
who have turned Turk of their own free will… there is no Christian nation on 
earth that has not produced renegades in this city… Muscovites, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Valacos, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Bohemians, Germans, 
Danish and Norwegians, Scotsmen, Englishmen, Irishmen, Flemish, Burgundians, 
Frenchmen, Navarrese, Basques, Castilians, Galicians, Portuguese, Andalusians, 
Valencians, Aragonese, Catalanias, Majorcans, Sardinians, Corsicans, Sicilian, 
Calabrese, Napolitans, Romans, Tuscans, Genoese, Savoyans, Piedmontese, 
Lombards, Ventians, Slavs, Albanians, Armenians, Greeks, Cretans, Cypriots, 
Syrians, Egyptians, and even Abyssinians of Prester John as well as Indians from 
the Portuguese Indies, from Brazil, and from New Spain.144 
 
Conversion to Islam was a common professional strategy among Christian slaves in the 
Ottoman Maghrib and in Morocco. Slaves converted to improve the conditions of their 
enslavement, to be manumitted or socially incorporate themselves, to develop 
professional careers, to gain more freedom of movement in order simply to escape to 
Christendom or because they saw the light in Islam. In calling conversion a strategy, I do 
not mean to imply that no slaves converted because they believed in Islam or that none of 
the converts saw the light after practicing their new religion for a while. Rather I bracket 
the question of belief and focus on the way in which renegades and others talked about 
conversion and used it as well as on its social and professional implications.145  
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Renegades loom large in captives’ autobiographies, religious propaganda, and 
Inquisition cases.146 In each genre they filled a different function and were represented 
differently. In the autobiographies written by Spanish captives after their rescue and 
return, renegades were converted into a common place that enabled the authors of the 
autobiography to confront the threat associated with North African captivity and 
convince their readership that they had withstood the trial, remaining faithful to 
Christianity.147 In texts written by the Mercedarians and the Trinitarians, the discussion of 
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Es-Sa’di, Tarikh Es-Soudan, H. Houdas, Ed. And Trans. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1900.  
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I would be sorry for the bad life I would have to live, rowing in the galleys, being beaten with clubs, 
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renegades and their conversion was employed to stress the horrors of captivity, the risk 
Christian souls faced in captivity, and the need to give charity to the Orders to save as 
many souls as possible.148 A third corpus replete with accounts of renegades is formed by 
Inquisition documents recording the trials of renegades. Renegades who escaped to Spain 
or were captured by Spanish forces had to be examined at the nearest inquisitorial 
tribunal.  The inquisitors who investigated them were intent to examine both their words 
and their deeds asking them: what was said during their conversion, and when? what did 
they wear and eat after the conversion? how many times did they pray?  One of the goals 
of these trials was to reduce the complex process of conversion into a dogmatic scheme 
that enabled punishment or social reintegration into a Christian community. The script 
recounted by most renegades followed a similar model. It opened with the convert’s 
initial objection to conversion, continued with the physical pressure exerted upon him 
and the punishments he suffered before succumbing to the pressures, the recitation of the 
Muslim profession of faith – the shahāda – and wearing a Turk’s attire.149 The inquisitors, 
however, were also interested in other Christians who converted in North Africa, and 
renegades, together with former captives that testify in these trials, become the ears and 
eyes of the inquisitors in North Africa. 
                                                                                                                                                 
wearing poor clothes and eating poorly, and many other hardships, but turning Moor, I would not have to 
work, I would be dressed well and would eat well” (“después… volvió el bajá a darme otra rociada con 
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volviéndome moro no trabajaría, y andaría bien vestido y comería bien”), see: Ibid., 53-54.  
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Mercedes García-Arenal (éd.), Conversions islamiques. Identités religieuses en Islam méditerranéen. 
Islamic Conversions. Religious Identities in Mediterranean Islam, Maisonnneuve et Larose: ESF, 2001, pp. 
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One feature shared by these three corpora is the idea that Muslims forced their 
slaves to convert or exerted pressure on them to do so. Accounts written by European 
consuls in the Maghrib, however, challenge this image by framing captivity in economic 
terms. The Knight d’Arviex, for example, who in 1666 negotiated the ransom of French 
captives in Tunis on behalf of the French King, wrote in his description of his diplomatic 
mission there that “as for what they say that the Muslims force the captives by tortures to 
became Mahommedans, that happens only rarely and it can be said to be extremely 
exceptional.” Only the zealously devout, he added, want that and even they never force 
anyone to convert. More commonly, he claimed, women try to convince captives to 
convert and then marry them.150 Tassy actually asserted that Muslims objected to the 
conversion of Christians: 
Many people believe that they [the Muslim] force the Christian slaves to become 
Mohammedan…but the error is great. Rather than working to seduce them [to 
convert], their masters would be very angry if their slaves become Mohammedan 
despite the fact that they do not become free following their conversion.151  
 
This is reiterated in Spanish intelligence reports recording the arrival in Algiers of 
soldiers defecting from Oran. To the request of the soldiers to convert, the Pasha of 
Algiers replied that “he had enough Turks and he enslaved [the soldiers].”152 Masters, 
then, did object to conversion not because it entailed immediate freedom, but rather 
because, from a Christian point of view, it devalued captives. In other words, once 
captives converted to Islam, they were not ransomable anymore as Christians would have 
paid for the freedom of Muslims. For this reason, French consuls and others shared the 
opinion that Muslim masters deemed their captives too precious as commodities and 
excluding specific political circumstances that I analyze in chapter four, refused to allow 
them to convert. 
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2.10.1608. See also: Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age, pp. 88-90. 
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Conversion was not only and not always a change in one’s religious beliefs, 
practices or community of believers. It had social effects that went beyond the realm of 
the religious. The Knight d’Arvieux confirmed what we have seen earlier in the chapter, 
namely that conversion did not entail immediate manumission but rather a transformation 
in the status of the converted captive vis-à-vis his master. D’Arvieux explained that after 
converting, the slaves can pay their owners a monthly fixed fee determined by the Divan 
and wander around freely, but they still belong to their masters and it was up to the latter 
to decide whether they want to grant their slaves manumission.153  Not only were 
renegades not immediately freed but also their conversion entailed the formation of new 
social bonds as the converts were gradually inserted into their masters’ families.154 Often, 
masters married their daughters or sisters to their former slaves.155 This was the case of 
Juan de Payba, an Augustinian monk from the Canary Islands taken captive on a journey 
he made to Spain in order to be ordained as a deacon. He was taken to Algiers and 
enslaved there but was quickly ransomed by the friars of the Order of our Lady of the 
Mercy in 1668. However, during his stay in Algiers or perhaps even after his ransom, 
Payba and his former master planned a surprising future for the young Augustinian. A 
year after his ransom, Payba voluntarily returned to Algiers with another Augustinian, 
publicly converted to Islam, and married the sister of his former master.156 We do not 
have enough information about people who voluntarily crossed the sea to convert and 
start new life in Muslim cities but we can assume that their numbers were not high. And 
yet, the case of Payba demonstrates how conversion to Islam was linked with the 
formation of new family ties. Becoming part of a new conjugal unit or a member of an 
extended household were not the only ways in which renegades formed new families. 
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Many converts to Islam became Janissaries, soldiers of the Ottoman militia. Soldiering 
did not entail marriage for them but formed part of a kind of adoption. The new converts 
moved into the soldiers’ barracks and became members of a male fraternity; they even 
referred to their fellow Janissaries as brothers.157  At least in the short run, conversion did 
not result in more freedom but in new social ties. 
What about the converts’ former families? Did renegades give up on them? Did 
conversion necessarily result in a rupture with the social past? Dakhlia has suggested that 
in converting, renegades did not give up their former families and in some cases they 
brought their wives, children, or brothers to the Maghrib to live with them.158 There is 
only scant evidence for that claim, yet there are many more archival traces of renegades 
who maintained their family ties in Christendom. Renegades maintained such ties 
through letter exchange, sending money, and occasionally meeting their kin. Francisco 
Verdera, a Majorcan taken captive at the turn of the century and converted to Islam in 
Algiers, wrote to his aunt at least one letter after his conversion in 1606.159 Similarly, the 
Catalan Francisco Girbau continued to write to his father after he converted in Algiers.160 
In the next chapter, I analyze these and other letters that renegades wrote in detail. In this 
chapter, it is sufficient to point out that the medium of letter-exchange, as interrupted as 
its flow may have been, enabled renegades to maintain blood ties and friendships across 
the sea.  
Renegades who did well in their new life often sent money or supported their 
families.  A renegade whose name the sources do not disclose mediated the ransom of a 
certain Bautista Fernandez in 1589. The latter was ordered by the renegade to pay his 
debt to the renegade’s mother, to whom Bautista’s relative gave guarantees.161 Perhaps 
more surprising were the visits Christians paid to their converted kin who settled down in 
the Maghrib. Simón Pérez, for example, a Genoese who married an Andalusian and lived 
in Cadiz was the nephew of Mami Genoese, a rich Algerian renegade. Pérez frequently 
visited his uncle in Algiers staying there each time a few weeks. In early January 1619 or 
late December 1618, he went to meet Mamí but stayed only for seventeen days “because 
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he did not find [his uncle] who had left for the Levant… and as his [uncle’s] wife died at 
that time and [Pérez] did not know the other woman with whom [Mamí] was married.”162 
Their kin relation may have been imbricated by commercial exchange. Pérez may have 
bought galima, the moveable booty Mamí looted of Christians, redistributing it in Spain.  
Whatever the exact nature of the relations, Pérez’ visit shows that the relations between 
renegades and their Christian relatives were not limited to letter exchange;   they often 
met in person. The deposition that the Andalusian Lorenzo Jiménez submitted in the 
inquisitorial trial of a merchant accused of selling materials of war to the Algiers, is 
somewhat ambiguous and yet it points out how affective relations between Muslims and 
renegades on the one hand, and Christians on the other, continued despite the religious 
and geographical divide. Jiménez, who at the time of the trial was forty years old, 
testified that two years earlier, in 1665, he returned to Algiers where he had been held 
captive in the past. He explained that he went to give a gift to his former owner and his 
wife, Catalina Bruna, a Christian converted to Islam, who had treated him very well 
during his captivity. His relations with his former master and his wife were mediated by 
the obligations procured by gift exchange. As often is the case with gifts, however, it 
seems that Jiménez denied their reciprocal nature and experienced his ties to his former 
owners as affective and based on the sentiment of gratitude. Jiménez added, perhaps due 
to the fact that he was testifying in an Inquisition trial and did not want to become a 
suspect himself, that the wife was secretly Christian, and that he hoped to return to Spain 
with her.163  
Conversion then had deep social implications; it resulted in the formation of new 
social ties, yet it did not necessarily imply a social rupture as converts often continued to 
maintain old ties across the Mediterranean. While some renegades returned to 
Christendom independently or were captured, the majority, even if they continued to be 
in touch with their relatives, never returned and eventually became part of the social 
tissue of the Muslim Maghrib. In that sense, conversion could function for captives as a 
strategy to improve their living conditions, but eventually, it removed them from the 
system of slavery into which captivity initiated them.  
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6. Spatial Mobility and Social Networks: within the City and across the Sea  
Professional mobility, as we have seen, was a central feature of slavery of 
Christians in the Ottoman Maghrib and in Morocco. This is best encapsulated in the work 
of galley slaves who shifted between pulling the oar and working in the docks – being the 
property of individuals and belonging to the commonwealth depending on the season of 
the year. While we should not confuse professional mobility with agency, slaves could at 
certain points direct their professional careers either by conversion to Islam or by forming 
trust-based relations. An important feature of professional mobility that I have not yet 
discussed is the spatial mobility it entailed, as well as the ipso facto establishment of 
widespread and diverse social networks. Slaves moved across the Mediterranean from 
one port city to another and within the cities in which they labored throughout the year. 
In each of the places they stopped, they met new people, visited old acquaintances, and 
exchanged information and goods. 
In his autobiography, Jerónimo de Pasamonte provides a glimpse into the range of 
these networks. During his stay in Alexandria, for example, Pasamonte formed relations 
with Franciscans and Dominicans that stretched all the way to Jerusalem. At least part of the 
time, he was free to walk around in the city. This mobility allowed him to meet Franciscan 
friars, from whom, in the Italian fundago, he bought arms for one of the failing rebellion 
attempts in which he was involved.164 During the eighteen years he spent in captivity, 
Pasamonte sailed throughout the eastern Mediterranean meeting and communicating with 
various Orthodox Christians from the Greek Islands. As we have already seen, when the 
time was ripe, he decided to turn his back on his fellow captives and join forces with the 
renegade Chafer Arráiz, his overseer, who later helped him take advantage of his social 
network in the Greek Islands and arrange his ransom.  
Archival records provide further evidence as to how slaves established Mediterranean 
social networks. Damian Montenegro from Ragusa, for example, was one of a few that 
organized a spectacular slave rebellion in two galleys in 1589. Four hundred and twenty 
captives were set free within the course of a few hours while three hundred “Turks” were 
killed.165 At least one printed pamphlet, A True Account of the Victory and Freedom that 
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Four-Hundred Slaves Achieved, circulated in Barcelona, the port to which the captives 
navigated after taking over the galleys, celebrating the success.166 These captives worked 
months planning and preparing the rebellion and they risked their lives by buying arms in 
various ports over a long period of time. The part of Montenegro’s testimony in which he 
describes that process is worth quoting in full:  
Damián Montenegro, Ragusan, says that having been in Constantinople in the 
bagnio of the General Pasha of the Sea, he began negotiating that business [the 
rebellion] with Oraçio Agobiba Romano; and departing from Constantinople and 
arriving in Tripoli of Barbary, he continued to plan [it] with Oraçio Agbiba 
Romano and with Nicolo Riço, a Genoese renegade and servant of the Bey; and 
the latter gave me [sic] two swords for my ship; and departing from there we 
arrived in Bizerte where I returned to deal with the same two and with one-eyed 
Pedro Napolitano;  and [there] Oraçio Agbiba gave me a faked eye-bolt in order 
that in accordance with that one, I’ll prepare more; and departing from there we 
arrived in Algiers where he organized ten faked eye-bolts from the blacksmith of 
Morato Arraez and bought five swords for my ship.167  
 
In his prison cell in Istanbul, Damián Montengro, a subject of the thriving Ragusan 
Republic in the Adriatic Sea whose native tongue was probably some form of a Croatian 
language, negotiated with a Roman, whose mother tongue was probably the Roman 
dialect, a plan to flee captivity.168 The fact that they made the plans in prison suggests 
that it was the wintertime, yet they knew that once spring loomed they would be placed in 
the galleys pulling a heavy oar chained to their bench.  
At the same time and independently from their plot, other slaves of Hasan Pasha, 
were making similar plans. In Tripoli, Montengro, who later took command of the galley 
once the captives assumed control, met Riço, a Genoese renegade who led the rebellion 
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on the second galley and who provided him with two swords. According to Alonso de 
Peña, another accomplice, the swords were hidden in the galley – “he had two swords 
hidden underneath his bench with great risk.”169 Montenegro and Riço met again in 
Bizerte the next port in which the galleys of Hasan Pasha harbored, nearly a six hundred 
miles away from Tripoli. There, Riço and Montengro shared their plans with others and 
arranged false eye-bolts similar to the ones with which the Muslims cuffed the slaves. 
The arms and equipment were bought with money the captives had collected, probably 
through petty commerce of the kind discussed above. On the due date, the plot’s leaders 
signaled the signs agreed in advance, started attacking their guards, took over the galleys 
and sailed to Barcelona. According to Miquel Llot de Ribera who complied and 
published the above-mentioned pamphlet, the captives had been planning the rebellion 
for two or three years waiting for the right moment. Even if he was merely trying to 
aggrandize the victory with that detail, planning and preparing the rebellion must have 
taken weeks, probably months; it also required enacting a wide-spread social network 
formed by renegades and captives and others which captives were able to establish thanks 
to their mobility.  
7. Conclusion 
Captivity, then, was a system in which slaves constantly moved: between masters and 
occupations and in space – across the region and in the city. Examining the life of 
captives from the prism of the narratives a few captives penned after they were liberated 
and returned home, risks occluding these forms of circulation and exchange. Moreover, 
the stress of such narratives – as well as of records produced by the Orders of 
Redemption – on the moment of capture, on the first sale in the slave market, and on 
retrieving liberty via ransom, reifies captivity and portrays it as a world separated from 
that from which the captives arrived. In the world such narrative construct, upon their 
capture and enslavement, captives lose all contact with their home communities. 
Captivity, however, neither necessarily entailed the severing of connections with 
captives’ home communities, nor prevented the establishment of new ties between 
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captives and institutions at their communities of origin. The next two chapters complicate 
the history of captivity by focusing on the ways in which captives employed links with 
home to negotiate their captivity while in the process reinforcing and shaping such links. 
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Chapter	3:	
Spread	Rumor,	Recommend,	Complain	and	Threaten	
1. Introduction 
In chapter two, I examined the ways in which Maghribis captured, enslaved, and 
employed Christians, arguing that slaves’ professional and spatial mobility was a salient 
feature of the system of Christian captivity in the Maghrib. In this chapter as well as in 
the next, I turn to examine trans-Mediterranean social practices employed by Muslims 
enslaved in Spain and Christians in the Maghrib, practices that provided links between 
North Africa and the Habsburg Empire. In this chapter, I examine the dissemination of 
rumors, the construction of letters of recommendation, and the culture of complaint and 
threat in order to compare the ways in which these were understood and deployed among, 
first, Muslim and Christian captives, second, renegades, third, the political authorities on 
both sides of the Mediterranean, fourth, the Spanish Inquisition, and, finally, the kinsmen 
of Christian and Muslim captives.  
Within this divided and complex Mediterranean world in which seizure and 
enslavement were commonplace, rumor served as a form of transmission of knowledge 
about identity. Both Muslims and Christians spread rumors about the identity of Christian 
captives and of renegades, that is, Christians who converted to Islam during captivity in 
the Maghrib. Recommendations also served as a means of knowledge transmission: 
throughout the period, Christian captives wrote letters of recommendation for the 
Inquisition on behalf of renegades who expressed a desire to return to Christendom but 
feared punishment for their apostasy at the hands of the Inquisitors. Both Muslim and 
Christian captives felt free to send their sovereigns complaints when they believed the 
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latter to have sabotaged their chances of being freed, or when they needed help. Often, 
the latter kind of complaints resulted in threats, sometimes executed, that Algerian and 
Muslim authorities made to worsen the living conditions of Christian captives or to kill 
them in order to improve the conditions of Muslims enslaved in Spain. Throughout this 
analysis, I move back and forth between two scales: I examine how writing and textuality 
served captives locally – in a Maghribi city or Spanish island or region –but I constantly 
tie this to how they functioned on a Mediterranean level. In so doing, I demonstrate some 
of the ways in which the captivity and slavery of Muslims in Europe and of Christians 
within the Ottoman Empire and Morocco were tightly interrelated and interdependent. 
The lives of captives on one side of the sea were influenced by the actions of their 
counterparts on the opposite shore. Thus, in order to better understand the captivity of 
Christians in North Africa, on the one hand, and seventeenth century Mediterranean 
history, on the other, these histories are best approached from a perspective of 
“connected” history.170  
Whether spreading rumors, complaining or writing letters of recommendation, 
captives engaged in textual and discursive practices which transcend a merely 
representative function and act by influencing the captives themselves, the objects of 
writing, and the addressees. For instance, when captives wrote a letter of 
recommendation for a Christian who converted to Islam, their words – should the 
Inquisition accept them as true – had the potential effect of constituting the renegade as a 
Christian, by redefining the object’s religious identity. Thus, these letters prompted and 
pronounced a social transformation. The words that constitute such letters have no power 
in themselves. The letters become effective or “felicitous” only when, on the one hand, 
those desiring them, and on the other, their addressees recognize them as efficacious and 
those who wrote or uttered them as authorized to do so.171 But such letters had multiple 
effects. They also formed objects within a reciprocal exchange system – whose nature as 
such was denied – involving captives and renegades. Focusing on recommendations, 
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complaints and threats effectively reveals the social structure and dynamics in which they 
were employed.   
A focus on these practices and dynamics can make explicit the ways in which 
captives – by engaging multiple forms of writing – were able to weave webs of personal 
and political ties across sea. In the next chapter, I focus on various textual media 
(intelligence reports, urban topographies, and chronicles but also visual material such as 
maps and plans) that captives employed to transmit strategic information, and in the 
fourth, I analyze petitions for economic help captives sent to the crown, of which 
thousands survived and are archived in Spanish archives and libraries. Captives, however, 
also participated in larger cultural processes, such as those undertaken to promote saintly 
canonization advanced by the papacy. These they supported by transmitting testimonies 
on candidates for sainthood who had died as martyrs in North Africa.172 Their 
engagement in research and scholarship is attested by de Sosa’s work, Topography and 
History of Algiers, whose compiling I analyze closely in the next chapter.173 They 
undoubtedly used language, writing, and texts in a variety of other forms that did not 
leave archival traces. The examples examined here suggest that any captive who could 
write, sign his name, or ask others to write for him, employed writing.  When captives 
turned to writing, they did so less to represent the system that deprived them of their 
liberty than merely to survive. Writing for them was almost a matter of routine, as is 
attested by the mass volume of petitions for help archived in Spanish state archives.   In 
this sense, writing recommendations, spreading rumors, and complaining to their 
sovereign were all strategies of survival. 
 Despite the documented importance of engaging in multiple forms of writing in 
captivity, most studies of captivity rely almost exclusively on printed works: captivity 
narratives – mostly autobiographical literature but also plays, literary works and 
pamphlets.174 These narratives, written only by ransomed captives, were composed 
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months, even years, after their authors had returned home, at the moment when their 
agenda was to convince their readers they had remained faithful to their creed. Their 
works form an excellent corpus for the study of the ways in which captives employed 
‘ego writing’ as a means to ensure a Christian identity that had been threatened by their 
captivity in the Muslim Maghrib. While I make ample use of such sources, I want to 
insist on the importance of other sources captives composed. Captivity narratives pose 
two problems. First, only a minority of captives, among those who were eventually 
ransomed, wrote elaborated autobiographies that were published.175  By focusing 
exclusively on this genre, or mode of representation, rather than on an array of other 
forms of writing with which captives engaged, these narratives stop being truly 
representative of captives’ writing. Second, by exclusively relying on such narratives, 
scholars privileged formed literary narratives over fragmentary archival sources. These 
narratives, however, provide performed histories thus robbing the historian of his craft.  
Not only they are limited in what they reveal about captivity in the Maghrib but they also 
overshadow other forms of writing which, as I demonstrate, formed a common practice 
among captives.  
There are no libraries or special collections that systematically archive rumors. 
Rumors must thus be caught in the margins of things: autobiographies, petitions for help, 
investigations in the Inquisition, and in other documents.176 Rumors remain elusive, and 
have left only a few concrete traces in diverse places because they did not neatly fit into 
any logic classifiable in archival/bureaucratic terms. And yet, references to them abound 
in the sources, which usually fail to provide information sufficient to allow the 
reconstruction of the context of their appearance or how they functioned.  Yet the 
prevalence of the traces suggests their ghostly power.  Recommendations, complaints, 
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and threats pose similar difficulties. No registers of letters of recommendations or 
complaints that captives wrote exist; nor do bundles of threats made by Algerian 
governors rest in an organized and neatly catalogues manner on shelves in state archives. 
Such documents or references to them appear irregularly in bundles of petitions, 
investigations and intelligence reports. Thus, while I do not make claims about the 
volume of such textual practices, I argue that there are enough of them to justify their 
examination. An analysis of the ways in which these practices operated offers a new way 
of understanding captivity, the diversity of strategies that captives employed for their 
survival, and the ways in which they linked North Africa and the Spanish Empire. 
2. Writing Letters 
It is worth preceding the analysis of specific kinds of texts that captives wrote and 
sent across the sea with a more general discussion about the importance of letter writing 
for captives. Captives wrote and sent many letters to their families.  The practice was so 
common that a captive’s wife whose husband did not write had reason to complain, as did 
Franca Puda in February 1676 in a letter to her captive husband – “all [the wives] 
received greetings and letters from their husbands and I have received no letter nor 
greeting with which to console myself….”177  We can enumerate a few reasons for the 
remarkable epistolary activity of Christian captives. First, the failure of delivery 
encouraged multiple letters. Captives constantly complained about letters they sent which 
were never delivered.  For example, in a letter sent from Algiers in 1679 by Domingo de 
la Luz to his friend Juan de Hererra in the Canary Islands, De la Luz wrote that “…I 
wrote six letters to his Honor for which I have not received any response…”178  Francisco 
Veredera, also captive in Algiers, expressed similar worries in a letter to his aunt in 
Majorca in 1606 – “I am horrified [by the fact that] out of so many letters I wrote, I never 
received a response to any of them.”179  By writing more than a single copy, captives 
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tried to overcome the risk of lost letters and to ensure their arrival.  Like other letter 
writers in the early modern period, captives occasionally began their letters with a listing 
of the last letter sent, as if trying to keep track of the flow of communication. Diego de 
Tarfán de los Godos, another captive in Algiers, wrote his wife in October 1655, 
notifying her that he had already sent two letters replying to her last letter.180  To further 
facilitate the tracking of letters, writers also referred – to the degree they had the 
information – to the routes over which letters were being sent.  Thus, an unsigned letter 
addressed to Señor Manuel Jorge, and carried to Spain by the renegade Jusepe Brexa, 
mentioned how a previous letter the author had written was sent via Ceuta – “through 
Ceuta I wrote his honor giving him account of the state of the business of his son.”181  
These detailed, careful references reflect the large volume of letters written and sent, and 
also the difficulty of following them and verifying that they had reached their destination.  
Beyond the fact that writing was an efficient way of seeking funds for ransom, many 
letters traversed the long sea route because their captive authors never gave up the habit 
of communicating with their loved ones even after they had lost any hope of returning 
home.182  
Understanding that their best chance of securing funds was by writing home, 
everyone, including the illiterate, found ways to put their thoughts onto to paper.  When 
Juan de Hererra was asked if the handwriting and signature in the letter he received 
belonged to the captive Domingo de la Luz, he replied that “the said Domingo de la Luz, 
a friend… does not know how to write nor how to sign and thus the signature and the 
handwriting necessarily belong to a foreign hand just as those who do not know how to 
write are used to do when they want to write letters.”183  Illiterate captives were assisted 
by others in writing. In a letter to his mother from Tunis in June 1594, Jerónimo Gracián 
claimed that he spent so much time in captivity because “God wants me to stay more time 
for the help I give here to those Christians taking care of their souls and businesses, 
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writing their letters and dealing with their ransom” (emphasis added).184 The testimony 
of Ynés Hernández Sardiña in the Inquisitorial tribunal of the Gran Canaria, quoted in the 
previous chapter, reflects how such letters were often composed on behalf of illiterate 
captives writing to their illiterate kin, and thus had to be read in public by a third party. 
Being illiterate like her husband, Hernández Sardiña had to ask a friend to read for her 
the letter her husband sent her. The fact that illiterate wrote to illiterate, by necessity, 
enlarged the circulation of the information reported. Both the scribe and the person 
deciphering the letter for the addressee, as well as additional audience as in the above 
vignette, shared with the sender the information he sought to convey.  
Merchants, consuls, ransomed captives, Trinitarians and Mercedarians, and 
renegades all served as mailmen.  Diego Galán, for example, asked some Trinitarians that 
he had met in Algiers in June 1592 to deliver a letter to his parents.185  Usually, these 
mailmen carried more than one letter with them.  Jusepe Brexa, a renegade who escaped 
from Algiers in 1655, provided similar services to captives with whom he had contacts.186  
Similarly, Gaspar de los Reyes, another captive in Algiers, saved up money to pay his 
own ransom and then returned to Spain.  He later returned to Algiers independently in 
order to ransom other captives.  Before returning to the land of his captivity, various 
persons gave him letters to deliver to their enslaved relatives.187 Dom Patricio, a 
Portuguese captive in Algiers in the third decade of the seventeenth century, mentioned in 
the autobiography of the former captive João Mascarenhas, gave a renegade who left to 
Iberia “a bundle of letters” he wrote to his parents.188 
Muslim captives in the Habsburg Empire enjoyed similar, and partly parallel, 
mailing networks.  Juan Bautista, registered in the Inquisition record as a Polish sailor, 
served as mailman to Muslims enslaved in Mallorca in 1635.  Captured by agents of the 
Inquisitorial court, he failed to deliver the letters to their relatives in Bona and Tunis.189  
                                                 
184
 “…Dios quiera que assista más tiempo a algún provecho que aquí se haze en estos christianos 
acudiéndoles a sus almas y negocios, escribiendo sus cartas y tratando de sus rescates,” Gracián, Cartas, A 
Dª Juana Dantiscu, su madre – Túnez, 11.6.1594. Gracián was not the only one to provide such services. 
Emmanuel d’Aranda mentions a captive from Brabant, François l’Étudiant, who in the 1640’s provided 
scribal services for Dunkirkian captives, see: d’Aranda, Les captifs d'Alger, p. 45.  
185
 Galán, Relación del Cautiverio y Libertad de Diego Galán, pp. 95-6. 
186
 AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 933-2.  
187
 AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 1824-2. 
188
 “…[U]n paquet…” Mascarenhas, Esclave à Alger, p. 110. 
189
 AHN, Inqisición, Libro. 862, Fols. 189-195. 
 66 
 
The French consul in Algiers, who was accustomed to travelling to Mallorca so as to 
ransom Algerian captives there, must also have delivered news on behalf of the Muslim 
who remained in captivity. Even for captives, then, there was always someone who 
would carry a letter home and many captives took advantage of that technology of 
communication. Captives, however, as I now turn to demonstrate, did a lot more with 
letters than merely inform their kin about their health or to urge them to find money for 
their ransom.  
3. Rumors 
Miguel de Pando began negotiating his ransom soon after his capture by Algerian 
corsairs. But reaching an agreement proved difficult because “they [his captors] asked an 
excessive price from him,” the reason being that a Muslim enslaved in Spain, who 
eventually returned to Algiers, claimed de Pando belonged to a rich family:  
Because it was said in Algiers that he [de Pando] was the brother of the Inspector 
General (veedor) in the Armada of the Oceanic Sea, which office was mentioned 
because at the time, his brother, Antonio de Pando, was in Lisbon filling that 
office . . . because of the absence of [the office’ original] proprietor. And it was a 
Turkish slave of the general lieutenant of the artillery of the armada who spread 
that piece of news.190   
 
De Pando’s brother did temporarily occupy the royal position of which the slave spoke, 
but the position did not belong to him. And yet, this was enough to mark de Pando as a 
man of wealthy stock and to demand excessive ransoms for his rescue. This case 
demonstrates the ease and rapidity with which hearsay and news could cross the sea, here 
carried by a ransomed Muslim captive to information-hungry slave owners. Eventually, 
de Pando retrieved his liberty but the price he had to pay was far beyond his means.  
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Enslaved captives – both Muslims and Christians – and others spread rumors across 
the Mediterranean about the wealth, status, or religious creed of other captives.191 
Rumors whose objects were Christian captives claimed that the captives were rich or 
important and should hence be ransomed for a hefty sum. Christian captives themselves, 
however, also spread rumors as when, in their letters home, they reported the conversion 
of their neighbors, kin, and friends who were held captive with them. Such rumors were 
embedded in various textual genres and traces of them appear in the margins of petitions 
for economic help, inquisitorial records, autobiographies and other texts. In some cases, 
they were written, in others, writers describe the effects of rumors spread orally.  
It might be useful though to clarify what I mean by ‘rumor’ and how it differs from 
‘gossip,’ for example. Chris Wickham has recently offered a short definition of gossip 
that implies a give-and-take of information between those gossiping. “Gossip,” Wickham 
has argued, “is, simply, talking about other people behind their backs.”192 Likewise, 
anthropologists Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart claim that gossip “takes place 
mutually among people in networks and groups.”193 A distinction between ‘gossip’ and 
‘rumor’ Stewart and Strathern have made, which derives from their definition, is that 
gossip circulates in smaller networks or groups than rumors. The information I examine 
in this section, however, either did not form part of larger cycles of give-and-take of 
information (but it was certainly exchanged as I will demonstrate) or such cycles remain 
invisible to the contemporary historian. The definition Wickham offered and the 
distinction made by Stewart and Strathern, however, are helpful in distinguishing the two 
kinds of rumors I examine. Rumors that circulated to influence others’ ransom price 
usually served to forward the interests of the person circulating them; when Christian 
captives, however, reported about conversion of fellow captives to their kin, they were 
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delineating and recreating the boundaries of the groups to which they pertained – for 
example: Christian or Majorcan – thus maintaining the group’s unity. 
Rumors have the form of truth-value propositions, namely, they are either true or 
false. However, in this discussion, I bracket the epistemological status or facticity of the 
information I refer to as rumor and understand as rumor any information, regardless of its 
truth value, that the people who reported on it considered as untrue, inexact or partial. 
The story of de Pando demonstrates how inexact information could have grave results – 
hindering the ransom of a captive in this case – regardless of its veracity. Often, 
information turned into a rumor only after it became public. It might have disseminated 
before among small groups forming what Wickham, Stewart and Strathern would have 
called gossip, but it reached the archive in its later form as rumor widely circulating. 
Then it became a force influencing its object. However, in contrast to its public nature, in 
many cases, the identity of the person spreading the rumor was unknown and the people 
reporting about it used the passive voice or unattributed indirect speech. Another property 
of rumors is their performativity, i.e. their power to affect not only their objects but also 
the people spreading them. Rumors place those spreading them in a position of a knower. 
When they are taken as true, those spreading them present and communicate incorrect 
information as though it reflected the true state of affairs.194  
Word about recent events spread like wildfire in Algiers and other coastal cities, a 
theme I further analyze in the next chapter. For example, Hugo Ferez, the name Spanish 
sources attributed to a former English captive, testified in Cadiz in 1619 that a few years 
earlier, while being held in Algiers, he heard about a failed escape attempt by several 
Portuguese and Scottish captives. The scribe who took his testimony copied into the file 
Ferez’s explanation of his source of information “and the next day, the said Hugo Ferez 
heard about that from the Scots and it became public all over Algiers” [emphasis 
added].195 Various sources attest to the speed at which rumors spread in the city. A year 
after he was ransomed from Algiers, the Augustinian Juan de Payba returned to Algiers, 
converted to Islam and married the sister of his former master. Almost immediately, all 
                                                 
194
 As such, Strathern and Stewart claim, they resemble acts of witchcraft and sorcery, Ibid, p. 55. 
195
 My italics  “Lo qual supo el día siguiente el dicho Hugo Ferez, de los escoçeses, y fue publico por todo 
Argel…” ADMS, Leg. 4407, 2.11.1619.  
 69 
 
the Christians in Algiers knew about it.196 Francisco de Morales, who was held captive in 
Algiers at the time, testified in 1677 in front of the inquisitorial tribunal of the Canary 
Islands that he heard this news, “because it was publicly known among the Christians that 
were captured there.”197 
Rumors also affected the lives of individuals. The case of the Carmelite priest 
Jerónimo Gracián, confessor of Saint Teresa, held captive for two years in Tunis, is 
instructive in this regard.  Gracián was captured in October, 1592 on his way to Rome. At 
first, as he recounts, things did not seem too complicated.  In his Treaty of the 
Redemption of Captives, he describes how his first owner was willing to set him free for 
“a reasonable price.”198  However, having heard of his capture, some Christian captives 
lied to the Pasha of Tunis.  They alleged that Gracián was not a simple priest, but rather 
an archbishop on his way to Rome for elevation to the cardinalate. The motivation of 
these Christians remains unclear. They may have been rewarded for providing 
information valuable to Gracián’s master in negotiation over Gracián’s ransom price. 
According to Gracián they had “maliciously lied about him.”199 The honor these 
unidentified Christians falsely conferred on him became a burden.  Captives always 
attempted to appear poorer and of lower status in order to avoid a high ransom price.200  
This “newly respected status” put an end to Gracián’s hopes of returning home quickly.  
Based on this disinformation, the Pasha demanded thirty thousand golden escudos for 
Gracián’s freedom.201  
This, however, was not the only rumor circulating in Tunis that attributed to 
Gracián a status he did not actually have or wealth that he never possessed. At a later 
date, another anonymous party spread a rumor among the Janissaries that Gracián was an 
inquisitor who had burned some of the militia’s soldiers at the stake. He almost lost his 
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life because of this hearsay. Later, a corsair told the Pasha he “knew” who Gracián was, 
and advised the Pasha to exchange Gracián for Materráez, a corsair held captive in 
Naples: “if [Gracián] could not get Materráez who is [held] in Naples,” the corsair 
claimed, “no one could.”202  Finally, in what Gracián later insisted was a nationalistic 
retaliation for the Spanish occupation of Sicily, a Sicilian merchant “insinuated in the 
town square” that Gracián was a rich person – “they would pay at least six thousands 
escudos for him.”203 Eventually Gracian was ransomed, but the circulation of these 
rumors delayed his return home. The number of rumors spread about Gracián borders on 
the absurd, as he ironically recognized:   
If in Christian land, I was so criticized and passed over that I was not even worthy 
of being the cook of any religion in the world, in the land of Moors, I was 
promoted to be a great archbishop on his way to Rome to become cardinal and in 
a few days to become the gran papaz which is what [the Moors] call the pope.”204 
 
What his case demonstrates is how, despite their weak epistemological status, rumors 
regarding captives’ identities could have an immense influence on captives’ ability to 
negotiate a reasonable ransom agreement. 
Unlike this case, in which the sources reveal only the after-effects of rumors, other 
examples provide information about their overseas origins. In the following case, hearsay 
successfully sabotaged ransom agreements.  Taken captive by Algerian corsairs, 
Bartholomé Martín de Castro was sold three times before a Trinitarian friar negotiated 
with his third master an exchange in return for ‘a Turk,’ who was a slave of the Count of 
Monterrey from Galicia in the north of Spain. According to Castro’s account, when the 
‘Turk’ heard of the deal, he sent a word to Castro’s master telling him that “the father 
of… [Castro] was rich and that the Moors should try and get an elevated ransom for 
him.”205 As a result Castro’s master raised his demands and locked Castro in a little cell. 
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Eventually Castro who gave up on the hope of being ransomed converted to Islam hoping 
to improve his living conditions. He told this story during his investigation before the 
Inquisitorial tribunal of Majorca in 1689 after his return to Spain.206 As in the previous 
cases, the identity of the rumor monger ‘Turk’ slave is unknown, but Castro knows who 
his master was and can locate the origin of the information. Such rumors circulated 
across the sea with ease becoming available for masters and others. Epistemologically, as 
the cases show, their status was unstable and unfounded, and yet that did not make them 
less valuable, desirable or effective. 
Rumors could also lead to the captivity of those who believed they were immune 
from capture.  A Valencian who arrived in 1694 in Algiers on an English ship, Carlos 
Vidal felt he had no reason to be worried upon his arrival in the city that the Spaniards 
call the “den of Christendom's thieves” (Ladronera de la Cristianidad). To the best of his 
knowledge, he had done nothing that would have made the visit unsafe. More 
importantly, he possessed a valid safe pass that was supposed to protect him. And yet, 
upon arrival in the Algiers he was detained. A letter issued in the Majorcan viceroyalty 
reports the affair. The writer described how “it was easy to find someone who” had 
falsely whispered into the ear of the city’s governor “that he [Vidal] was the cousin of 
Cristóval Matheu.”207 Matheu had been held captive in Algiers a few years earlier and 
was set free after giving his word that he would take care of the ransom of Hasan, a 
Muslim enslaved in the Spanish royal squadron of Sardinia. Once he left Algiers and set 
foot in Valencia, however, he either forgot his promise or was unable to execute it.  Since 
the Algerians believed Vidal was Matheu’s cousin, “although [Carlos Vidal] was 
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protected by the safe pass of the embarkation, they [the Algerians] put him in chains.”208 
While webs of social ties linking the two shores of the Mediterranean allowed for 
sophisticated diplomatic instruments such as safe passes, connectivity had its limits. 
Notwithstanding the smooth flow of information, there was never enough of it and much 
of the information that circulated was incorrect. Yet, the need for data led to the 
acceptance of rumors, information whose veracity was dubious. 
The chain of rumors of which Gracián suffered suggests that rumors represent 
opposition both between and inside various groups – an anonymous Christian captive 
(Gracián was a cardinal), a Sicilian merchant (Gracián was a rich person), the Janissaries 
(an inquisitor), corsairs (an important ecclesiastic), and Muslim captives (de Pando’s 
brother was important and rich).  Spreading rumors, then, was an activity that potentially 
included everyone. People did it as a religious or national revenge, in an attempt to 
ransom relatives or to make personal profit. Some disseminated rumors through face-to-
face interactions; others sent word across the sea. Those spreading the rumors, targeted 
slave owners who used the information to ask more money for the ransom of their slaves. 
What does the willingness of masters to trust this kind of knowledge, which in many 
cases was soon exposed as false, suggest? Some captives claimed that slave owners made 
use of whatever information they could get their hands on when negotiating their slaves’ 
value and ransom price vis-à-vis their identity. The Flemish Jean-Baptiste Gramaye, held 
captive in Algiers between 1619 and 1625, made this clear in his diary. He noted that the 
Algerians “carefully search for and occasionally produce faked testimonies, make of you 
someone whom you are not: from a priest they make you a bishop; from a gentleman, a 
duke; from a soldier, a captain; from a mercenary, a merchant…”209 Regardless of 
whether there was any truth behind this observation, or if it was merely Christian 
propaganda, Gramaye’s words imply that Muslim slave owners were aware that – at best 
– they had only an impressionistic sense of who their captives were.  
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That Christians – both captives and merchants – spread rumors about other 
Christian captives was common knowledge among captives.210 Emanuel d’Aranda, held 
captive in Tunis in 1640, mentioned a merchant who, taking advantage of the mail 
services he provided, read captives’ letters to get information about their value.211  For 
this reason, d’Aranda wrote, “it was necessary for a new captive to dissimulate for a 
while until he would be well informed who was a liar and who was sincere.”212  He was 
thinking of slaves who served their masters as informers, befriending new captives and 
attempting to extract information about their value.213  With that knowledge, slave 
owners went shopping in the slave market and later negotiated profitable ransom deals. 
D’Aranda’s warning and the rumors suggest that nationalistic pride (the Sicilian 
merchant in Gracián’s case) or military esprit de corps (the Janissaries and Gracián) were 
not the only reasons for which hearsay circulated. Rumors, so it seems, became a 
currency in some Maghribi cities and those spreading them were trading in them in a 
market of information. While there is no direct evidence for the ways in which 
information was traded, thinking about rumors as a currency may explain some of the 
motivations of Christian and Muslim slaves to spread rumors. They could either profit 
from that or improve their living conditions. Such rumors were what anthropologist 
Robert Paine has called “a device intended to forward and protect individual interests.”214 
Unlike among the Makah Indians whom Paine has studied, however, rumors spread in the 
Maghrib did not only serve the strong, slave owners seeking to increase their profits. For 
captives, in some cases, disseminating such rumors were strategies of survival, ways to 
obtain a little money, arrange more privileges or more liberty.   
Christian captives were not the only ones to suffer from rumors, and in some cases 
they themselves circulated rumors about renegades, that is, Christians who had converted 
to Islam. Captives did so in the letters they send home to their kin. Beyond writing about 
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their health and complaining about the hardships of life,215 captives updated their dear 
ones about friends, kin, and neighbors who had converted. In the letter, delivered by 
Francisco Marques to Ynés Hernández Sardiña, the author recounted the conversion of 
the former captive Gaspar de los Reyes. In her testimony in the inquisitorial tribunal of 
the Canary Islands, Sardiña recalled how she received the letter and what the response of 
the people present was when they heard the news: 
Ynés Hernández Sardiña….[said] that after Francisco Marquez arrived from his 
captivity to locality of the Puerto de la Cruz… he went to see her since he was an 
acquaintance and nephew of her husband…. And he took out a linen bag in which 
there were many other letters and gave this witness the letter directed to her 
husband… and then she opened the letter in the presence of everyone who was 
there and gave it to one of the women, called María Fonte, present at the visit so 
she might read it; and among the news it contained, one bit was that Gaspar de los 
Reyes had turned Moor… And all the people who were present stood amazed by 
the news they heard read aloud in the said letter.216 
 
The testimony captures the shock effect that such news had on a local audience. 
Renegades who were denounced in captives’ letters risked the loss of continued relations 
with their kin networks.  
 Letters renegades wrote to their relatives in Spain reveal just such fears. On 
September 2, 1606, for example, Francisco Verdera who had converted to Islam in 
Algiers during his captivity wrote a letter to his aunt. He opened the letter with a question 
– “Aunt Berdera [sic]… I’m terribly horrified because I have received no response to the 
many letters I have sent. I don’t know what the reason is for that. I don’t know if it is 
because I turned Moor. The whole world knows that I was forced to do so…” [emphasis 
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added].217 Verdera stresses how he was forced to convert in the same breath that he 
acknowledges his conversion, thus arguing that the distinction between forced and 
voluntary conversions was important. He was afraid that someone had sent the word 
about his conversion without fairly representing the conditions under which he converted. 
He asked his aunt to ask his friend about it, one on whose testimony he knew he could 
count – “now you can find out [about it] from the patron Juan Maltes who was here when 
I was forced into it [into conversion].”218 Other renegades expressed similar fears. Eighty 
years later, in July 1689, Francisco Girbau, a renegade from Blanas, a village north of 
Barcelona, wrote a letter to his father from Algiers. He too complained about not 
receiving any letters from his family and also expressed his worry that this might be 
attributed to his conversion to Islam. He asked his relatives “not to believe news from 
anyone else, [since] all are lies.”219 Knowing how important the relations with their 
relatives were for some renegades, captives could employ this information in two ways. 
They could promise the renegades to keep their conversion in secret in return for favors. 
And they could punish renegades by informing the latter’s relatives about them, thereby 
delineating the boundaries of their religious community. Spreading these rumors should 
not be seen only as part of a relationship between captives and renegades. Once in Spain, 
such information worked in two ways: through webs of kinships and friendship which 
following the admission of news could serve to exclude the renegade, and through the 
Inquisition. For the Inquisition, an institution with strong long-term memory, such 
information was always relevant. The letter of Verdera, for example, found its way to the 
inquisitorial record almost forty years after it was written and sent and years after its 
author’s death. The Inquisition, which sentenced Verdera post mortem, summoned Juana 
Benonada, the nephew of Verdera’s aunt, who had kept Veredera’s letter for decades.220 
While I have focused on two kinds of rumors (about captives’ economic value and 
about shifts in captives’ creed), doubtless other kinds of rumors involving captives 
circulated across the sea. Unfortunately, as wide as their circulation might have been they 
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have left little or no archival traces. The rumors analyzed here share similar properties: 
they could serve as the weapon of the weak against former kin and friends who 
converted, other captives with more power, or as a source of income and privilege with 
which to improve the living conditions. At the same time, these two classes of rumors 
radically differed: information about captives’ value served individuals who sought to 
advance their own interests, but news about renegades served to unite group members by 
delineating and recreating the group’s boundaries while excluding members who 
converted.221 The former originated in the Maghrib or immigrated southward from 
Christendom; the latter was produced in North Africa and was sent up north. The 
importance attributed to such rumors demonstrates the contradictory nature of 
Mediterranean webs of connectivity. The production, circulation and consumption of 
such rumors assume, on the one hand, that news traveled fast across the sea and on the 
other, that information was always scarce and that there was always need of more of it. 
Rumors allowed the Inquisition a foothold in the Maghrib; to slave owners rumors 
offered a look into slave’s past identities across the sea.  
4. Recommendations 
In the first chapter I have analyzed some of the relations captives formed with 
masters and overseers. Captives, however, also established friendships and alliances and 
became involved in conflicts with other Christian captives and renegades. In many cases, 
relations between captives and renegades were mediated by the ties – real or imagined – 
that captives maintained at home and by the extent to which captives succeeded in 
making such ties visible. Interactions between captives and renegades could place 
captives in surprising positions of power, especially when the renegades sought 
legitimacy and absolution for their conversion from the captives. In so doing, renegades 
might have been motivated by an authentic sense of guilt prompted by the despising gaze 
of their co-religionists who had remained faithful to their creed. But they were also 
driven by the desire to return to home and by the painful awareness that should they 
successfully execute their plans, they would face the authorities – secular and 
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ecclesiastical – as well as their families, neighbors, and friends, and be required to 
account for their conversion.  
Keeping conversion a secret was practically impossible, and both captives and 
renegades knew that. In the previous section, I discussed how, in their letters home, 
captives informed their kin about those who had converted, as did other returning 
ransomed captives and merchants. In his captivity narrative, Diego Galán described the 
way in which a number of renegades and the Pasha of Algiers attempted to convert him 
to Islam. His description illustrates vividly the rapid circulation of this type of 
information across the sea and the serious consequences that its travel could unleash. 
Addressing his reader, Galán explained how he resisted the temptation to convert. 
According to his narrative, rather than turning to theological reasoning, the angel that 
helped Galán stay firm in his belief reminded him of his family’s honor: 
[T]he angel confronted me with my parents’ honor and [with the fact] that there 
are no secrets in this world and that as soon as I arrived back in my place and in 
Toledo, someone who knew me in Algiers and in Constantinople would appear, 
and that would be shameful…222 
 
Galán’s comments suggest that, even if he could leverage his conversion to Islam and the 
freedom of movement it would have afforded him in order to escape, upon returning 
home, everybody would know of his conversion.  
For Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian renegades, the return home also meant that the 
Inquisition would investigate and potentially punish them. In fact, in the same scene, the 
renegades who were asking Galán to convert said “…one day, with the liberty renegades 
have, when they rove lands of Christians, they can easily stay there and ask mercy from 
the señores inquisitors, as some have done.”223 The fear of the Inquisition was a mainstay 
among renegades, so whether they desired to return or were afraid of being caught and 
brought to trial, they turned to Christian captives asking for letters of recommendation 
with hopes that these letters might protect them when confronting their inquisitors. 
Captives could write letters of recommendation on behalf of these renegades, attesting to 
their ‘true’ Christian nature by providing mitigating circumstances for their conversion or 
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explaining how, despite their conversion, they kept helping Christians in need. These 
letters were meant to serve as insurance policies for renegades who wished to leave the 
Maghrib. Gracián described the practice in his Pilgrimage of Anastasio: 
There are many renegades whose heart is touched by God and who wish to escape 
to a Christian land to save their soul; and the only reason for which they stay is 
out of fear of the Inquisition saying that it would punish them unless they carry 
some testimony of a man of credit and renown who would testify that they had 
left for Christian land out of their free will and desire for catholic belief.224 
 
Gracián says little about the exchange involved and portrays the concession of such 
documents as disinterested: renegades sincerely avow their former creed and would ask 
Christian captives to provide a testimony to the inner change that they had experienced; 
the latter, in their testimony, tended to merely describe the reconversion of the renegade. 
The concession of these certificates is not characterized by the reciprocal nature of gift 
exchange, but forms a single transaction: the giving of testimony.  
In his Treaty of the Redemption of Captives, which also details Gracián’s 
experience as a captive, the meaning and function of such letters is more ambiguous. In 
this work, Gracián describes how he had himself written a certificate on behalf of a 
French renegade – “I have seen [them] bringing to Tunis and Binsart a large number of 
French boys… [T]hey [the Muslims] circumcise them by force... I gave a certificate for 
one of them for the Inquisition with which he escaped and arrived in Cagliari.”225 As in 
the previous quotation, Gracian does not explicitly link the issuing and concession of the 
document to an economy of gifts or even favors. He allegedly initiated the writing and 
giving of the certificate only because of the injustice involved in the forced circumcision. 
But the lines immediately following imply a more complicated connection – “I and other 
Christians convinced another (renegade) to get a boat of his master so that twenty out of 
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the Pasha’s captives, who were in Binsart could escape…”226 Gracián does not make the 
link explicit but this juxtaposition connects the help that renegades provided to the 
escaping captives with the certificates they received from them.  
Literary sources make references to this same practice, shedding further light on the 
power dynamics involved. In his comedy The Bagnios of Algiers (1615), Cervantes 
describes Hazén, a renegade, entering the scene where Lope and Vivanco, two captives, 
stand talking.227 Upon seeing Hazén, Lope asks Vivanco to lower his voice so that the 
renegade – a potential traitor and an enemy – will not hear their conversation. But Hazén 
surprises them by a request that marks him as a repentant Christian:   
With just your two signatures I’ll happily set foot on Spanish shores; I’ll have a 
favorable wind, a calm sea with smooth waves. I want to return to Spain, and to 
one to whom I must confess my childish and ancient error… [He gives them a 
handwritten note.] It states here that it is true that I have treated Christians very 
affably, without Turkish cruelty in word or deed; that I have aided many; that as a 
child I was compelled to turn Turk; that, though I go roving, I’m a good Christian 
underneath. Perhaps I’ll have a chance to remain in what for me is the Promised 
Land.228  
 
Cervantes explicates what Gracián left implied. Hazén does not humbly ask for a letter 
but rather demands that Lope and Vivanco confirm what he already had put in writing. 
For the sake of the play’s spectators, who cannot read his note, Hazén explains what he 
has written. On the one hand, he employs the same trope as Gracián, pronouncing claims 
about his interiority to explain that, although he roves foreign lands, he is “a good 
Christian underneath.” On the other hand, he frames his transformation from a Muslim 
self, formed in and through conversion to Islam, and his present Christianity in pragmatic 
terms, pleading them to vouch for his claims. The signs for his reconversion are 
embedded in practices, behaviors, and favors – he has “treated Christians very affably, 
without Turkish cruelty in word or deed… [and has] aided many.” Hazén makes an 
explicit reference to an exchange system between renegades and Christian captives – 
renegades, who keep the option of returning to Christianity open, help captives in goods 
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and services in return for absolution in the form of a certificate for the Inquisition. The 
captives’ response reaffirms the reciprocal nature of this exchange. Hazén’s words 
immediately quell Lope and Vivanco’s suspicions and Lope, happy to assist Hazén, tells 
him – “When the sinner mends his ways, he pays an advance on his salvation. We’ll 
happily provide the signatures you ask of us, for we have witnessed that all you say is 
true, Hazén, and that you are honest. May heaven grant that your course be as smooth as 
you desire.”229 The reference to a down payment becomes even clearer in Hazén’s 
following words: ”I will try to raise a mutiny on my galliot;” or, in other words, that he 
will organize a slave rebellion in the sea and help the captives enslaved on the galliot to 
take it over and escape to Spain. 
Recommendations form an element in an exchange between the author of a letter 
and the object of the letter, the person on whose behalf the letter was written. Letters of 
recommendation make a unique source. Unlike other sources, such as chronicles or 
autobiographies, letters of recommendation for returning renegades are both account and 
artifact: a tool with social relevance. First, these letters testify to Christian identity and 
the subjectivity of Christians who had converted to Islam: they change, or have the 
potential to change, a state of affairs by making a Christian out of a Muslim. But beyond 
that, the letter, as a material artifact, formed an object in an interaction of exchange. The 
letter itself – due to the qualities associated with it – was exchanged for other goods 
and/or services.  
References to this practice were not merely a literary trope. Similar references 
abound in trial documents and trial summaries (relaciones de causa) of renegades and 
others who were investigated and sentenced by the Inquisition.230 The Maltese Marcos de 
Bono, for example, captured at the age of nineteen, was sold into slavery in Cyprus and 
later taken to Istanbul. During his deposition before the Inquisition in 1634, he explained 
how he had taken advantage of the fact that he “knew how to speak the Morisco [by 
which he probably meant the dialect of Arabic spoken by Moriscos] language from 
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having spoken it often in his land” – and pretended to be a Muslim.231 He used his 
linguistic skills to avoid slavery, and, without ever converting to Islam, joined the forces 
of the janissary and was eventually positioned in Tunis. There he became acquainted with 
Christian captives to whom he recounted his adventures, explaining that, despite his 
position, he had never converted to Islam. His coreligionists took him to the church of 
San Antonio and introduced him to the local chaplain who provided captives with 
religious services. De Bono, who was plotting his return to Christendom, asked the 
chaplain to write a letter of recommendation on his behalf attesting to the veracity of his 
story. He received “a certificate written and signed by [the chaplain’s] hand dated 
September 6th 1633, Tunis… [telling how] the said Marcos was a good Christian.”232 
Later, he managed to escape, arrived in Majorca, and after presenting the document to the 
island’s inquisitors was absolved with only a light punishment. Jacobo de Maqueda, a 
Frenchman from a village near Calais, was captured by Algerian corsairs and was forced 
to convert when the French signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans.233 Later, during his 
inquisitorial investigation in 1634, he described how he got a letter of recommendation 
through a similar course of action: 
With hopes of leaving his captivity, and returning to profess the holy catholic 
faith in a land of Christians… before leaving [Tunis] to [rove] the high seas he 
arranged a testimony… given by the Christian captives who were in Tunis at the 
time… [which] he presented in the said hearing [the testimony was written] by 
three Carmelite priests and a redeemer of captives from the order of the preachers 
from the kingdom of Sicily.234 
  
Such letters were occasionally copied into Inquisition registers which thus provide 
more detail than literary sources about the exchange and its effects. Joseph Brexa, a 
Neapolitan captured as a cabin boy by corsairs and converted to Islam in Algiers, 
                                                 
231
 “y sabía hablar Morisco por hablarse de su tierra comúnmente,” AHN, Inquisición, Libro 862, fols. 83v-
84v, April, 1634. 
232
 “…[U]na fee escripta y firmada de su mano fecha en Túnez a los 6 de septiembre de 1633 de lo 
susodicho referido, y de cómo era buen christiano dicho Marcos…” Ibid. 
233
 Whenever peace treaties were signed, masters had to release subject slaves of the polity with which the 
agreement was reached. One way of avoiding that and the lose of the intital investment in the slave, was to 
convert the slave to Islam. I discuss this theme in chapter five. 
234
 …[C]on esperanzas de salir de su cautivero, y venir a profesar la santa fee cathólica a tierra de 
christianos, y del año de 1631 en esta parte que andava por la mar antes de salir tomo testimonio de todo lo 
susodicho que le dieron los rreligiosos cautibos que estaban en Túnez… como en efecto presento en la 
dicha audiencia de tres religiosos carmelitas y del rredemptor de cautivos del rreyno de Sicilia de la orden 
de predicadores…” AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 862, 4.5.1634. 
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managed to escape after spending seven years in North Africa and to reach the Spanish 
Peninsula in the autumn of 1655. Fortunately for the historian, Brexa submitted himself 
to the Inquisition’s familares in a small village in Valencia and eventually found himself 
before the region’s Inquisitorial tribunal.  Because the inquisitors copied them into his 
trial record, we have full transcriptions of the nine letters he carried with him.  In seven 
of them, the authors asked the addressees to assist Brexa. For example, in a letter to his 
wife, Diego Antonio de Tarfan held captive in Algiers asked her: 
What I beg you for the love of God is to host the carrier of this [letter] in your 
house and do what you could for him as if he were me because he is a man to 
whom I am heavily obliged and many times he saved me from hunger, and if it 
were not for him, I would have been lost, because he did for me what you would 
have done…235 
 
In another letter, de Tarfan addressed an acquaintance about the same matter: 
Because here [in Algiers], being a young boy, his owner turned him Moor by 
force, [and] his intentions [were] always to go to a land of Christians. And so if he 
should fall in the hands of the inquisitorial tribunal your honor would always 
serve as a mediator, and if by any chance he would be in need of money to buy 
clothes, your honor would do it as if it were me, and if it would be necessary 
during the time when he would not have a shelter to protect him, and during the 
days he may like to stay in that city, your honor would provide him with 
accommodation in your house, and if it would be necessary by any chance that he 
would like to go elsewhere. Your honor would help him with that.236 
 
These passages articulate the exchange in clear terms and illustrate its scope beyond 
merely providing character evidence. Brexa’s Christianity is mentioned, but the help 
asked on his behalf is justified by his actions – saving the author from hunger and helping 
him in many ways. The alleged inner transformation of Brexa was a condition for the 
exchange, but Brexa’s declarations on the matter were not enough and he had to express 
his religiosity through deeds and gifts. The fact that the behavior Brexa was expected to 
                                                 
235
 “Lo que te suplico es por amor de Dios que al portador desta lo aloxas en casa y agas lo que pudieres  
con él como si fuera mi persona propia porque es un hombre a quien yo le devo muchas obligaciones y 
muchas veses me ha matado el hambre, y sino huviera sido por el huviera perdido, porque ha hecho quanto 
puedes tu hazer por mí…” AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 933/2, 10.28.1655. 
236
 “Porque aquí siendo muchacho su amo le bolvió moro por fuerza, siempre sus intentos de yr a tierra de 
cristianos, y assi si fuere cosa que cayga en el tribunal de la inquisición siempre servirá v.md de buen 
tercero, y si acasso fuere menester algún dinero, para ayuda bestirse hágalo v.md como si fuere para mi 
persona propia, y si fuere menester el tiempo que estuviere desacomodado de ampararlo, y los días que 
quisiere estar en essa ciudad lo hospedara v.md en su casa, y si fuere menester que si acasso quisiere yr 
alguna parte lo acomodara v.md” Ibid. 
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perform matched the basic idea of charity and good works helped the participants deny 
the reciprocal nature of the exchange. 
Of course, not all letters had equal value. The higher a captured ecclesiastic's rank, 
the more valuable were the letters of recommendation and certificates that he issued. In 
“The Captive's Tale,” an independent unit formed of three chapters of Don Quixote, 
Cervantes implies that some letters were more valuable than others – “because some 
renegades used to bring with them certain signatures of principal captives when they have 
the intention of returning to a Christian land.”237 Gracián makes the same point. He 
complains about the rumors that attributed to him, first, the rank of a cardinal and later of 
an important inquisitor. These rumors meant that the Pasha of Tunis, his owner, 
overestimated Gracián's ransom value and refused to let him go for a price Gracián could 
afford. But a side effect of this inflated appraisal was that the certificates he issued were 
considered more valuable than those of other captives:  
And with that opinion according to which I was a great ecclesiastical prince, 
many renegades came to me asking me to give them letters for the Inquisition 
testifying they were returning to Christian land of their own will [and] because of 
the fear of the Inquisition many give up on returning....238 
 
Due to the intensity of the circulation of news, renegades and captives could not falsify 
such documents without risking punishment. In some cases, the Inquisition contacted the 
recommending captive to make sure the certificate was true. The French renegade who 
arrived in Sardinia with Gracián’s letter, for example, was first detained by the 
Inquisition, which wrote to Gracián to verify the veracity of the certificate.239  
This implies that social distinctions among captives and the means through which such 
distinctions were performed were partly mediated by the practice of writing letters of 
recommendation. Captives who successfully claimed distinction – based on rank, title, or 
wealth – could employ it in their favor regardless of its real value. But successful letters 
                                                 
237
 “Porque suelen algunos renegados, cuando tienen intención de volverse a tierra de cristianos, traer 
consigo algunas firmas de cautivos principales.” Miguel de Cervantes, Obras Completas, Aguilar: Madrid, 
1962, p. 1213. 
238
 "y con opinión de ser un gran príncipe eclesiástico, venían a mí muchos renegados que les diera cartas 
para la Inquisición, testificando que se iban de su voluntad a tierra de cristianos, que por el temor de ella se 
dejan muchos de venir.” Gracián, Tratado de la redención de cautivos, pp. 71-72. 
239
 Andrés del Mármol, Excelencias, vida y trabaios del Padre Gerónimo Gracián de la Madre de Dios 
Carmelita, Valladolid: Francisco Fernández de Cordoua, 1619, cap. IX. 
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could enhance one’s status. That the Inquisition occasionally authenticated a letter’s 
author reinforced hierarchies within communities of captives as well as the value of the 
certificates that ranked individuals could provide. 
Not only priests or nobles participated in such exchanges, however. Juan de Nicolao 
from Ragusa, for example, was taken captive with the rest of the passengers and crew of 
a Neapolitan ship, enslaved in Algiers, and from a certain point in time, lived there as a 
Muslim. In 1563, he escaped from an Algerian corsair ship and arrived in Almería in 
Andalusia. There, he was interrogated by the mayor, who suspected that he was a 
renegade because of his clothes. In his defense, Juan presented a letter of 
recommendation written by three or four captives who rowed on the same galley on 
which he had sailed along Christian coasts.  None of the captives was identified as a 
person of status. Unlike previously quoted letters, which were tailored to a particular 
addressee, this letter was addressed ‘to whom it may concern.’ The relative anonymity of 
its authors – they signed their names but they were not famous men – the fact they did not 
name the person on whose behalf the letter was written and only identified him as a 
foreigner – Nicolao was from Ragusa (Dubrovnik) – and that the letter was addressed to 
everyone required the deployment of textual strategies to bestow authority on its authors. 
The authors first testify to Nicolao’s Christianity – understood both in terms of belief and 
behavior: 
Sirs, (may) our grace favor and help, in all that would be possible, this youth who 
is carrying the present (letter), because he is a good Christian and always behaved 
well to Christians, and although he said, on the foist [a light ship], that he wanted 
to become a Moor, he isn’t actually a Moor, nor does he behave like one.   
 
Then, the authors ask the impersonal addressee to provide Juan with a job and help him 
economically until he gained independence. Their tone is assertive, and they attempt to 
create a presence and eminence that the letter otherwise lacks due to its impersonal 
nature: 
Therefore, Your honor, as I have it said, help him, and this (Nicolao’s 
Christianity) you can take as truth, because here we are, Bartolomé delBaeça (sic) 
and Gavriel de Espinosa and Juan de Gibraltar, by faith and testimony of truth, 
because should things be different than what is hereby written, we will pay with 
our lives.  And there is no more to add other than that you should help him with 
all the alms that you can, because he deserves it and because he is a foreigner, so 
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that he could live until he finds work. I am entrusting myself to Your 
Mercifulness, Bartolomé delBaeça and Gavriel de Espinosa and Juan de Alcántara 
Miguel de Limán.240 
 
Again and again the writers claim presence – “because here we are,” “I am entrusting 
myself to your mercifulness.” But ironically, perhaps, the more frequently they iterate 
these assertions, the less convincing they sound. Either because of the letter’s impersonal 
character or because of its excessive rhetoric, the mayor who investigated Nicolao was 
not impressed. The letter was copied into the file, but Nicolao was released from his 
prison cell only after several witnesses who had known him in Algiers testified on his 
behalf.  
The letter’s failure – its rhetoric of compensation representing the weaknesses it 
sought to overcome – brings into relief both some of the performative aspects of such 
documents and some of the properties of the Mediterranean’s connectivity. Through the 
use of such letters of recommendation, captives came to occupy two positions. Whether 
the letters worked or not, by employing a witness’ voice, testifying to the religious nature 
of the subject, captives – usually thought of as commodities – enacted a legal persona of 
which, surprisingly, captivity had not deprived them. This point further demonstrates how 
Patterson’s idea of natal alienation, of a person deprived of all ties to his home 
community, is irrelevant in the context of slavery of Christians and Muslims in the 
Mediterranean. Christian and Muslim captives kept the statuses they possessed in their 
home communities, including the legal privileges these statuses entailed, and often took 
advantage of them.  In so doing, they placed themselves in a position of power. First, they 
signaled themselves as having the power to determine the religious identity of another. 
Their words within these specific institutional contexts and situational features could 
                                                 
240
 “Señores, este mancebo que lleba la presente nuestras mercedes lo faborezcan  e ayuden en todo lo que 
fuere posible, porque es buen xristiano e gazía todo bien a xristianos, e aunque él dezía  en la fusta que 
quería ser moro, no lo hes en verdad, ni tiene hobras de ello. Por tanto vuestras mercedes, como tengo 
dicho, le ayuden y esto pueden aver por verdad, porque aquí estamos Bartolomé delBaeça y Graviel de 
Espinosa e Juan de Gibraltar para en fee e testimonio de verdad, porque quando otra cosa fuera de lo 
escrito, lo pagaremos con nuestras personas. Y no ay más que escrevir sino que le ayueden con toda la 
limosna que se pudiere, porque la meresce y porque es hombre forastero, para que pase su vida hasta que 
halle en qué trabaxar. Me encomiendo a vuestras mercedes, Bartolomé de Baeça y Grabiel de Espinosa e 
Juan de Alcántara Miguel de Liman.” Archivo de la Alhambra, Leg. 122-12, apud Juan Martínez Ruiz, 
"Cautivos precervantinos. Cara y cruz del cautiverio." Revista de filología española 50 (1967): 203-256, 
239. 
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make a Christian of a Muslim. The structures of mobility and the complicated webs of 
connectivity linking the Maghrib and Christendom facilitated rapid exchange; but the fact 
remained that people in Spain, France, and Italy knew less about what was going on in 
North Africa than those present there. Such letters shaped strategies that – far beyond 
serving the needs of renegades – enabled inquisitors and others to negotiate the 
fragmentary knowledge that they had of the Maghrib and of the life of the Christians who 
lived there. And yet, being aware of the epistemological limitations of the genre, 
inquisitors and others encouraged further strategies to qualify and verify the knowledge 
embedded in such letters.  The preference of renegades for letters from priests was one 
such strategy. It suggests that the Inquisition also preferred such letters. As Gracián 
mentioned, however, his was not always enough, and inquisitors did attempt to contact 
the authors of such letters and ensure their authenticity and truthfulness. Second, at least 
in letters of the personal kind, captives maintained and acted upon social and familial ties 
in Christendom which had persisted despite the distance and disconnection imposed by 
the experience of captivity. Moreover, Christian captives managed to make these 
networks visible and to convince renegades of their effectiveness so that the latter could, 
in turn, aid the Christian captive in escape and in survival. Writing letters of 
recommendation, however, was not the only practices captives employed to enact social 
and political ties across the sea and to improve their situation as captives. Complaints and 
requests were two other forms that the next section analyzes. 
5. Complaints, Requests and Threats 
Less surprising than letters of recommendation were the complaints that captives 
submitted to the Spanish crown. There are a few indications that Christian captives also 
took advantage of the Muslim legal and administrative authorities, occasionally bringing 
charges against their masters; but overall the evidence for this dynamic is scant.241 More 
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 For example, ACA, Consejo de Aragón, Leg. 993, 4.28.1692; Gracián, Tratado de la redención de 
cautivos, pp. 75-76. See also his description of these events in his Peregrinación de Anastasio, in Ibid. pp. 
120-121.  See also:  d'Arvieux, Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux, p. 45. On the history and function of this 
position of the kadi, see: E. Tyan and Gy. Káldy-Nagy, Ķādī (Brill, 2008); available from the following 
website: http://www.encislam.brill.nl.proxy.lib.umich.edu/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_COM-0410. On 
the increase in the power of the kadi in the Ottoman legal system during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, see:  Haim, Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 66-71. 
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evidence reveals that Christian captives complained to the Spanish crown both about its 
policies, which they saw as damaging, and about the unjust behavior of Christian 
merchants active in the Maghrib. Like rumors and recommendations, embedded in such 
complaints is the assumption that their authors, the plaintiffs, knew more than their 
recipient – the monarch – even though the complaint concerns the recipient’s actions. Yet 
the performativity of complaints catalyzes much more potent reactions than do rumors or 
recommendations. In submitting their complaints, captives demanded that the crown act 
in a way that went beyond simply establishing the Christian identity of a former convert 
or the wealth of a captive’s kin.  
 Let us start by examining two cases of complaints Christian captives sent to the 
crown. In 1579, several Spanish soldiers held captive in Istanbul convened in their prison 
cell to write a carta de poder to the Spanish crown. The captives, the majority of whom 
had been captured in Tunis and La Goleta in 1574 and eventually taken to the Ottoman 
capital, addressed the behavior of Giovanni Margliani, a Milanese operating in Istanbul 
as an ambassador for the Spaniards on whose behalf he negotiated a peace treaty with the 
Ottomans.242 The captives claimed that Margliani misused the money he received from 
the crown for their ransom.  Instead of spending it on their rescue he had used it to 
ransom Milanese captives. The captives went on to discuss the inefficient assistance that 
the Crown’s representatives offered them within the Habsburg’s Italian territories. They 
focused on the viceroys of Sicily and Naples, and their administrations. Spanish captives 
ransomed traveled west in order to return home. On their journey they usually stopped in 
the Habsburg Italian territories, Naples or Sicily. Those among them who were former 
soldiers, upon arrival in these viceroyalties, expected the authorities to provide them with 
economic support to pay their debt to the intermediaries who ransomed them. The 
prisoners called on the king to order his viceroys to serve the captives more efficiently: 
[His majesty] would be served by ordering the viceroys of Sicily and Naples that 
whenever a slave is liberated . . . [the viceroys], without delays and excuses, find 
out the debt [the crown] owes such a man… [and] order to pay him so that he 
could pay his creditor, because it happens that it takes six months and sometimes 
even a year to verify the said sum [the captive owes] . . . 243 
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 On Margliani and his mission in Istanbul, see: Braudel, The Mediterranean, pp.1152-1165. 
243
 “…Será servido de mandar que los virreyes de Sicilia y Nápoles siempre que algún esclavo fuere en 
libertad… sin poner dilaciones ni escusas averigüen la quenta de los pagos que a de aver el tal hombre… se 
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The authors wrote on behalf of captured soldiers to whom the crown owed salaries for 
their years of service prior to their captivity. Those among them who managed to pay 
their own ransom did so by borrowing large sums of money from intermediaries, a theme 
examined in chapter four.  When captives were unable to pay their debt, debtors could 
order their imprisonment, this time in a Christian land.  
In the absence of additional records, it is impossible to determine how effective 
this specific letter of complaint was. However, as with the accounts submitted in the 
Inquisition, the fact that plaintiffs complained, suggests that they believed in the potential 
power of their claim to change a situation and thus regardless of the success the 
complaint achieved, it is worth proceeding to analyze it. Like the authors of 
recommendations and those who spread rumors, the complainants claim that their 
knowledge about the issue at hand is superior to that of the recipient of their message. In 
so doing, they not only claim specific knowledge about persons and events but they also 
place themselves within the position of authority on such knowledge. But unlike rumors 
and recommendations, the authority of knowledge that the captives stake out regards the 
recipient’s action, i.e., the policies of their king and their execution. They were not 
directly criticizing the monarch per se, but rather accusing his representatives. And yet, 
by complaining about the royal elite, and by claiming to know better how Spanish 
officials truly behave, the captives place themselves in a surprisingly powerful position. 
They are able to do so because their claims concerned events in territories distant from 
the royal court, stretching deep into Spain’s principal enemy’s capital. Moreover, the 
actions over which they complained touched them as the unlucky ‘beneficiaries’ of the 
king’s actions. Yet, at the same time, they are aware that their claims might be weak due 
to their position as imprisoned captives with almost no access to the political corridors 
where the actions they refer to took place. Their use of the notarial genre of carta de 
poder is an acknowledgement of that and an attempt to validate their claims. 
Ten years later, in 1589, Spaniards held captive in Algiers sent a complaint to the 
crown regarding the King’s approval of several ransom deals, which included the 
                                                                                                                                                 
le mande luego pagar para que pueda pagar a su acreedor porque subcede pasarse seis meses y aún un año 
que no se acaba de averiguar la dicha quenta…” AGS, Estado, Leg. 491, 11.1579. 
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exchange of Christians enslaved in the Maghrib in return for Muslims enslaved in Spain. 
The captives did not challenge the idea of an exchange of Muslims for Christians, but 
they expressed fury over  the rates of exchange on which the deals were based. In the 
complaint they sent to the Council of War (Consejo de Guerra), they argued that the 
crown freed rich Muslims in return for poor Christians, in other words, that the king paid 
too much and got too little. In so doing, the crown inflated ransom rates and sabotaged 
their chances of returning home:  
In Barbary, they have been making profit by giving a poor Christian for a wealthy 
Moor from your Majesty's slaves [,] and even if it is true that one engages in good 
works when a captive leaves [captivity] in return for a Moor, one causes damage 
to the rest of the captives because following that the [Moors] raise the ransom 
[prices] saying that if such a poor Christian won them a Moor that was worth that 
much… and as a result ransoms cost a lot.244 
 
The crown’s actions, the captives argued, signaled to Muslim slave owners that they 
could and should ask for more in return for their Christian slaves. Unlike the letter from 
the captives in Istanbul, the captives in Algiers did not employ a legal form to strengthen 
their claim. But in this case, we have a record of the monarch’s response. The king 
ordered a halt to such exchanges for the reasons listed in the captives’ complaint. I do not 
want to overestimate the success of their letter here, for the crown’s policy remained 
indecisive on this subject throughout the seventeenth century. While orders against such 
exchanges were regularly issued, captives’ kin continued to petition the crown for his 
slaves, and royal officers continued to provide them with slaves to ransom back their 
relative held captive in the Maghrib.  Despite this continued back and forth, the complaint 
did wring a temporary halt of ransom deals, demonstrating its inherent potential to 
provoke action. Through the medium of the complaint, then, addressed in this case to the 
sovereign in respect to his actions perceived as damaging to his subjects, captives helped 
link together the Maghrib and Spain. The king’s actions had an immediate effect on the 
slave market in Algiers and thereby on slaves’ lives. But captives were not completely 
powerless and could take measures designed to return the market to its previous state.  
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 “…[Y] aunque es verdad que se haze buena obra al cautibo que sale por el moro, hazese mala a todos 
los cautivos porque con esto les suben los rescates diziendo que tal christiano pobre le dio un moro que 
valían tanto y quieren al respecto que cada uno vaya subiendo y con esto cuestan muchos los rescates…” 
AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 268, Fol. 200, 1.3.1589. 
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Complaints of this kind – captives writing to their sovereign complaining about the 
sovereign – seem to have been the exception. More common were complaints that 
Muslim captives sent to the sovereign about their living conditions or injustices they 
suffered . Such complaints often encouraged sovereigns to issue threats intended to 
protect their subjects. On December 13th 1603, for instance, “a Turk entered the Divan [in 
the city of Algiers] with a letter in his hand asking revenge for his brother who was 
burned in the galleys of Spain; he (the burned brother) was a reis and his name was 
Caravali.”245 Everyone present became agitated and a consensus was formed – four 
priests should be burned as revenge for the Turk’s death. The next day, a larger Divan 
meeting convened. The corsairs, however, forming one of the parties represented at the 
Divan, unanimously objected to the revenge saying “if they would burn Christian 
[captives] every day, what would be of the [corsairs] roving the seas and often falling in 
the enemy’s hand.”246 The parties did not reach an agreement and left the matter 
unresolved. This incident succinctly captures the dynamics of complaints and religious 
violence across the sea. An unidentified Muslim slave – “a Turk” – was executed in the 
royal galley on which he was probably pulling an oar. His mates to the oar sent the word 
home. Immediately upon hearing the news, his brother went to the governing Council 
waving the letter he received with the news and asked for vengeance. The Corsairs, 
however, fearing to become the next victim in a blood feud, objected and nothing 
happened. In some instances, however, revenge was taken and captives were mistreated 
or even executed.  
Throughout the seventeenth century, Christian sources – Trinitarian and 
Mercedarian propaganda and literary works – reported how, on several occasions, 
Algerian, Moroccan and other Maghribi authorities radically altered the lives of captives 
for the worse.247 At times, it was claimed, the Maghribi authorities restricted the religious 
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 “Entro en la aduana un turco con una carta en la mano pidiendo venganza de que habían quemado un 
hermano suyo en las galeras de España el qual hera arráez cuyo nombre hera Caravali….” AGS, Estado 
Leg. 198, 12.13.1603. 
246
 “…[S]i cada dia quemaran cristianos que que sería dellos andando en corso y viéndose cada día en 
manos de sus enemigos…” Ibid. 
247The most paradigmatic example is Sosa’s Diálogo de los mártires de Argel which offered its reader a 
catalogue of atrocities Christian suffered in Algiers before they were finally killed, Antonio de Sosa, 
Diálogo de los mártires de Argel, Emilio Sol, Ed., Madrid: Ediciones Hiperion, 1990. Most captives’ 
autobiographies include similar descriptions, see: Mascarenhas, Esclave à Alger, p. 119. At other points of 
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liberties that captives had previously experienced, preventing them from practicing their 
Christianity. At other times, they allegedly executed Christians without reason.248 These 
sources also claimed that the Algerians and other Maghribis constantly broke their word 
and violated ransom agreements by refusing to let the captives who had paid to go free. 
On the basis of such claims, Christian propaganda argued that Maghribi cities were 
lawless spaces in which captives’ lives were dominated by capricious Muslims 
irrationally acting upon their feelings and arbitrarily punishing their slaves in cruel ways. 
In the rest of this section, I examine such instances by focusing on the threats that North 
African authorities made on the lives of their captives, and, on instances in which they 
did, in fact, execute captives.249 I demonstrate that the dramatic worsening of captives’ 
living conditions, in most of the cases I was able to document, came as a response to 
complaints from Muslims, enslaved in Spain, to their Maghribi sovereign. Muslim slaves 
complained that they were forced to convert to Christianity and were being deprived of 
their religious freedom. On the basis of documents composed by Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians, who could not be suspected in a desire to portray the Muslims as just, I 
argue that North African authorities warned their Christian counterparts before executing 
such violent measures. Often, these threats contain references to preceding complaints 
and hence reflect larger social dynamics and point out not only Mediterranean networks 
of connectivity but also the effectiveness of complaints and their importance as captives’ 
weapons against their masters.  
Such moments of violation of standards resulting in violence were not exceptional. 
Christians and Muslims enjoyed different religious privileges, but these privileges and the 
norms guiding them were acknowledged on both sides of the sea. These norms were 
                                                                                                                                                 
his autobiography, however, Mascarenhas also capture the reciprocal nature of such violent moments, see: 
Ibid, pp. 113-116.  
248
 Such killings occasionally occurred but they should be examined within a longer dynamic which, while 
not justifying the killings, present them as a response to earlier deeds.  On Saint Thomas day (December 
21) of 1594, the Morisco Monfadal, a royal official in Tétouan, killed twelve captives as a punishment for 
an attempt to escape. The surviving captives wrote home and protested. On Januarys 16th, the Corregidor of 
Gibraltar wrote the King expressing his difficulties in preventing the relatives of the killed captives to 
revenge and kill Muslim slaves from Tétouan as revenge. He urged the King to contact the Moroccan 
Sultan and demand that Monfadal liberate other captives as compensation or be punished, see: AGS, 
Guerra Antigua, Leg. 423, fol. 71. 
249
 On the behavior of threats, see: William Ian Miller, “Threat,” in Belle S. Tuten and Tracey L. Billado, 
Eds. Feud, Violence and Practice: Essays in Medieval Studies in Honor of Stephen D. White, Ashgate, 
2010, pp. 9-27, esp. 9-14. 
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never codified, indeed the records hardly ever refer to them, and they manifested 
themselves only when violated. Whenever the daily routine was broken by stricter curfew 
limitations, religious repression, or worse, slaves’ executions, enslaved captives noted 
such violations in the accounts they left. Vicente Colom, a Catalan enslaved in Algiers in 
the first decade of the seventeenth century, who operated as a spy for the Spanish Crown 
and documented the main events in the city, meticulously related such moments in his 
diary. On August 19, 1602, for example, he wrote about how “the [Algerians] decreed 
curfew laws [imposing] chains and handcuffs and [declared] death penalty for any 
Christian walking around day or night.”250 It is unclear when the curfew was cancelled 
and the regular routine reestablished, but four and a half months later, on January 8, 
1603, Colom mentioned the imposition of other harsh laws:  
They issued a cruel edict [ordering] the destruction of all the churches, forbidding   
masses to be offered under a death penalty,  and they ordered that the… legal 
authorities in this land pay a visit to all the prisons and break and destroy all the 
[religious] images they could find …251 
 
A Valencian priest caught saying mass a few weeks later, on January 25, was severely 
punished by one hundred blows, “only for saying the mass and the [Algerians] were on 
the verge of burning him.”252 This curfew lasted for such a long time that the chronicler 
commented on its duration: “and although they say that in the past the (Muslims) 
imposed curfews, none was maintained for so long and none lasted so much time as this 
one does.”253 Colom never explains what he means by a long time. But an entry in his 
diary from May referring to recently published and implemented curfew laws suggests 
that the January restrictions were annulled less than four months after their imposition. 
The new laws ordered “all the Christians to be chained and every two [captives] to walk 
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 “A 19 hecharon bandos de cadenas y manillas y que ningún christiano caminasse de noche ni muy de 
mañana si pena de la vida,” AGS, Estado, Leg.198, 8.19.1602. 
251
 “se hecho un vando rigurosso que se desiziessen todas las yglesias y no se dixese misa pena de la vida y 
mandaron que… la justicia visitasse todos los baños y que rompiesen y quebrasen todas las ymagines que 
hallassen …” Ibid, 8.1.1603. 
252
 “… [A]l mismo día dieron cien palos de muerte a un sacerdote clérigo valenciano llamado Mossen 
Navarro  solo porque havía dicho missa  aun estuvieron a pique de qumallo de que huvo sospecha en el 
baño de su patrón Morato Arráez.” Ibid, 25.1.1603 
253
 “…que aunque en los tiempos pasados se dize sean hechado otros bandos ninguno se aguardado ni 
durado tanto como este…” Ibid. 
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in pairs chained one to the other and that they shave their beards and hair and that they 
don’t wander around very early, late or on Friday the prayer day, but rather be locked.”254  
The careful recording of such shifts marks them as exceptions to a rule whose form 
the documents loosely delineate. Routinely, Christian captives in the Maghrib – at least 
the majority of them – were allowed to wander around day and night, and over the 
weekdays, unchained. They could openly practice their religion in one of the few 
churches operating in Algiers. Colom’s diary does not provide enough detail, but it does 
imply that when Muslim authorities wanted to change this routine and violate the daily 
order they had to follow legal-administrative procedures. The Divan, the governing 
council, had to convene, and the issue was debated between the Janissaries, the corsairs, 
and the governor before a decision was made. It is true that such procedures do not 
exclude violations of religious freedom or cruel behavior of individual slave owners. 
Trinitarians and Mercedarians did not always exaggerate and even the Knight d’Arvieux, 
who criticized their propaganda as “pious lies” and claimed that the treatment of 
Christian captives in Tunis was fair, acknowledged that “there are bad-tempered slave 
owners, hard, nervous and even cruel.”255 The point is that, as a rule, there were norms 
regarding the treatment of slaves and their violation had to follow institutional 
procedures. D’Arvieux explained that slaves were well treated because they were a 
precious commodity – “the Turks have an interest to be careful with theirs [their slaves]: 
among them [the Turks], these [slaves] are commodities, they buy them in the best deal 
they can, and sell them at the most expensive price they can. They would risk losing their 
money if they were to treat their slaves so badly as to make them ill and even cause their 
death.”256 D’Arvieux economic reductionism, however, cannot explain the cases I 
analyze here in which Maghribi governors preferred to protect their subjects even if that 
entailed destroying their goods, namely their slaves, and diminishing their future profits.  
                                                 
254
 “… que todos los cristianos truxessen cadena y andubiese de dos en dos con una cadena y se repassen la 
barba y cabello y que no anduviessen muy de mañana ni tarde ni el viernes que es el día de su çala no 
saliessen en todo el día sino que estuviesen cerrados…. “AGS, Estado, Leg.198 
255
 “Il est vrai qu’il y a des patrons de mauvaise humeur, durs, fâcheux et même cruels,“ d’Arvieux, 
Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux, p. 44. 
256
 “Les Turcs ont intérêt de ménager les leurs: c’est une marchandise chez eux, ils les achètent au meilleur 
marché qu’ils peuvent, et les vendent le plus cher qu’il leur est possible; ils s’exposeraient à perdre leur 
argent s’ils maltraitaient leurs esclaves au point de les rendre malades et de les faire mourir.” Ibid. 
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Colom rarely offers causal explanations on these bursts of aggression, but he 
juxtaposes them with events that the Algerians understood to be strategic threats and 
which might necessitate stricter security in the city and allows his readers to fill in the 
gaps.257 Letters sent by Algerian and Moroccan governors to Spanish authorities shed 
more light on the circumstances in which violence erupted and further restrictions were 
imposed. In 1589 for example, unidentified Muslims in Tétouan threatened to burn three 
Christian captives from the city of Gibraltar and to do the same with all captives from 
Gibraltar that might be captured in the future. Two friars, Trinitarians or Mercedarians, in 
Tétouan on a ransom mission, served as couriers for the Muslims and sent the news, 
through Ceuta, to Gibraltar.258 According to the message, the Muslims were reacting to 
news that they had received about the intentions of the Inquisition and the governor of 
Gibraltar to burn Ameto Melexi, an enslaved Morisco originally from a village near 
Marbella in Andalusia. Melexi was a corsair whom the Spaniards captured and enslaved 
numerous times, but who constantly fled back to North Africa.259 According to the 
Inquisition Melexi not only reconverted to Islam in North Africa and hence was 
considered a renegade but also was guilty of capturing and enslaving many Christians.  
It is unclear how the affair ended, but it was not an isolated event. In May 1603, a 
few Muslim slaves escaped from the Habsburg’s Sicilian galleys, which, at the time, were 
anchored in Cartagena, in the south of Spain. The runaway arrived in Algiers and 
reported that the Spaniards captured the galley of French Morato (Morato Françes), a 
Maghribi corsair, and that in Murcia, six renegades of Morato’s crew were burned at the 
stake. The renegades in Algiers were enraged and, at the next meeting of the Divan, 
demanded that six captive priests be burned in revenge.260 The threat was not executed, 
and unfortunately, Colom, who reported the event in his diary, does not provide 
additional details. About a decade later, in 1615, the Majorcan Hyeronimo Contesti, a 
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 In the two and a half weeks preceding the curfew of January 19th 1602, rumors about Spanish agents 
sent to the Kingdom of Cuco – Algiers’ near enemy – roared the city and terrified the population – “caused 
great commotion,” (“…causo grande alboroto en la tierra…”), AGS, Estado, Leg. 198 1.8.1602.  In the 
third, seventh, and eighteenth, Colom reported how the agents were heading to Algiers and communicating 
with captives and renegades in it. The curfew seems like a response to the situation. The curfew in May 
was imposed immediately after the army left the city for its triennial power demonstration and tax farming 
in the towns, villages, and encampments that surrounded Algiers.  
258
 AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 247, Fol. 141, 10.4.1589. 
259
 AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 247, Fol. 142, 10.4.1589. 
260
 AGS, Estado, Leg. 198. 
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former captive in Algiers, returned to Majorca, now as a renegade, submitted himself to 
the inquisitorial tribunal in the island, and unfolded his story. He had been taken captive a 
year earlier and sold into slavery in Algiers. He managed to negotiate a ransom deal 
which he nearly finalized. But, while he was already on a boat that was about to set sail 
and return him to his island, the Divan ordered his arrest. The Divan was reacting to news 
from Majorca, Contesti recounted, that Majorcan owners of three Moriscos slaves from 
Andalusia threaten to burn them if they would not convert to Christianity. Contesti was 
detained together with another Majorcan captive, Bartolomé Vidal, and the two were 
forced to convert to Islam as revenge.261   
These early documents allow the formulation of a few hypotheses about religious 
violence within the context of Mediterranean captivity. Eruptions of violence in Algiers 
and other Maghribi cities seem to have been dominated by the logic of challenge and 
riposte.262 One of the parties, be it of Spaniards or Maghribis, behaved in a way that the 
other would perceive as a violation of the conditions that captured subjects deserved. A 
riposte followed, sometimes elevating the price – for a burned Muslim, three burned 
Christians and so on. Majorcan captives paid for violations of religious freedom in 
Majorca, and residents of Gibraltar, paid for actions taken against Muslims in Gibraltar. 
Moriscos demanded revenge for violence exerted on Moriscos, renegades for violence 
exerted on renegades. This is only the outline of a model, and doubtlessly, in practice 
things must have been messier and in some cases bloodier. Surprisingly, the ‘go-between’ 
that mediated these violent exchanges between Maghribi and Spanish authorities were 
Trinitarians, Mercedarians, Franciscans, and other friars. Surprisingly, because these 
friars were responsible for the production of pamphlets and images portraying one 
dimensional violence against Christians.  
Later documents provide more detail about these interactions. In January 1663, for 
example, Alonso de Jesus, a Franciscan friar posted in Algiers, sent an urgent letter to the 
Council of Aragon. He reported that the Divan ordered “to burn all the priests and 
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 AHN, Inquisición, Leg. 861. Fols. 142-143V 9.4.1617. 
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 On the logic of challenge and riposte, see: Pierre, Bourdieu, “The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyle 
Society.” In J.G. Peristiany (ed.) Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. pp. 191-241. 
Transl. P. Sherrard. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965. A similar logic governed blood feuds in 
Iceland, see: William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 182-187,  
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images, destroy the churches, and that the redemption [a short name for members of the 
orders of redemption] be enslaved.”263 Was the Franciscan surprised by the atrocious 
measures? Did he demand that the crown retaliate? On the contrary. He explained that the 
governor of Algiers was reacting to letters Muslims enslaved in Andalusia had sent to 
him. The slaves claimed that six other Muslim slaves from the Port of Santa María near 
Cadiz, six from Sardinia (then under Spanish rule), and one from the Andalusian town of 
Alcalá de los Gazules were arrested shortly after paying the ransom fee that their masters 
demanded. In addition, the slaves reported that Christians were desecrating bodies of 
Muslim slaves in Sanlúcar de Barrameda. Alonso Jesús acknowledged the injustice of the 
actions and asked that the Spanish governors immediately amend the situation allowing 
the Muslim slaves in their jurisdiction to bury their dead according to their custom 
“because what they ask is just.” The Council acted rapidly and ordered that such actions 
be stopped and that manumitted slaves would not be arrested. 
While participating in and enhancing a cycle of violence, the Algerian retaliation 
was also a communicative action, a warning that order in Algiers be reestablished by 
maintaining an acknowledged standard of living – some religious freedom and fair 
execution of ransom deals – which Muslim slaves in the Habsburg Empire deserved. The 
records suggest that these incidents were not isolated but rather reoccurring chronicles of 
violence foretold. A few documents from 1644 shed light on the early stages of these 
chronicles. Yusuf of Tlemsen (a city to the west of Algiers), a slave of a Sevilian noble, 
was arrested and put to work as a galley slave almost immediately after his manumission, 
without having committed any crime, and in spite of carrying manumission records that 
proved he was a free man on his way back to the Maghrib.  In the complaint he submitted 
to the Spanish Council of War on March 9, 1644, he demanded his immediate release, 
adding that  
In Barbary, they never detain Christians who paid their ransom;, and by detaining 
in Spain the Moors who had paid their ransom, [the Spaniards] create a situation 
in which in Barbary they would do the same with the Christians, a thing that 
would result in notable damage to many Christians because there are much more 
Christians than Moors who are ransomed.264 
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 “…[Q]uemar los sacerdotes y las imágenes, destruir los templos, y que quedase esclava la 
rredempción…” ACA, Consejo de Aragón, Leg. 607, Fol. 33, January 1663. 
264
 “Pues en la Ververía a ningún christiano se le detiene después de haver pagado su rescate, y deteniendo 
en España a los moros después de haverse serrescatado sera dar ocación a que aque en la Ververía hagan 
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Yusuf’s complaint suggests that Muslim slaves were able to master the Spanish legal and 
administrative repertoires and employ them in moments of acute need. More importantly, 
it points to the connectedness of Mediterranean slavery and the relational nature of the 
violent reprisals that followed violations of enslavement and ransom standards. Likewise, 
it demonstrates the role that Muslim slaves played in making visible for the Spaniards the 
interactive nature of such violations. By referring to how Maghribi authorities allow freed 
Christian slaves to return to Christendom – "in Barbary, they never detain Christians who 
paid their ransom" – Yusuf implicitly expressed his expectations that the Spaniards 
would let him go. But he does more than merely voice his private anger with and hope 
that the individual magistrate reading his petition would be kind enough to let him go. 
His words echo institutional norms and regularities that go beyond the kindness of 
individuals and expectations inherent in trans-Mediterranean slavery, taking for granted 
that his Spanish interlocutors share his assumptions. Yet, facing the violation of these 
norms, he added an implicit threat, reminding the magistrates of the Council of War how 
such incidents end. Was Yusuf, out of desperation, giving empty threats? The fact that 
the Council of War ordered his immediate release suggests that this was not the case. The 
Spaniards understood that Yusuf’s next step would be to write home to ask for help, an 
action that might lead to threats against Christians and potential killing.  
The incident was resolved before Yusuf asked redress from the Algerian governor, 
but his complaint and the Council’s reaction shed further light on the stages that preceded 
Maghribi threats. First, communication between the Maghrib and Spain flowed 
continuously and Muslim slaves, just as Christians, could easily send messages to their 
kin updating them about their situation. Second, once the right people in Algiers heard of 
Yusuf's troubles, they would immediately take action and create obstacles to the ransom 
of a Christian captive there. Third, Mediterranean slavery was a system characterized by 
reciprocity but not by symmetry, namely it offered Muslims and Christians uneven 
chances of retrieving their liberty. Christians were ransomed in greater numbers than 
Muslims and thus Christians would suffer more from violations of ransom procedures. 
                                                                                                                                                 
otro tanto con los christianos de que resultara notable perjuicio a muchos cristianos pues ellos son muchos 
los que por su rescate salen del cautiverio y muy pocos los moros,” AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 1541, 
3.9.1644. 
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However, Muslim slaves were not completely helpless and could also make use of 
resources in their home community to arrange issues related with their captivity, slavery 
or ransom. 
The next case provides information on the missing link between the requests that 
Muslim slaves sent their sovereigns calling for help and the threats that Algerian 
governors made to Spain. In April 1692, a Muslim slave held in Majorca, Bive Maamet 
Rex, as he was called in the Spanish sources, sent a letter to his relatives in Algiers in 
which he complained about his miserable living conditions and the bad treatment he was 
receiving from his mistress, the wife of a fisherman “who does not allow him to live 
according to his religion, who does not give him food, and who ties him with chains to 
his neck during the night, and who also badly treats the other captives.”265 Maamet knew 
what he was doing. His relatives addressed the governor of Algiers asking him to 
intervene.  In response, the Algerians “closed all the churches and chained all the captives 
from the island of Majorca.”266 The Trinitarians were asked to write to Spain and make 
sure Maamet received fair treatment. In their letter, they described the fair conditions that 
Christians and Trinitarians received from the Algerians and how the letter of Maamet 
changed this status quo: 
 We [the Trinitarians] have recently arrived [in Algiers] and in the last short days 
we have enjoyed many favors of the gentleman governor [of Algiers] and of all of 
these [Algerian] gentlemen . . . they [the Algerians] allow the slaves to attend the 
churches, to frequent the saintly sacraments and in holy days the owners send 
them to carry out the obligation of Christians, they do not force anyone to leave 
the Christian religion, they treat them uniformly well, and if one of them 
complains to the governor about his owner mistreating him, they punish him and 
make him [the owner] sell him [the slave] to another . . .267 
 
                                                 
265
 “…[Q]ue no le deja vivir en su ley, que no le da de comer, que de noche le tiene con cadenas a el 
pescuezo, que fasse también del mal trato de los demás esclavos…” ACA, Consejo de Aragón, Leg. 993, 
fol. 30, 4.28.1692. For more related documents and analysis of other aspects of this affair, see: Vernét 
Gines, El rescate del arraez argelí Bibi. 
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 “…[N]os an zerrado todas las iglesias, y pusto en cadenas a todos los esclavos de la ysla de Mallorca…” 
Ibid. 
267
 “Somos recién llegados y en estos brebes días havemos esperimentado muchos favores del señor 
gobernador y de todos estos señores… permiten a los esclavos que bengan a las iglesias, que frecuenten los 
santos sacramentos y en los días de fiesta sus mismos patronos los enbían a que cumplen con la obligación 
de cristianos, no fuerzan a nadie a que deje la religión cristiana, los tratan uniformemente bien, y si alguno 
se queja ante el governador de que su dueño le mal trata, le castigan y se le hazen bender a otro…” Ibid. 
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The Trinitarians explained that by mistreating Muslims in Spain, depriving them of their 
religious rights and trying to force them to convert, the Spaniards were “giving an excuse 
to these señores [the Algerians] to do the same with these [Christian] poor slaves and 
with us.”268 The Trinitarians sealed their letter with an excited appeal to the viceroy of 
Majorca: “discover who that woman is, and who own slaves [in Majorca], and order them 
to treat their slaves with love and charity in order that they [the Algerians] treat the 
Christians in this city [in Algiers] in the same way.”269 Following unfair treatment, 
Muslims addressed their sovereigns directly or through their families in the form of a 
request. The slaves asked the Algerian governor to assist them and correct the injustice 
incurred on them. There are only fragmentary traces of such actions, but in contrast to the 
complaints of Christian captives, we get a good sense of the efficacy of such complaints. 
The letter Maamet wrote was extremely effective. The viceroy of Majorca moved 
Maamet to the vice royal prison and forced his former owners to pay him a real per day. 
In return, the Muslim had to write a letter recounting how fairly he was now being 
treated.270  
This case, like the previous, demonstrates how in contrast to the image of Algiers 
embedded in the propaganda of the Orders of redemption, and which the Trinitarians and 
the Mercerdarians have left with us, representatives of the orders actually worked in 
tandem with the Algerian authorities. While there is no doubt that the lives of captives 
were miserable, the descriptions provided by the Trinitarians, who passed on the threats 
of the Algerians to the Spaniards, provide a more balanced picture of captivity. In their 
comments on the messages of the Algerians, the Trinitarians insisted that the Algerians 
treated the Christians – captives and ransomers – fairly. The Trinitarians understood that 
threats to the status quo conditions that the Algerians occasionally imposed made sense 
within the context of Mediterranean slavery.  
This was not the last seventeenth century incident of this kind. Four years later, the 
Dey of Algiers, Hadji Ahmed ben al-Hadji, again used the Trinitarians to convey a 
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 “se da ocasión a estos señores a que hagan lo mismo con estos pobres esclavos y con nosotros…” Ibid.  
269
 “…[S]epa quien es esa muger y quien son los que tienen esclavos y les mande los traten con amor y 
caridad para que en esta ciudad allemos los cristianos la misma correspondencia…” Ibid. 
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 Maamet’s second letter, in Arabic, survived. It is an exceptional document and I know of no other 
documents written in Arabic by Muslim captives which survived, ACA, Consejo de Aragón, Leg. 993, fol. 
37, 7.26.1692. 
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similar message. Algerians enslaved in Spain appealed for his help, making similar 
complaints about the treatment they received from the Spaniards. In this case, the actual 
words of the Dey have survived, for the Trinitarians passed on a verbatim translation of 
his letter. The Dey addressed the Spanish Council of the State (Consejo de Estado) listing 
the injustices his subjects suffered: 
On top of the immense labors [of the Muslim captives], the popish religious 
priests upset and disturb our captives who are under your dominion, and when 
they [the captives] are sick, the said religious [priests] make them prevaricate 
their religion by force and they make our Mohammedan captives knights turn 
Christian…. And [we heard] that [the Spanish priests] take our captives by night, 
at the time of their death, [and] throw them of the castles, and others they tie to a 
stone in order to throw them in the sea and others they leave in the most filthy 
streets, and we address you [asking:] why are you doing this when that is how one 
treats a dog?...271 
 
He compared the treatment that Muslim slaves received to that of the Christians in 
Algiers: “we treat your captives in these parts like our vassals without preventing them 
from going to their churches, and see their priests, and when they are sick, the priests 
attend them at the hospital.” The Dey demanded that the priests responsible for the 
Muslims’ travails be punished and warned the Council that if in three months the 
situation will not be changed, the Christians in Algiers would pay for that:  
… and therefore we address you as a friend in order that later you will not say that 
you did not receive a warning before and after; because we will impose the same 
extortions and travails on the religious priests and all the captives which are in our 
kingdoms… and we will shut down the hospitals and force… the Christian 
captives to turn Moor…272 
 
The same violent eruptions that Trinitarians and Mercedarians represented in their 
propaganda campaigns as the result of irrational Algerians and other Maghribis acting 
upon their feelings followed the logic of challenge and riposte. Before imposing stricter 
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 “…[Q]ue los capitvos nuestros que están vajo de vuestros dominios, les suelen molestar y inquietar los 
relligiosos papzes (además de sus inmensos travajos), estando enfermos haziéndoles prevaricar de su ley 
por fuerça dichos religioso y los hazen volver cristianos a nuestros captivos cavalleros mahometanos… y 
que a nuestros captivos al tiempo que mueren los llevan de noçhe para arrojarlos de los castillos, y á otros 
atarlos de una piedra para heçharlos al mar y algunos a dejarlos en las calles más asquerosas, y os dezimos 
por que hazen esto quando con los perros se haze tal?” AHN, Estado, Leg. 670, 5.1696. 
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 “…[Y] por esso os avisamos como amigo para después no se diga que no os ha dado noticia antes y 
después; y por qué haremos con los rrelligiosos y todos los captivos que están en nuestros rreynos las 
mismas extorsiones y travajos (como se habrá) y les quitaremos los hospitales y forçaremos vuestros 
captivos cristianos a que se buelban moros…” Ibid.  
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curfews and executing captives, North African authorities issued warnings about their 
intentions and tied them to injuries Muslims slaves suffered from their Spanish masters. 
In making such threats Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians referred to what they 
understood as acknowledged standards that Muslim and Christian slaves deserved. Such 
threats constituted moves in communicative interactions and they meant that those who 
made them refused to accept the violation of slaves’ living standards. As these threats 
explicitly referred to the complaints that preceded them they emphasize the efficacy of 
complaints made by captives and point out the importance of engagement with textuality 
and writing – of complaints in this case – in the life of captives, both Muslim and 
Christians. 
At the same time, the dynamics of captives asking their sovereigns to use their 
power to protect them reflects the state of diplomatic relations between the North African 
Ottoman regencies and Morocco, on the one hand, and the Habsburg Empire, on the 
other, and underscores the importance of violence as a mediating force between these 
polities. Peace agreements between these powers were signed only during the eighteenth 
century, and before that they interacted with each other by means of violence. Yet, 
without ever signing agreements, these powers shared understandings and expectations 
about the treatment of captives. Often, these were violated, usually by small and mid-
level political or religious actors, ranging from slave-owners to local governors and 
priests. Such moments brought into relief the doxa that managed the life of slaves in the 
Mediterranean and the implicit rules that the involved parties believed should be mutually 
respected. In what might be termed, following the work of Renaud Morieux, ‘diplomacy 
from below,’ captives took the initiative, demanded that their sovereigns take a decision 
and act.273 In doing so, they activated diplomatic interactions in which Trinitarians and 
the Mercedarians played a major role between Algerian Pasha or Moroccan Sultan and 
the Spanish crown. 
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 On ‘diplomacy from below’ between other powers separated by a body of water, see: Renaud, Morieux, 
“Diplomacy from Below and Belonging: Fishermen and Cross-Channel Relations in the Eighteenth 
Century,” Past and Present, 202 (2009): 83-125. Morieux examined neutrality agreements between the 
French and the English, different from the understandings the interactions analyzed here implied. He claims 
that the “originality” of the agreements he  has studied lies in the fact that they survived throughout the 
century, but the agreements examined here survived at least throughout the seventeenth century and 
perhaps a good few decades into the eighteenth.  
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6. Conclusion 
Sorting through thousands of bundled archival documents has revealed that the few 
autobiographies that a minority of former captives wrote and published formed only the 
tip of a large iceberg of textual production in which captives engaged. Unsurprisingly, 
requests for economic help to execute ransom, examined in chapter four, formed the 
majority of such texts.274 Captives, however, also spread rumors, wrote letters of 
recommendation, and filed complaints; they compiled chronicles that recorded the main 
contemporary political events and intelligence reports – analyzed in the next chapter – 
engaged in intellectual production, and even submitted testimonies needed for processes 
of canonization of saints who died in the Maghrib. An intellectual scholarly bias 
expressed in exclusive reliance on mostly elite, printed sources has silenced the 
importance of diverse forms of writing and textuality in the life of captives. Writing, for 
most captives, was not an intellectual exercise, a moment of self-reflection, or an attempt 
to work through the trauma caused by captivity.275 Rather, testifying, snitching, 
complaining, recommending and doing other things with words, were strategies of 
survival, part of a larger repertoire of actions that, in their entirety, constituted captivity. 
Writing was a means to improve one’s life or an attempt to restore order and return 
deteriorating living conditions to a mutually acknowledged bare minimum that Muslims 
and Christians in the Mediterranean expected their captors to provide them with. 
The scholarly focus on captivity narratives has not only overshadowed the 
importance of the exercise of writing but has also silenced how writing and its traveling 
products – rumors, recommendations, complaints and more – created and recreated the 
Mediterranean as a social space. Each of the genres analyzed in the chapter served 
captives locally but at the same time operated on a Mediterranean scale. Writing and the 
spatial transmission of written texts across the sea implied a few assumptions about the 
structures of mobility that connected the Maghrib and the Habsburg Empire shared by 
writers and addressees. When writing to their kin, the Inquisition or political 
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 On such documents, see: Bono, “Slave Histories and Memoirs in the Mediterranean World,” pp. 106-
114. 
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 María Antonia Garcés has read the works of the Cervantine corpus which treat captivity as a long term 
intent to work the trauma Cervantes experienced in Algiers through writing, see: Garcés, Cervantes en 
Argel. 
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bureaucracies, captives assumed that their messages had a good chance of reaching their 
destinations and indeed many did. At the same time, the distance separating the Maghrib 
from the Habsburg Empire meant that people living in south western Europe knew a lot 
less about the Maghrib than the captives imprisoned there and vice-versa.  The massive 
presence of Christians in the Maghrib and of Muslims in Europe made captives into a 
principal source of information. In informing their kin about the conversion of friends or 
attesting to renegades’ true Christianity, captives served as ambassadors of the Inquisition 
in the Maghrib and perhaps helped overcome the anxiety provoked by the conversion of 
Christians and the threat – real or imagined – it posed for Christian communities. When 
requesting aid from a sovereign via family members, captives both strengthened kinship 
ties and engaged in “diplomacy from below,” by the drawing and redrawing of 
understandings regarding Mediterranean structures of mobility and the traffic of man that 
as a matter of routine remained implicit. In that sense, captivity, or at least its aspects on 
which I have focused in this chapter, was a way reshaping spatial boundaries or 
reconfiguring the near and the far and of extending the power of political, religious, and 
social institutions – the crown, the church and the family – across the sea into a hostile 
land. 
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Chapter	4:	
Moving	Captives,	Moving	Knowledge	
1. Introduction 
This chapter links two seemingly unrelated topics: captive-taking and ransom on the 
one hand and the production and circulation of strategic information and knowledge in 
the Mediterranean on the other. As we have seen in the previous chapter, captives often 
managed parallel channels of communication with their home land sending information 
and transmitting knowledge of various kinds. Thus far I have focused on knowledge 
regarding captives and renegades’ identity or on information concerning the living 
conditions of slaves.  More than other forms of knowledge and information, however, 
captives played a central role in the production and transmission of strategic information 
and knowledge. Captives sent home information about enemy corsairs, movements of 
hostile fleets and plans of their captors to attack their homes; they also produced 
knowledge: maps, topographic accounts and detailed programs explicitly geared towards 
conquest and defense. In occupying this role, captives were instrumental to the shaping 
and maintenance of the Habsburg imperial boundaries in the Mediterranean.276 The 
chapter offers new ways of thinking about captivity and views captives – Muslim and 
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played in knowledge production and the ways in which they were crucial imperial expansion. This 
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exclusively on elaborated, published captivity narratives, see: Viogt, Writing Captivity in the Early Modern 
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Christian, and captured, ransomed, and runaways – at times active producers of 
knowledge of the enemy, and yet also passive bodies inscribed with useful information.   
Scholars have argued that Habsburg rulers lost all interest in the Mediterranean 
following the battle of Lepanto in 1571and the negotiation of the peace treaty with the 
Ottomans a decade later.277  A reorientation of Habsburg focus towards continental 
Europe and the New World was reflected, it is claimed, in a decline in both the quantity 
and quality of published treatises on the Maghrib.278  In support of that argument, 
scholars refer to the fact that the three important published treatises on North Africa – 
Mármol’s Descripción General de África, de Torres’ Relación del origen y suceso, and 
de Sosa’s Topografía – were all composed before 1581.  These works,  written by 
individuals who suffered years as captives in North Africa, provided elaborated 
discussions of the history,  geography, and ethnography of Morocco, in the case of the 
first two, and Algiers in the case of the third. The fact that Mármol, de Torres, and Sosa 
all encountered difficulties when attempting to publish and distribute their works 
resonates with the impression of a declining interest in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean.  Indeed, for a long time after the publication of these works, no large 
systematic treatises on the Maghrib were printed within the Habsburg Empire.  
Despite this apparent trend, I will argue, to the contrary, that the production and 
circulation of strategic knowledge about the Maghrib did not cease; it merely changed 
form.  The fact that on a daily or weekly basis Christian captives arrived in Algiers as did 
Muslims in Majorca meant that through them an exchange of information could occur in 
more-or-less real time. Captives participated in the production of strategic information 
and knowledge in five ways that include: (1) during the sixteenth century, a few ex-
captives wrote and published systematic treatises on the Maghrib; (2) many captives 
warned their kin of corsairs’ attacks in the letters they sent them; (3) many captives – 
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 In his famous article in the Revue Africaine, Braudel was probably one of the first to make the claim that 
in 1577, Phillip II abandoned “any imperial politics in North Africa,” see: Braudel “Les Espagnols et 
I'Afrique du Nord, 1492-1577,” p. 192. 
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 Mercedes, García Arenal, “Introducción,” in: Torres, Diego de, Relación del origen de los xarifes y del 
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Century: Diego de Torres,” The Maghreb Review, VIII, 1-2: 1983: 53-59;  Mar, Martínez-Góngora, “El 
discurso africanista del renacimiento en la primera parte de la descripción general de África del Máemol 
Carvajal,” Hispanic Review 77 (2009): 175-7, and Bunes Ibarra, La imagen de los musulmanes y del norte 
de África en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII, pp. 3-6. 
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Muslims caught by Christians and Christians by Muslims – were questioned upon their 
arrival in a port about the enemies’ plans and their maritime strategic movements; (4) in 
the first decades of the seventeenth century, ex-captives often compiled detailed, 
topographic urban narratives of Maghribi cities, which were often accompanied by plans 
and maps. In the narratives, the authors pretended to point out the cities’ “Achilles’ heel,” 
the key to their conquest; and (5) a few captives wrote urban diaries during their captivity 
chronicling the main political – local and international – events they had experienced.  
These were not the only forms of knowledge captives developed and circulated.. 
They were also involved in the production of religious, social and political knowledge of 
the Maghrib and North African Islam.  In their investigations in the Inquisition, 
renegades provided ethnographic accounts of religious conversion. In personal letter 
exchange, captives wrote about their life in North Africa, and in the few autobiographies 
written − only in some cases published − by ex-captives, they revealed fascinating social 
histories of captivity.  In this chapter, I limit myself to the production and circulation of 
strategic information and knowledge. The distinction between ‘information’ and 
‘knowledge’ is not easy to draw. I call ‘knowledge,’ what experts, professionals, and 
charlatans (claiming expertise) produced; ‘information’ was produced by laymen, 
captives who were not professional spies and did not claim expertise on the Maghrib. 
Thus, when captives informed their kin in the letters they sent them about near corsairs’ 
attacks, they provided them with information. When the governor confiscated such 
letters, the information turned into knowledge he was about to apply in the service of the 
protection of a city or island. The chapter is structured around the five forms of 
knowledge mentioned above. Each of these five genres of writing provides abundant 
information or knowledge, not all of which could be reduced to the strategic and the 
political; yet, all of these genres were employed, albeit in different contexts, for strategic 
and political goals.  I thus examine the context and conditions of knowledge production, 
the identity and backgrounds of those producing it, and the effects that its circulation had 
on the societies that consumed it.  I also place these different forms of knowledge 
production within the larger historical dynamic that characterized the Mediterranean.  
I illustrate this argument with examples taken from Morocco, the Ottoman Maghrib, 
and Istanbul, but for a number of reasons, I focus most closely on the city of Algiers and 
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the island of Majorca.  Early modern Spanish authors referred to Algiers as the “den of 
Christendom's thieves” and, later it came to be known among Europeans as the “Scourge 
of Christianity.”279 Studies of the history of Christian captives in Algiers and the Maghrib 
have largely  examined captivity as a system of domination, ignoring the way it enhanced 
exchange and the production and circulation of knowledge and thus supporting the 
incomplete early modern image of Algiers. Studies of information and knowledge 
production within the context of Islam, of the kind examined in this chapter, also fail to 
link it to captives. On the one hand, there are scholars who study early modern 
geographical and historical works on the Maghrib, such as those of Al-Wazzan, Mármol, 
de Torres, and de Sosa.280 Since these works are divorced from the massive textual 
production I examine, the fact that the authors of these learned, published treatises on the 
Maghrib were captives is ignored. On the other hand, scholars who focus on reports of 
ambassadors and professional spies also fail to recognize the importance of captives in 
networks of espionage. The fact that the majority of researchers studying spies within the 
context of Islam focus on the Habsburg Italian territories, Venice, or Istanbul partly 
explains this.281 Venice, the first city-state to have a fixed embassy in Istanbul and current 
commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, had institutional and formal channels for 
acquiring information about the Sublime Porte.282 Similarly, the fact that the Habsburgs 
and the Ottomans were formally at peace beginning in 1581 may have meant that it was 
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easier for professional spies to penetrate Ottoman imperial secret corridors and captives 
thus become less important secret agents. The advantage of focusing on the relationship 
between captivity and knowledge production in Algiers lies in the absence of institutional 
channels for communications between the Habsburgs and the governor of the city. As an 
‘extreme case,’ – both in the sense of the apparent absence of diplomatic relations and in 
light of its image as the scourge of Christianity – the conclusions we can draw from the 
case of Algiers about captives and knowledge will probably be valid for other cities in 
North Africa and the Ottoman Empire. 
These scholarly trends – studying captives in Algiers while neglecting the links 
between captives and knowledge production on the one hand, and studying knowledge 
producers in Italy and Istanbul while ignoring the role of captives among them on the 
other – have divorced two quintessential Mediterranean phenomena, that is, captivity and 
its instrumental role in the production and circulation of knowledge.  Captivity was one 
of the few early-modern maritime practices that produced a tissue of connectivities by 
facilitating the traffic of people, goods, and ideas across the Mediterranean. Ironically, 
the increasing volume of captives at the turn of the seventeenth century and the violence 
related to captivity were both understood by scholars as a sign that the sea had lost its 
earlier characteristic unity. Scholars were not wrong in claiming that captivity had 
divisive effects on the Mediterranean; but it was not only because of the pain and 
violence that the capture and enslavement of people created. Captivity was more than 
merely a violent system of domination separating peoples, or even just a practice that 
enhanced maritime connections. Captivity also aided in the process of the unmaking of 
the Mediterranean by portraying it as a divided space separating self-contained political 
entities – the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires as well as the Moroccan Sultanate. In other 
words, while the traffic in peoples − as well as the circulation of knowledge that they 
produced − made the sea a space characterized by an extreme degree of connectivity, 
captives also participated in producing and transmitting divisive discourses that shaped 
the region as religiously torn and divided.  Understanding the role of captives in the 
production of knowledge and in its transmission across the sea is crucial for an 
understanding of how the ‘Mediterranean’ was created and recreated in the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.  
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2. Printed Works 
Three out of the four most important sixteenth-century studies of Morocco and 
Algiers were written by former Spanish captives. None of three, however, won a success 
similar to that of the Andalusian-Moroccan-Roman former-captive Leo Africanus’ 
Description of Africa. In this section, I examine Mármol’s General Description of Africa 
(1573, 1599), de Torres’ An Account of the Origins and History of the Shereefs (1586), 
and de Sosa’s Topography of Algiers (1612), focusing on their authors’ identity and 
agendas and on their publication and reception histories. These printed works are 
extremely important for our understanding of the early modern Maghrib and the way it 
was perceived by Spaniards. Because no similar studies were written and brought to light 
for a long time after Mármol, Torres and de Sosa died, scholars assumed that Spaniards 
lost interest in North Africa and that the production of knowledge of the Maghrib ceased 
during these years.283 In making these authors into exceptions that marked the end of the 
period, however, scholars have de-contextualized them and read them in ways which 
masked the historical trend of which they formed a part. The section seeks to provide a 
context for the oral and manuscript forms of knowledge of the Maghrib examined in the 
rest of the chapter, and to place these printed texts within a larger historical trajectory of 
knowledge production and circulation carried out by captives. Rather than rupture there 
was continuity between these published texts on the one hand, and, on the other, forms of 
knowledge production which did not make their way to the printing press. The histories 
and geographies that Mármol, Torres, and Sosa wrote formed part of the larger corpus of 
writing in the Maghrib formed by intelligence reports and chronicles written by captives 
in the early modern period which are examined in this chapter. 
One of the most celebrated figures in the history of the Mediterranean, al-Hasan ibn 
Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi, also known as Leo Africanus, was a captive and the 
author of the most famous text on Africa in the early modern period.  An Andalusian who 
moved across the Mediterranean to Morocco soon after his birth, al-Wazzan was later 
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captured by Sicilian corsairs, who offered him as a gift to the pope in Rome.  There, after 
converting to Christianity and then operating within a society of humanistically-shaped 
papal curia, he wrote several works which suited the desires of his time and place.  The 
most famous and significant was the Description of Africa (1526).  First published (in 
Italian) in 1550 in Ramussio’s collection of “discoveries,” it quickly became an 
authoritative European source of information about Africa, first in a series of editions and 
then in translations into French (1556), Latin (1556), English (1600), and Dutch 
(1665).284 Al-Wazzan, however, was never published in Spanish. In Spain, at the heart of 
the Habsburg Empire – a state that invested in the Maghrib more than any other 
contemporary monarchy or empire – the reception of Al-Wazzan’s work was mediated by 
Spanish authors who had focused on the Maghrib in works published between 1573 and 
1612.285  Like Al-Wazzan, the authors of these principal published treaties on North 
Africa in Spanish also experienced long periods of captivity.  Luis de Mármol Carvajal, 
whose General Description of Africa two volumes were published in 1573 and 1599, 
arrived in North Africa in 1535 as a soldier.  Having lost his liberty at an unknown date, 
he spent almost eight years as a prisoner.286  Diego de Torres, who published his Account 
of the Origins and History of the Shereefs  and of the State of the Kingdoms of Morocco, 
Fez and Taroudannt in 1586, was also briefly held captive in Morocco, but had begun his 
North African career rescuing Christian captives.  In 1546, he left Spain for Morocco in 
order to join his friend’s relative, Fernán Gómez de Almodóvar, “who served in those 
kingdoms in the office of ransomer for the serene king, Don Juan.”287  After four years on 
the job, he decided to return to Spain, but was detained for debts of his predecessor.  He 
                                                 
284
 In 1805, it was also translated to German. On the history and politics of the publication of Al-Wazzan’s 
Description of Africa, see: Zhiri, Oumelbanine, “Leo Africanus, Translated and Betrayed,” in The Politics 
of Translation in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Luise von Flotow, 
and Daniel Russell, Eds. The Politics of Translation in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, University of 
Ottawa Press, 2001, pp. 161-174. 
285
 On Mármol’s use of Al-Wazzan and on the differences between the works, see: Martínez-Góngora, “El 
discurso africanista,” pp. 171-195. On how de Torres used Mármol and others, see: García Arenal, 
“Introducción,” pp. 11-14. There were other Portuguese authors writing on the Maghrib, especially on the 
defeat in the Battle of the Three Kings. Here I am unable to include them in my discussion. See, García 
Arenal, Ibid. 
286
 Luis del Mármol Carvajal, Descripción general de África, tomo I, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios 
Africanos del Patronato Diego Saavedra Fajardo del CSIC, 1953.  On the life of Mármol, see: Agustín, G. 
de Amezúa, “Prologo,” in Luis del Mármol Carvajal, Descripción general de África.  
287
 “…[Q]ue servía en aquellos Reinos en officio de rescatador al sereníssimo Rei Iuan…” Torres, Diego 
de, Relación del origen y suceso de los xarifes, p. 150. 
 111 
 
spent more than a year and a half captive and waited another year after his ransom before 
returning to Spain in 1554.  Unlike Carvajal and de Torres, the Portuguese de Sosa was a 
doctor in canon and civil law and in theology and had appointments of Vicar General of 
the bishoprics of Siracusa and Catania in Sicily.288 His North African account, 
Topography of Algiers, was published later in 1612 and was based solely on his stay there 
as a captive between 1571 and 1581.289   
The experience of captivity was central in the life of Mármol, Torres, and Sosa, and 
at the very least provided them with access – in the form of direct experience and 
knowledge of the required languages – to the subject about which they wrote. De 
Amezua, the modern editor of Mármol, had no doubt about the answer to this question. 
He claimed that Mármol’s imprisonment was “a providential captivity since it formed the 
future author of the General Description of Africa.”  He was right in the sense that 
Mármol learned to master Arabic and the ‘African’ language during his captivity, and 
that his travels with his master in North Africa provided him with direct experience with 
the regions about which he wrote, from Morocco to Egypt.290  Captivity, then, was 
instrumental in enabling Mármol to study the languages which provided him with access 
to the issues he explored in his work.  In the case of Torres, it is a little harder to answer 
the question. Almost nothing is known about Torres except for the little he provides in 
chapter LIV of his work. His captivity and stay in Morocco were shorter than those of de 
Sosa and Mármol. However, the fact that he spent a quarter of his time in the Maghrib as 
a captive suggests that captivity must have at least partly shaped his understanding of the 
land, language, and people, providing him with access to knowledge which later served 
him in his work. The experience of captivity was undoubtedly essential to de Sosa’s 
composition of the Topography.291  He began writing as a captive, and captivity 
conditioned his access to books and to interlocutors. The parts of his work completed in 
Algiers were based on the few works to which he had access, as he mentions in the text, 
such as Leo Africanus’ Description of Africa, which a certain Morisco from Fez loaned 
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him, and a biography of Saint Paulinus, bishop of Nola.292 The conversations he had with 
other captives, renegades, and Muslims were also vital sources, as they provided him 
with information about Algiers. The importance of his captivity to his work is also 
reflected in the fact that many pages of his book are dedicated to historical, theological 
and legal discussions of captivity.  
Unlike autobiographies written by former captives, which began to be issued in the 
1580’s, these works purported to present systematic knowledge of the societies they 
discussed and provide support for Spanish colonial conquest.293  The titles suggest 
different focuses – geographic, historic and ethnographic – but they each provide a little 
of all three. Mármol and de Torres, and de Sosa to a lesser degree,294 shared a similar 
point of view seeking to achieve imperial goals.  Mármol expresses this in the dedication 
to the king, explaining that he hopes for his work to be “not less pleasant than beneficial 
for the conquest of the barbarous African people, our neighbors as they are our cruel 
enemies.”295  De Torres, in his original dedication to Don Sebastian King of Portugal, 
expressed similar wishes.296  Conquest for these authors did not merely serve religious 
goals, but also economic ones and both stressed the wealth of the country and the 
potential utility of its resources for colonial Spain and Portugal.  An imperialist agenda 
likewise reverberates through De Sosa’s work, but it is less pronounced.297  His volume is 
much harder to classify, as it fuses various genres. He opens with an ethnographic 
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description of Algiers and a history of its governors.  But he also adds three dialogues.  
The first is a historical juridico-theological discussion of captivity; the second, a 
martirology, a kind of writing which had gained renewed popularity among Christian 
writers – both Protestant and Catholic – since the Reformation;298 and the third, a 
discussion of Islam meant to prove its inferiority to Christianity.  
Bringing their work to fruition, however, was not an easy task for these writers; 
each, or their kin and acquaintances, faced various difficulties in this mission. Even after 
their works were published, these scholarly volumes were poorly received and it seems 
that they did not circulate widely. In that sense, the publication histories of these works 
have more in common than their ostensible agendas might suggest. All were printed long 
after they were written, and their publications encountered similar obstacles.  Mármol 
wrote and submitted the first volume of General Description of Africa in 1573, seventeen 
years after his return to Spain.  More than a decade later, he  applied for another royal 
publishing privilege in 1584, with the intentions of both reprinting the first volume and 
publishing the second for the first time.  He received the privilege but even though the 
first volume “was well received in these kingdoms and outside of them,”299 he could not 
find a publisher “because the book is long and very expensive.”300  In 1599, about four 
years after his royal privilege had expired, he applied for its renewal.  Acknowledging his 
failure to find a publisher, he invested the little funds he had, and published the second 
volume at his own expense.301 De Torres, on the other hand, never lived to see his work 
in print.  He began writing his An Account of the Origins and History after his return to 
Spain in 1554, and finished it sometime before 1575.  But there is no archival indication 
that he ever applied for a printing privilege or that he took any steps to secure the 
publication of his work.  It was not until several years after his death that his widow, in 
dire need, petitioned the king and managed to publish his work.302  Finally, de Sosa’s 
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Topography of Algiers was also printed posthumously, in 1612, about thirty years after its 
completion.   Until the 1970’s, authorship was attributed to his editor, Diego de Haedo, 
who published it under his name.303  De Haedo was the nephew of a bishop in Sicily with 
the same name, who either received the manuscript from de Sosa, or had gotten his hands 
on it in some other way, a little after de Sosa’s arrival in 1581 on the island from 
Algiers.304  De Haedo must have received the manuscript from his uncle, but he did not 
race to publish it as is testified by documents that precede the actual text: a permission for 
publication from October 1604, a dedication to his uncle signed December 1605, an 
endorsement dated October 1608, and a printing license from the Royal Council dated 
February 1610.305  
Beyond such delays, none of these books was reprinted in Spain before the 
twentieth century, a fact that strengthens the assumption about limited circulation.  There 
are twenty-six known extant copies of De Torres’ work in libraries and archives in the 
world, but the book was translated to French in 1636, and reprinted in 1667 as the third 
volume of the French translation of Mármol.306  Mármol’s writing garnered greater 
successes, and we even know that included among those who owned a copy of his book 
were nobles, royal functionaries, and artisans.307 His work was translated into French in 
1667, and there are a handful of works that refer to it. A few English authors also 
acknowledged their debts to both Mármol and Sosa, on whom they relied for their later 
works on North Africa.  Sosa was much more influential, but among whom? And which 
parts of his work were more popular and had more effects? Central authors of the Spanish 
Golden Age, such as Lope de Vega, or Gonzalo Céspedes y Meneses, referred to the 
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Topography and appropriated sections of it.308 Similarly, Diego Galán, who penned two 
versions of the same captivity account wherein he recounted his own experience as a 
captive in the Ottoman world, directly reproduced full sections of Sosa’s Topography.309 
Additional research points out other, lesser known, seventeenth-century Spanish authors 
who refer to the Topography of Algiers; but more than half of these writers were 
interested primarily in the dialogues, which offer a radically different view from that of 
the An Account of the Origins and History and the General Description of Africa.  In 
other words, it seems that in Spain, the Topography was read less for its geographic, 
historic and ethnographic content than for its theological discussions or as a source for 
historians of the Trinitarian order.  
Not only, then, were none of these works as extensively translated as Al-Wazzan’s 
Description of Africa, but their reception and circulation in Spain was scant.  Why is this 
so?  Do the obstacles to publication, the fact that only one edition of each work saw the 
light of day, or even the lack of Spanish readership, suggest that there was little Spanish 
interest in North Africa at the time?  How are the dynamics of publication and reception 
linked to a larger framework of Mediterranean history? As I have noted, historians have 
asserted that the 1570’s marked a turning point in the history of the Mediterranean.  On 
October 7th, 1571, the Habsburg Empire defeated its Ottoman rival in the battle of 
Lepanto, the largest battle fought at sea. The Ottomans and Habsburg kept testing the 
power balance between them for another decade (the battle of Lepanto, 1571; the 
conquest and reconquest of Tunis, 1569-74; and the battle of the Three Kings, 1578). 
Until the peace treaty was signed in 1581 between the two Empires, the Ottomans 
continued to strengthen their sway in the western Mediterranean.310 Scholars tend to 
agree on a sense of decline in the quantity and quality of works on the Maghrib after 
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1581.311 By then, they have claimed, the Spaniards lost not only their fear of the 
Ottomans, but also their interest in the Islamic world.  Decreasing textual production 
about that world, we are told, is a product of that loss of fear and interest.312    It was at 
this historical juncture that a different kind of writing about the Maghrib began to gain 
popularity – captivity narratives, the Cervantine corpus of captivity tales, and the 
religious quest for redemption of captives.313  The fate of the three works I have been 
discussing is certainly, then, part of this turn in the history of knowledge production, of 
the pacification and withering away of the Mediterranean as object of inquiry.   
De Torres’ An Account of the Origins and History, which called for the conquest 
and economic exploitation of Morocco, became obsolete after the Portuguese defeat in 
Alcazarquivir,314 and the fact that his widow managed to find a publisher is actually 
surprising. Mármol, as we have seen, claimed that his book’s length and price were the 
cause of his failure to find a publisher.  But surely, large books were published in Spain 
at the time, and studies of the Spanish printing market suggest that excluding the years 
1582, 1593 and 1594, the number of books published in the last two decades of the 
waning sixteenth century were constantly increasing.315 Rather than the book’s price, it 
was a shift of atmosphere that may have been the real cause.  This transition is the result 
both of the desire of the Spaniards to sign a peace treaty with the Ottomans, and a 
response to their defeat in the Battle of the Three Kings – a strategic enterprise to which 
Phillip II was opposed. Mármol’s relative success, then, is tied to the fact that he 
published another book, this one telling the tale of the rebellion of the Moriscos in the 
Alpujaras, in whose suppression he participated, and which was well received.  
While scholars were right in pointing at Spanish political trends as an explanation 
of the fact that no similar works were written and published at the time, they did not fully 
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account for the implications of these political trends. In the introduction, I have 
mentioned that Spain’s turn away from the Mediterranean also signaled the beginning of 
what Braudel has called Algiers’s “second brilliant age.” With that, Braudel was referring 
to a military shift that resulted from the political reorientation. Piracy and corso came to 
dominate warfare in the Mediterranean. In its turn, that transformation changed the 
distribution of captives over time and across space. While the number of captives did not 
decline it became more balanced. From the 1570’s, rarely did masses of captives lose 
their liberty in spectacular battles. Instead, small numbers of captives arrived in most 
Mediterranean cities on a daily or weekly basis. As the rest of this chapter demonstrates, 
that entailed a constant flow of information that obviated the need in further systematic 
treaties that explored the topography of Maghrib cities and their military might. The 
production of knowledge about the Maghrib never stopped; nor did its quality deteriorate. 
Rather, it merely changed forms.  
The accessibility of the expansive works from these celebrated authors, and the fact 
that they circulated in print, make them important to both studies on North Africa and the 
life of captives in the Maghrib. But by dissociating these key sources from the wider 
context of captivity and the production and circulation of strategic knowledge about the 
Maghrib, their authors are depicted as exceptional individuals, each engaged in a unique 
project. But rather than an enterprise carried on the shoulders of a few giants, the 
recovery and transmission of knowledge about the Maghrib should instead be seen as a 
task that almost every captive in the Mediterranean was constantly engaged in.  
3. Strategic Information in Personal Letters  
The negotiation of peace with the Ottomans brought an end to regular war in the 
Mediterranean. However, as Braudel notes, “the living materials of that war, the men 
who could no longer be kept in the war fleets by what had become inadequate rewards 
and wages were driven to a life of roving by the liquidation of international war.”316  This 
military shift transformed the circulation of captives, and ipso facto the production and 
distribution of knowledge in the Mediterranean. Recently arrived captives interviewed 
immediately upon their arrival in the port provided the Algerian governor, or the 
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Majorcan viceroy, with information about when the enemy’s fleet had left its port and the 
direction in which it was headed.  But strategic political information was not transmitted 
exclusively in face-to-face interviews.  Beyond the strategic reports, city maps, and 
political chronicles that captives composed, ever more personal media, such as letters 
between family members, became the vehicles through which captives circulated 
strategic information.  
A central concern captives shared with their kin in the letters they sent them 
regarded other captives who had converted. In the previous chapter, I have claimed that 
this was part of a process of social boundary making. This, however, was not the only 
reason for which captives informed their kin about conversion of relatives and friends. 
Letter writers warned their kin, asking them to watch out and to be careful of attacks 
from corsairs.  Converts like these individuals, who mastered the maritime entries and 
exits of their native land and could still pass as community members, became extremely 
dangerous after their conversion, often joining with the corsairs.  In the letter quoted 
above, delivered by Francisco Marques to Ynés Hernández Sardiña, the author recounted 
the conversion of Gaspar de los Reyes, warning his addressees that the latter had become 
a corsair and that, as a result, “they [the addressees] should not trust any sail [on the 
horizon].”317 Occasionally, captives ordered their kin to go and inform the magistrates of 
their warning so that timely measures might be taken.  In a report dated October 13th, 
1617, the viceroy of Majorca wrote the king about Algiers.  He had received news, he 
explained, from two islanders who were held in captivity there, and who had written their 
wives and mothers to warn them of a corsair’s raid.  The viceroy explained to the king 
that the captives urged their kin to let the magistrates know about this situation: 
In letters to their wives and mothers written in Algiers the 7th of this month, Juan 
Maltes and Estevan Gia, Majorcan slaves, told them to inform the magistrates of 
this city that they might have certain knowledge of a renegade who is prepared to 
come and attack one of the villages with fifty high deck ships and they should be 
alert because there are renegades who speak the language.318 
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The captives’ kin did not always follow the instructions sent by captives.  Knowing that, 
and the potential strategic value of such letters, the viceroys of Majorca often collected 
for inspection all the letters that islanders received from Algiers, whether from a known 
captive or not.  A reference to this practice is echoed in a letter accompanying the long 
report on Algiers that the viceroy sent to the king on June 26, 1603: “And [I also decided] 
to collect all the letters sent from Algiers by Christian captives to individuals from here 
of which I am aware of and to send them to your majesty so that your majesty would 
better understand what is being reported there.”319 Once the information contained in 
such letters was in the viceroy’s hands, he could apply it to better protect its subjects, or 
alternatively, advise the King as to the best way to attack the enemy. 
In the above discussion, I have attempted to show how even personal letter 
exchange served as a means of transmitting strategic information.  The evidence shows 
that becoming a captive did not necessarily mean losing touch with home. The 
participation in letter exchange, a practice probably more common among residents of the 
Balearics or the Canaries due to the short distance of the islands from North Africa, also 
meant the tightening of ties across the Mediterranean. Through many other means, 
individuals held in captivity played a vital role in the production and dissemination of 
knowledge which informed military strategies and espionage. Before I turn to examine 
other genres through which information and knowledge were transmitted, I examine the 
effects that information of the kind discussed here – about hostile armadas or corsairs’ 
raids – had on its addressees.  
4. Questioning Captives 
4.1 The Circulation of News in Algiers and its Effects 
Scholars have noted that the first thing that corsairs did when they took over a ship 
was to search their victims and to interrogate them about their status and fiscal standing.  
Emmanuel d’Aranada, for example, recounts that after his ship was overtaken by 
corsairs, “an Englishman by nation, but a renegade…. asked me of which nation I was 
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and whether I was a merchant….”320  Similar references to this type of questioning 
abound in captivity narratives. The captives’ confusion and fear amidst the noise and 
clamor of the capture gave their conquerors a reliable advantage in discovering the 
captives’ real worth.  Beyond this searching and questioning, another investigation 
awaited captives, one perhaps more important. This was the interrogation that each 
captive was destined to endure upon his arrival in a port – either as a fresh captive or as a 
recently freed captive returning home – about the ongoing events from their place of 
departure.  Not only did politicians and generals seek such information from new 
captives, but also old captives were also hungry for information about their homeland.  
Captives’ arrival in the port provided a moment of linkage to the other shore of the sea.321  
When Algerian corsairs returned to Algiers with Christian captives, or Majorcans to 
Majorca with Muslims, those previously captured as well as renegades were waiting to 
hear from the new ones any recent news from home.322  The newly captured reported the 
latest movements of the Spanish armada, visits of the King in the viceroyalties, and other 
such major events.  
The Algerian chronicles compiled by Spanish captives-turned-spies during the first 
two decades of the seventeenth century reflect the kind of information that Algerians 
desired. Vicente Colom, for example, who chronicled Algiers for the viceroys of Majorca 
from (at least) 1602 until his death five years later, thus described the arrival in port of 
thirteen captives on May 9, 1603: “A privateers’ frigate arrived [in the port] with thirteen 
captives from Barcelona and Valencia and other parts and they brought no important 
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news.”323 Obviously, the ‘newcomers’ had much to say about events in Christendom, but 
the information Colom considered worthy of chronicling, and that the Algerians were 
seeking, was more specific; namely, the information of interest pertained to the 
movements of the Spanish armada and Spanish military plans. On the last day of the 
same month, Colom chronicled a similar event – the arrival of a frigate with new captives 
– disclosing his addressees and his chronicler’s interests:  
A frigate entered [the port] with nine Christian captives who said they have been 
captured in the field of Tarragona and having been questioned they said that they 
knew nothing about an armada…324 
Colom wrote with the viceroy of Mallorca and those responsible for the imperial 
navy in mind.  What they were mostly interested in was what the Algerians knew about 
the plans of the Spaniards. In other words, Colom was describing for them the state of 
Algerian tactical knowledge about Spain’s strategic plans. While Algerian corsairs 
regularly raided the coasts of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic islands, the Spaniards 
continued during the first two decades of the seventeenth century to lay plans to take over 
the city.325  The Algerians were aware of these Spanish plots, and thus the obsessive 
desire to obtain information about Spanish military intentions was well-founded.  If 
Spanish sources depict a regime of fear that dominated the life of Habsburg subjects 
living along the coasts,326 similar fears are attested in Algiers.  Depending on the level of 
anxiety, certain news could inflame the city in seconds and cause great turmoil. Rumors 
could lead to hysteria. This was the case in August 24th, 1603, upon the arrival of new 
captives in the city: 
The day of Saint Bartolommeo, Morato Arraez returned from course [corso] with 
his nine ships.  They were afraid when they arrived because they had seen many 
large ships in Ibiza, and this was the reason they had returned earlier. And they 
brought with them two hundred Christian captives some of whom they had taken 
in Torre de Cope; and in another ship they captured seventy-two persons among 
whom were two Augustinian brothers, two Franciscans, two Trinitarians, one 
Carmelite, of whom three were priests who traveled from Mallorca to Barcelona; 
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and [they also captured] a theater group whose director was Juan Ramírez and his 
wife Ana Manrique; and the rest [of the captives], up to the mentioned number, 
[were caught] in different parts of the coasts of Spain and even though none of 
them confirmed for certain anything about the armada, [in light of what Morato 
Arraez reported from] Ibiza… it caused great fear (emphasis added).327 
 
This entry is relatively lengthy in comparison with others due to the exceptionally 
large number of captives, and more specifically, churchmen, who were captured.  
Colom’s portrayal of Morato Arraez betrays the reputation of great ferocity that the 
Spaniards had bestowed upon the latter, and points at once to the complexity and balance 
of these chronicles. In contrast to literary and religious constructions of Algiers, in which 
the city functioned as the “den of Christendom's thieves” and a military power ravaging 
helpless Christians, these chronicles render Algiers as a city whose residents suffer 
hunger and live in constant fear of Spanish attack. In fact, the image these chronicles 
portray is almost an inverse mirror image of how religious propaganda and literary 
authors of the period described Spain in relation to Algiers. But perhaps more 
interestingly, Colom’s report shows the dependence of the city of Algiers upon the news 
brought to it by captives and pirates.  As uncertain as their truth-value may have been, 
good or bad news, even no news at all, had the potential to stir both Christians and 
Muslims.328 Likewise, the quote indicates how widely and quickly information delivered 
by captives could be distributed.  
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Colom and the others who chronicled life in Algiers and who formed part of the 
Spanish net of intelligence point to the importance of captives for the circulation of news, 
and illustrate the Algerian dependence on such news.  Such accounts say less about the 
mechanics of interviewing, evaluating information and informers, or the circulation of the 
information.  To learn about these, we need to turn to the exchange of letters between the 
viceroys of the imperial territories in the Mediterranean and the Councils of State and of 
War. 
4.2 Valuable Informers and Reliable News 
Viceroys and captives sought fresh information produced by experts and carried by 
reliable transmitters.329 This section examines the ways in which information and 
knowledge were evaluated arguing that expertise and experience, freshness and 
knowledge of the informer, and his national identity were the criteria that mattered most. 
Rather than focusing on textual genre, I reconstruct and analyze the criteria employed to 
assess the quality of information and knowledge on the basis of reports, interviews and 
letters. 
On the evening of March 13th, 1612, the duke of Medina Sidonia wrote a report to 
the Council of War assessing naval strength at the port of Algiers:  
50 ships, 40 of which are large, the largest is of 300 barrels, and there were 10 
fishing settees, and all have captains of all the nations, and the governor obliges to 
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take with them Turkish infantries helped by salaried slaves, munitions, supplies, 
and bronze artillery….330   
 
The account is longer, and goes into greater detail in its review of the city’s military 
might.  The duke acknowledges that little has changed since his earlier report.  As before, 
his informers were soldiers captured and taken to Algiers, where they had spent three 
years before escaping.  That the duke had to rely on captives’ testimonials in order to 
gain strategic information about Spain’s imperial nemesis was by no means exceptional. 
The viceroy of Majorca, Prince Filiberto de Savoy, admiral and later viceroy of Sicily, 
and other governors and magnates along the Habsburg’s littoral, similarly depended on 
the thriving networks of spies and information based, to a large extent, on Christian 
captives.  Not only did captives chronicle Algiers and other cities through written reports 
sent back to Spain, but they also provided information upon their return during their 
interviews with Spanish governors.  On the basis of these ‘oral reports’ (relaciones de 
palabra), the governors composed accounts that they then sent on to the councils of War 
and of State.  
While the duke of Medina Sidonia received daily updates about the situation in 
Atlantic Morocco, knowledge about Algiers more commonly first arrived in Majorca.331 
There, alongside Christian and Muslim captives, the viceroy interviewed consuls, 
merchants, ship captains and their crews, mostly but not exclusively foreign.  A report 
(probably from 1604) sent from Majorca to the Council of the State, for example, 
synthesizes information received from the Majorcan captain Juan Maltes, who undertook 
a voyage to Algiers in order to smuggle Christian captives back to the island, and from 
Muslim captives that Maltes had captured in Delis, sixty miles west of Algiers.  Those 
captives reported that “they have seen the army that left Algiers in order to go to the 
mountain of Cuco… and that Janissaries and Moors from Delis and Tamagot left to join 
                                                 
330
 “…50 baxeles los 40 grandes el mayor de 300 toneles, y havía 10 saetías pescadoras que en todos eran 
capitanes de todas naciones y el gobernador les obliga llevar infantería de turcos ayudándoles con sclavos 
al sueldo…” 13.3.1612, AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg 774. 
331
 On the one hand, only 202 miles separated Algiers from Majorca and there were long-term commercial 
exchange between the cities. On the other hand, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, on Spain’s Atlantic coast, was the 
home of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Captain General of the Oceanic Sea and Coasts of Andalusia 
(Capitán General del mar océano y costas de Andalucía, 1588-1641)  who thus had easy communication 
with Atlantic Morocco, see: Luis, Salas Almela, “Un puerto de invierno para la armada del mar océano: La 
perspective sensorial de los duques de Medina Sidonia (1600-1640),” Huelva en su Historia, 13 (2010), 
135-148. 
 125 
 
the said force which should include, Janissaries and Moors, around 1,500 men.”332  
Muslim captives, then, also served as sources for the transmission of strategic 
information to the Christian power.  Yet when compared to interviews with Christians, 
Muslim accounts remained secondary. The advantage of interviewing Christian captives 
was reliability and common allegiance:  the majority of were Majorcans, Habsburg 
subjects, or French married to Majorcans and thus connected to home.  
Information had value as long as it was fresh and its carriers seemed trustworthy.  
Details of the movement of those carrying news was thus extremely important, just as in 
the case of the letters sent from captives to their kin.  There is little certainty in whether 
the practice of listing the geographic channels that information passed through originated 
in oral or textual practices; regardless, it functioned as a litmus test for assessing the 
relevance and utility of the information presented.  On October 5th, 1604, the viceroy of 
Majorca sent the Council of War updates about Algiers that he had received from Charles 
Cochon, a French ship patron recently arrived from Algiers.  The letter opens by 
mentioning Cochon’s arrival date in Majorca, and when he left Algiers: “Last night a 
French settee (saetia) entered [the port].  It [arrived] from Algiers which it left five days 
ago.”333 Cochon reported that a new Governor, Cader Pasha, had arrived in Algiers, that 
the Algerians were suffering hunger, and that the new Pasha was seeking peace with the 
Kingdom of Cuco. Cochon had received that information from three Majorcan ransomed 
captives who had all left Algiers at the same time as he, but on a different settee.  
Usually, the viceroy would have interviewed the captives, synthesized the information 
that they provided with that given by Cochon, and then sent it on to the peninsula.  But as 
the ship with the captives was running late, and fearing that the news might turn into no 
news, the viceroy delivered to the king Cochon’s insights and only later sent an update 
based on the information the captives provided.334  
Freshness alone, however, was not sufficient. In order for fresh news to be 
transformed into valuable information, the status of the messenger had to be ascertained.  
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Who was trusted, and how were reliability and accessibility to inside knowledge 
assessed?  On July 12th , 1596, the new viceroy of Majorca, Fernando Zanoguera, wrote 
the king telling him about Miguel Rovira’s success; his letter provides some insight to 
these questions.  A couple of weeks earlier, Rovira, with a license from the viceroy, had 
left Majorca for Algiers on a mission to ransom his brother, father, and other Majorcans.  
He succeeded not only in this goal, but also managed to smuggle aboard a large number 
of Majorcans, Sicilians, Genovese, and Nicean captives. Zanoguera interviewed them all, 
but he found the testimonies of some more valuable than others for the report he was 
compiling for the king.  He was especially fond of the testimony of Antonio de 
Villafranca de Nice, who had served as head shipwright (el maestre Daxa mayor) to the 
governor of Algiers.  This position, which the latter had probably secured as a result of 
professional skills acquired in the shipyards of Nice, meant that the Nicean was mobile – 
mobility was part of the privileges that came with the office – worked in tandem with 
corsairs, might have had amicable relations with the Pasha, and thus could gather 
knowledge to which other captives had no access.  He was precisely the kind of captive 
that the viceroy sought for composing such accounts: individuals who had either held 
positions of relative power in Algiers, or who had spent many years in captivity and, by 
learning Arabic or Turkish, had gained access to secret information.  In the report quoted 
above, Antonio de Villafranca proved the most apt informer, but was by no means the 
only one.  As a way of authenticating his account, the viceroy indicated that in addition to 
the testimony of the Nicean, the report drew from the testimonies of “the more intelligent 
among the others.”335  
Francisco Juan de Torres who became viceroy of the islands in 1618 wrote the 
Council of the State on October 9th of that same year, informing its members that there 
were only a few Algerian ships at sea at the time, but that soon, once Ramadan, “the 
Muslims’ lent,” was over, thirty ships would leave Algiers and head to Spain.  Torres’ 
informer added that “the [Algerians] frequently discussed the armada the Spanish 
gathered to attack them and [the Algerians] say it is like a dog whose bark was worse 
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than his bite.” 336 However, the informer, who perhaps was trying to incite the Spaniards 
into action, added that since the Algerians took no defensive measures, the conquest of 
Algiers would be an easy task.  The viceroy did not fail to indicate how novel this news 
was, nor how reliable his informer proved to be – “a native of this kingdom who arrived 
last night, and has been out of Algiers since the first [days] of the last [month]… enslaved 
there for seven or eight years, and is a man of good judgment.”337  The phrase catches all 
the evaluative parameters: the informer’s nativity as an islander and, as such, his 
trustworthiness; his knowledge of the city, as he had spent seven or eight years there; that 
the news was not superbly fresh but that the production date is provided; and, finally, that 
the informer is ‘de buena razón,’ i.e. one can trust his judgment.  
Trusted captives were also important for their ability to validate the truthfulness of 
information provided by others.  When in March 22nd, 1604, the French consul in Algiers 
was sent to Majorca to negotiate the ransom of several Muslim captives, probably on 
behalf of the Algerian Pasha, he was himself suspect to allegations of espionage.  The 
doubt was cleared on the basis “of the good [things] about [the consul] the redemptors 
and others in Algiers wrote to the viceroy and what other ransomed captives who arrived 
from there declared [about him].”338  Thus, captives did more than simply to produce and 
circulate information. Thanks to their knowledge of the field, they secured the veracity of 
claims made by royal officials, indeed some of which regarding the latter’s own identity, 
status, and intentions.  For example, when the Marquis of Villamizar, the viceroy of 
Valencia, seized a letter from the Pasha of Algiers, on September 4th, 1604 – possibly the 
letter that the Pasha had sent to the viceroy of Majorca in April of the same year – the 
viceroy turned to captives in order to verify that the letter was indeed written by the 
Pasha: “[N]ot being fully convinced the letter was the Pasha’s and having invested effort 
in ascertaining it for myself, I have found many captives who affirm it was indeed the 
said Pasha’s, and the same was confirmed by the Mercederian brother who had just arrive 
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from there.”339  Likewise, as I illustrated in the discussion of captives as letter-bearers, 
we have seen a number of instances in which captives functioned as the verifiers of 
knowledge originating in the Maghrib. And in the previous chapter, in the discussion of 
letters of recommendations, we have seen how captives wrote to the Inquisition on behalf 
of renegades who returned to Spain, vouching for the religious identity of the letter’s 
object and for his behavior towards Christians in the Maghrib. In the last few examples, 
captives fulfill their role as verifier of questionable information in the service of Spanish 
officials, information which often originated from Muslims or other suspected of 
cooperating with Muslims (like the French consul in Algiers). That detainees were 
recruited to play this part suggests that even during their captivity, while serving as 
slaves, captives maintain a legal subjectivity, acknowledged in Spain, which could be 
employed to vouch for different kinds of claims, in various administrative and legal 
contexts. 
5. Chronicling Algiers 
In the letter that the Marquis of Villamizar sent to the Council of State on 
September 4th, 1604, the Marquis mentions one of his informers in Algiers:  
A person held captive there [in Algeirs] who meticulously provides me with 
extremely detailed reports of everything that happens there; and in order for your 
majesty to see it, I send his majesty the very precise accounts I have from that 
person.  That person wishes to leave the position he holds and it seems to me so 
useful to have him there.340 
 
Three weeks later, in a separate letter to the Council, dated September 24th, 1604, the 
viceroy of Majorca notes that one of the two attached reports was written “by a friend in 
Algiers.”341  Various viceroys and Generals captaining the Habsburg’s Mediterranean 
territories had similar contacts and ‘friends.’ Who were these ‘friends’? Did the viceroys 
nominate and fire them, as suggested by the letter the Marquis of Villamizar? Or did 
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well-connected captives establish networks of spies and informants from below, leaving 
their superiors with little power in this regard?  
In the previous section, I used what I called the ‘chronicles of Algiers’ to illuminate 
how Algerians depended on the circulation of captives for knowledge of the Spanish 
armada.  These chronicles were lengthy reports written by captives in Algiers from at 
least 1602 up to 1614, which were later sent to Majorca as well as other Iberian cities. 
Undoubtedly, somewhere in the General Archive of Simancas, various other reports – 
from Algiers and other Maghribi cities – still lie buried, awaiting discovery. The reports 
discussed in this section, in addition to their exceptional richness, give voice to captives 
during their captivity. In these documents, the captive/author’s subject position is not that 
of a humble supplicant begging his king for help, as is the case in the majority of the 
extant texts written by captives.  These are authoritative, and are probably among the best 
sources for the history of Algiers during the period.  This makes their neglect by scholars 
particularly surprising.342  
There is very little information available about the authors of these documents or 
about the conditions of their writing and their circulation.343 Sosa, for example, the author 
of the Topography, formed part of small intellectual community in Algiers whose 
members had access to books. He claimed that in his company were sixty-two learned 
captives in Algiers, among them ecclesiastics, jurists, lawyers, doctors and others. 
Members of this community included captives whom the Algerians assumed could be 
ransomed for a hefty price; however, Sosa also refers to discussions shared with learned 
Muslims and renegades. Like this subterranean and diverse intelligentsia, the authors of 
the chronicles that I investigate in this section formed a parallel but distinct writing 
community. Its members were neither scholars nor priests but rather soldiers spying for 
their king. Like Sosa’s circle, this group too had varied contacts with Muslims and 
renegades, but the discussions they shared were not about faith, such as in the case of 
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Sosa, but rather about the city topography, its military might, and the political situation in 
Algiers and in the Mediterranean world. 
I have examined reports written by four captives who served as Spanish imperial 
agents. The earliest was Vicente Colom – probably a Catalan as his name suggests – who 
documented the events in Algiers from August 1602, and probably much earlier, until 
near his death on September 22nd, 1607.  Juan Ramírez, a playwright and theater director 
who was captured along with his wife and company on August 24th, 1602, also authored a 
number of reports until 1604. Colom’s successor, Juan Baptista Soriano, a second 
lieutenant, offers the names of several other captives who worked to assist him in his 
task. It is unclear when Baptista Soriano stopped documenting the city, but the next 
extant report was penned by an anonymous captive from the Valencian city of Denia, 
who covered the main events in Algiers from the beginning of September 1613 until 
March 1614.  Each of the chroniclers has a unique tone and emphasis, yet all were 
extremely disciplined in their writing, sometimes documenting even quotidian 
happenings.  The second lieutenant Baptista Soriano, like the anonymous chronicler from 
Denia, hardly missed a day; his account spans from September 19th, 1607, to October 
11th, 1608.  Some entries are extremely short. Often, he laconically reports “Monday, 1st 
of the said [month], offered nothing.”344  But other entries, especially in earlier reports 
written by Ramirez and by Vincente Colom, are longer, filling a page or more.  
A few themes were common to all: (1) Spain’s strategic plans and the knowledge 
that Algerians had thereof; (2) the return of Algerian corsairs to the port, and their prizes; 
(3) the public mood in the city; (4) power struggles between the Pasha, the corsairs, the 
Janissaries, and the Sultan; and (5) the condition of captives.  The negotiations between 
the Habsburgs and the ‘King of Cuco’ occupied a central place among the reports of the 
captive-spies.  At the turn of the century, Spain had negotiated the possibility of allying 
with the Berber ‘kingdom’ in order to launch a joint attack on Algiers.345  As a result, 
Spanish agents spent long periods of time in the court of the King of Cuco while his royal 
emissaries traveled constantly to the Spanish court, often staying for extended periods.  
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Moreover, it was not uncommon for Christians who had escaped from Algiers to visit 
Cuco before continuing their journey back into Christendom.  The chroniclers thus 
documented the escape of captives and their journeys to Cuco and their seizure by the 
Algerians as well as quotidian military encounters between Algiers and Cuco, the arrival 
of Spanish spies to Cuco, and the arrival of spies from Cuco to Algiers.  
When the chronicles reported on political events related to Algerian policy vis-à-vis 
Cuco, their discussions highlighted the power dynamics that animated the relationships 
between political actors in Algiers, Tunis and the Ottoman Sultan.346 At other times, the 
chronicles reported on debates about captivity.  Whenever French were imprisoned – 
usually for the rescue or aid of other captives – the French consul demanded their release 
according to the terms of the peace treaty already established between the Ottomans and 
the French monarchy.  It was usually the Janissaries who did not respect these treaties, 
whereas the Pasha tended to represent Ottoman interests and demanded the release of the 
captives.  In other instances, the Janissaries found themselves opposed to both the Pasha 
and the corsairs, as was the case when the Janissaries forbade the redemption or ransom 
of captives directly from the city. In response, the Pasha, whom the corsairs supported in 
his objection to this prohibition, namely, because of its potential negative economic 
impact, refused to pay the Janissaries.  Another recurring theme in these Algerian 
chronicles is the maritime arrival of corsairs laden with captives.  The authors are not 
systematic in this regard and do not record all the prizes. The focus was on Spaniards and 
imperial subjects.  For example, the unknown chronicler from Denia noted in September, 
1613, how on “Friday the 13th, captain Deli Mami arrived [in Algiers and] brought 
twenty Spanish and Italian Christians.”347  The chronicles were sure to report on the 
capture of priests, monks, women, children, or families, and, on occasion, they also 
referred to the capture of other nationals.  
The chroniclers, then, from their perch of captivity in Algiers recorded and 
commented on a large swath of the relevant political and economic dynamics and events 
                                                 
346
 While the chroniclers do not dedicate a lot of attention to the relations between Tunis and Algiers, they 
shed light on the hitherto little known tensions. Eighteenth-century Tunisian historians provide us with 
copies of peace agreements between these Ottoman regencies, but the records they copied cover the period 
between 1614 and 1628, see: Henia, “Archives ottomans en Tunisie et histoire régionale.” The chroniclers, 
then, shed light on struggles which later resulted in these treaties.    
347
 “Biernes a 13 allego el capitán Deli Mami traxo beinte cristianos españoles y italianos,”, AGS, Estado, 
Leg. 255, 21.4.1604 
 132 
 
– both local and international. Some of the information touched on real political and 
strategic maneuvers of the Spaniards.  But how important were these records for the 
Spaniards?  To what degree did they serve them?  As mentioned in the last section, 
Colom was especially alert to the arrival of news about the movements of the Spanish 
armada, and meticulously noted the state of knowledge that Algerians had about Spanish 
imperial plans.  His operator, namely the viceroy of Majorca, was obviously uninterested 
in such information in and of itself, but rather for its effect on the population and, most 
importantly, the Algiers’ governing elites.  For the Spaniards, Colom’s records were 
significant for their illumination of Algerian interests and anxieties as well as their degree 
of preparedness for a potential Spanish attack.  The idea of attacking Algiers, as 
mentioned, was popular among the ruling members of the Spanish crown during the first 
two decades of the seventeenth century; yet these plans were never secret, and rumors 
regarding them circulated regularly across the sea. The fear of their execution was 
constant in Algiers.  And the Spaniards, for their part, had a near-obsessive interest in 
Algerian intelligence.  Knowledge of what the Algerians knew about Spanish 
strategizing, and how alert or complacent they were, was as important for the execution 
of a successful attack as having exact information about Algerian military strength.  In 
that sense, what the Algerians knew about ‘la armada secreta’ conditioned not only the 
public sentiment in Algiers and its preparedness, but also the feasibility of such an attack. 
Part of the information that the chroniclers registered, then, held strategic value. It 
is difficult to gauge this value because the frequency with which the chroniclers sent their 
reports is unclear.  The surviving chronicles written by Baptista Soriano, which cover 
more than a single year, form a single narrative.  Thus, its information likely lost some of 
its potency by the time it reached the author’s operators in Majorca.  The last chronicle 
authored by the anonymous captive from Denia – which covered more than six months – 
was sent to Majorca, according to the viceroy, in but a few short pieces.  Its cramped 
handwriting and unusual spelling, uncharacteristic of documents issued in the viceroy’s 
palace, do suggest that it was penned by a single author, the anonymous from Denia, and 
sent in one piece to Majorca. When captives felt they had news they had to send 
immediately, they ransomed a reliable fellow captive and sent the message with him.  On 
June 26th, 1603, a ransomed captive from Nice arrived in Majorca on a French ship.  The 
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viceroy’s letter to the king describes his arrival by stating that “the others in Algiers have 
ransomed that captive in order to send with him to His Majesty the attached letter, and to 
provide an oral report about the things that happened between the Algerians and the king 
of Cuco.”348 It is likely, then, that pieces of information gathered in the chronicles were 
sent with ransomed captives while longer reports that covered a full year or more 
reiterated its details and rendered longer term trends.  
While little is known about the mechanics of the distribution of these diaries, even 
less is known about the way in which captives turned into secret agents.  Testimonies 
submitted to the viceroys of Sicily and Naples from ex-captives who served as imperial 
secret agents in Istanbul spoke to the professional formation of captive-spies and the 
activities that such positions entailed.349  The Sicilian Juan Leonardo Saya, for example, 
was captured in 1589 while sailing from Palermo to Trapani under the order of the duke 
of Alba, then the viceroy of Sicily.  Taken to Algiers, where he became the slave of Ali 
Pasha, he quickly moved with the latter to Istanbul.350  There, “as a slave he did certain 
services, helping to ransom slaves with his own industry.” After finally ransoming 
himself, his master sent him to take care of his garden and summer house.  He took 
advantage of these responsibilities, and, as he explained in April, 1604, to the viceroy of 
Naples, the count of Benavente, became an agent in the Spanish imperial network of 
intelligence in Istanbul.  In his master’s garden, he states: 
He hid all those coming from Naples to seek secret information, and those who 
served in Istanbul met in the same garden – as it was a secret place – to write to 
the viceroys of the kingdom [of Naples] and to those of Sicily, and specifically 
[when] Juan Policroci, who arrived from Naples by order of Francisco de Castro 
to get information, was caught by the Turks, and since it was made known 
[among the members of the intelligence network] that the Turks wanted to 
[question and] torment Policroci all those who served his majesty in Istanbul hid 
in this garden until the fury will calm down for fear of being discovered. And 
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because of the ease Saya had of hiding slaves in the garden, he gave shelter to 
many Christians until they got the chance to escape…351  
 
Saya was not the only captive-spy in Istanbul. An earlier petition submitted by Juan 
Domínguez from Caceres in Extremadura in April, 1595, further illustrates how captives 
rose to positions of relative or informal power, which thus enabled them to help others 
and serve the Crown.  Domínguez, captured in Tunis in 1574, struck an agreement with 
his master, married a Christian slave whom he had ransomed, was eventually liberated, 
and was then put in charge of his master’s house.  Like Saya, Domínguez took advantage 
of the opportunity, and “in that house he hid all the spies of His Majesty sent by the 
viceroy of Naples.” He lost the position he had gained, and the trust he had established 
with his master, when the latter caught him – “his master tore apart the letter of 
manumission he had, and put him in his galley which left for the island of Chios.”352  
Ex-captives like Saya and Dominguez took advantage of the years they had spent as 
slaves, acquiring fluency in the enemy’s tongue and transforming this into an asset, and 
came to master the secrets of the city in which they were held captive.  The same 
Domínguez, for example, claimed that he “understands well all the languages” and “he 
knew everything in the city.”353  During and following their captivity, such 
entrepreneurial captives also established valuable social connections.  Hernán Pérez, who 
had spent 35 years as a captive in Istanbul, managing finally to return to Christendom in 
1613, attached to his petition for help numerous letters of recommendation, all signed by 
important individuals whom he had connected with during his tenure of captivity: the 
patriarch, the English and French ambassadors in Istanbul, various Spanish spies posted 
there as well as captains and soldiers whom he had rescued from their captivity.354  While 
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from 1581, the Spaniards and the Ottomans were officially at peace, making the 
establishment of such connections less difficult, the numbers of spies and the multiplicity 
and depth of their connections was exceptional and even in Algiers effective networks of 
intelligence were established. 
Unlike Pérez, Domínguez, and Saya, at least one of the chroniclers of Algiers, 
Vincente Colom, died in the course of his duty as a captive-spy.  Following their release 
− if indeed they ever were released − there are no extant documents regarding the fate of 
Colom’s fellow authors-in-captivity.  But the report of Juan Baptista Soriano and the 
letter of Juan de Vilaragut, who was the viceroy of Majorca between 1606 and 1610, 
clarify the circumstances under which agents were formally installed following the 
capture or outing of their predecessors. The following events were reported in the account 
Baptista Soriano sent in 1608.  In the summer of 1607, the viceroy of Majorca sent a 
Muslim, who had served him and whom he trusted, with a letter to Colom, the captive 
who had preceded Baptista Soriano in the position.  The Muslim’s cover story was that he 
had managed to ransom himself from slavery in Majorca and had returned to the 
Maghrib.  The Algerians, however, suspected him and then tortured him until he admitted 
that he was carrying a letter to Colom.  Colom claimed that the letter was from a friend, 
and that he had torn it up after reading it.  In response, he was questioned under torture – 
“they began to cruelly torment him…. so that he would confess what the letter contained 
and who had sent it to him, and who his comrades were along with whom he gave 
accounts of everything that happened in this city to His Majesty.”  Colom died without 
disclosing who the other members of the network were, and Baptista Soriano took his 
place.   
It is unclear whether the viceroy was able to directly nominate a specific candidate 
or if the next connected member stepped into the vacant position.  In the letter from the 
viceroy to the king, he recounted these events and depicted Bautista Soriano’s 
nomination as the result of the viceroy’s own careful selection.  He describes the 
measures he took upon hearing about Colom’s death:  
I tried to inquire about the persons that have remained there and who could do 
what Colom did and enlighten us about what happens there, and a few Christian 
captives who arrived in the port told me that no one fitted better the job than the 
second lieutenant Juan Baptista Soriano… and so I wrote to him about that matter 
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assuring him on behalf of your majesty that he would be generously 
compensated…355 
 
The quote reflects the striking degree of connectivity that captivity created between the 
two cities. News constantly circulated, and the story about this agent’s death immediately 
reached the viceroy. The viceroy easily inquired about the proper replacement and sent a 
letter to the candidate asking whether the latter might be interested in the position. The 
letter listed the benefits the position offered, and the viceroy received the candidate’s 
approval of his offer. This intensive and fluent exchange took place between two cities 
that imagined each other as a source of constant fear and threat.  At the same time, it 
echoes the viceroy’s attempts to demonstrate to the king the effectiveness of his ties in 
Algiers. But did the viceroy really have a choice in the matter?  The viceroy had more 
than one contact in the city, and other documents reflect his ability to plant new agents in 
the city when the need arose. But in this case, the viceroy may have had less flexibility.  
The captives that he had asked told him that Baptista Soriano was the appropriate and 
worthy candidate because “he had many friends in the Council of the State (duana), the 
same that Colom had and for having helped the latter in this service for a long time.”356  
In a way then, Baptista Soriano was the only candidate, and had initiated himself into 
office long before Colom died.  
Baptista Soriano’s connections were the main reason for the viceroy’s de facto 
approval.  Agents like Soriano had social networks formed through relationships with 
free Christians in the cities in which they were imprisoned – like the ones Hernán Pérez 
developed in Istanbul – with other captives, and perhaps most importantly, with powerful 
renegades and Muslims.  Several entries in Colom’s diary offer a glimpse of both the 
volume of these networks and their fragility.  On August 26th, Colom recorded the arrival 
of a certain renegade sent to Algiers from Cuco.  The Algerians, who suspected the 
renegade, tortured him, and he admitted that he was sent to meet a Portuguese captive 
                                                 
355
 “…[P]rocure infórmame de las personas que allá que quedavan que pudiesen hazer lo que el hazía y dar 
nos luz de lo que por allá passava, y algunos cautivos christianos que aquí aportaron, me dixeron que 
ninguna era más apropósito para ello que el alférez Juan Baptista Soriano…”, AGS, Estado, Leg. 210 
356
 “…[P]or tener en duana muchos amigos que son los mesmos que avise a v.m. tenía Vicente Colom, y 
aver ayudadole al dicho en este ministerio mucho tiempo…”, Ibid. 
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employed as a gardener.357  By torturing the Portuguese, they extracted the identity of 
another of the group members, a Genovese called Pablo.  The Portuguese also mentioned 
the name of a Portuguese priest called Salvador de la Cruz. Continuing their 
investigation, the Algerians caught another Genovese and another Portuguese, all of 
whom they killed by flaying.358  Developing these social chains and establishing valuable 
ties with powerful Muslims and renegades in the city required long years in captivity, and 
the gaining of a certain standing. And, like any social network, the maintenance of these 
spy networks required the exchange of gifts.  Hence, the first thing Baptista Soriano 
asked of the viceroy was, “two dozen colored Toledo hats made of fine woolen cloth in 
order to give out to the friends who tell him  everything that happens, one dozen of the 
best brand and another, of a lesser one.”  The viceroy, in a manner that further 
demonstrates the exceptional degree of connectivity between Algiers and Majorca, wrote 
to the king and asked him “to order the hats, [because] once they arrive, I will send 
them.”359 The viceroy’s letter also illustrates the relational aspects of the positions that 
these captive-spies occupied were − that is, how interdependent the position of Soriano at 
the vice royal court in Majorca was upon the connections he had in Algiers; but at the 
same time, his connections in Algiers were at least in part dependent upon the power he 
had at the viceroy’s court. Moreover, his ability to maintain the position depended on his 
ability to make visible his value to each side. We have very little information about such 
maneuvering. But it is likely that the individuals who recommended him to the viceroy 
were his own dependents and, in that sense, his ability to display his connections to the 
viceroy was a result of his own efforts.  Yet − again, displaying the circularity and 
fragility of his connections − he managed to maintain his Algerian connections only 
insofar as he was able to deliver the promised gifts; that his request for colored hats was 
fulfilled immediately thus confirmed the connections that got him ‘officially’ nominated 
to the position. 
                                                 
357
 Gardens play a pivotal role in almost all textual genres involving captives. Many captives and ex-
captives in Istanbul, as we have seen, had to take care of their owners’ gardens and summerhouses, a 
position that many captives abused.   
358
 AGS, Estado, Leg. 198. 
359
 “Pídeme en su carta dos dozenas de bonetes de Toledo de grana colorados para repartir entre los amigos 
que le avisan de lo que se passa, la una dozena de marca mayor y la otra de los más baxoas.” AGS, Estado, 
Leg. 210. 
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Regardless of the how late such chronicles arrived in Majorca, they reflect the 
degree to which Spanish officials penetrated the Algerian administration and how 
captives could establish valuable ties that provided them with access to spaces and 
knowledge most captives, and perhaps most Algerians, were excluded from. Unlike 
information sent in letters and extracted in interviews, the chronicles analyzed in this 
section were produced by experts remunerated when possible by Spanish official to 
whom they reported. Textually, they differed from interviews and letters in that they 
unfolded in time. As chroniclers the authors mainly listed events which did not build up 
into narratives. However, these lists and details, often unrelated one to the other, ended 
up forming a narrative whose protagonist was the city of Algiers, its rhythms, and the 
fears, happiness and expectations some of its populations experienced – all transmitted 
from the perspective of Spanish captives and spies. While captives-cum-spies of the kind 
examined above produced narratives and chronicles, during the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century, various captives, self-designated experts on the Maghrib, produced 
spatial accounts, visual and textual, on which the next section focuses 
6. Mapping Algiers in Word and Image 
In the first decades of the seventeenth century, a number of ex-captives, renegades, 
and other ‘people of the frontier’ produced a large number of what may be called urban 
topographic narratives, mainly about Algiers and its surroundings.360 Unlike knowledge 
producers and carriers discussed above, some of these authors had independently initiated 
contact with government officials. They convinced the latter of their expertise, provided 
them with plans which the authors promised, pointed out the cities’ Achilles’ heel, and 
expected to be remunerated. These texts usually provided more or less detailed 
descriptions of the spatial organization of the city and its military might; and they were 
occasionally accompanied by visual aids, maps, or plans.  For example, an early report 
from 1563, compiled by a few ex-captives, lists only the city’s corsairs, the ships, and 
their manpower.  It is short, covering no more than a folio size sheet, but its authors had 
                                                 
360
 Topographic narratives were not the only kind of descriptions of North Africa that captives have 
compiled. For example, in 1592, Francisco de Narváez authored a long text recounting the history of the 
kingdom of Cuco and its relations with its neighbors and the Spanish Empire, AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 
364, Fol. 405. 
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drawn a map of the city on the back of the sheet.  Sometimes, the captives or renegades 
who composed these topographic narratives were obeying the orders of military 
bureaucrats.  At other times, the authors of these accounts initiated the writing and 
submission of such texts upon identifying a royal demand and were hoping to gain some 
form of economic compensation for their efforts.  Other reports were produced by 
individuals who were commissioned specifically to verify data from other captives. From 
all the media examined in the last sections, these topographic reports are the closest to 
works such as de Sosa’s Topography. This is the case in the description of the city gates, 
moat and other architectural elements. It is hard to determine whether the authors 
consulted de Sosa’s work or were simply employing a similar descriptive model. One 
thing is clear.  The authors always add to the data de Sosa provided, whether in reference 
to the number of Janissaries posted in the city or in their descriptions of the way space 
was inhabited. These reports circulated among the nobles and viceroys who ruled the 
Mediterranean frontier of the Habsburg Empire. They were copied and circulated in 
limited circles. A report arriving in Sanlúcar could have been copied and travel across the 
Spanish littoral as far as Valencia. Likewise, reports from Majorca circulated and were 
sent to Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid.  
In some cases, the textual panorama is so descriptively rich that one could draw a 
visual map on its basis. A good example is the report detailed compiled in 1618 by 
Rodrigo Pardo that spreads over twelve one-sided folios.  Pardo’s story of capture is 
especially stirring.  As a child, he left Balmaceda, a small village about nineteen miles 
west of Bilbao, and enlisted in the imperial army.  In 1610, at the age of fourteen, he was 
sent by his superiors to the tiny island of Santa Pola, near Alicante.  The goal of his 
mission did not hinge upon the security of the Empire. Rather, he was sent to find a 
hound dog that the Marquis of Santa Cruz, the Marquis of VillaFranca, and other nobles 
lost on the island in their hunting trip.  It was then that the Algerian corsairs took Pardo 
captive.  His master, a Sicilian renegade, did all he could to force Pardo to convert, but 
the latter withstood the trial.  Only when the renegade captor threatened to take Pardo to 
Istanbul, a city notorious among captives for offering little opportunity for ransom, did 
Pardo surrender, fearing that he would never return home.  After his conversion, at about 
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the age of sixteen, Pardo was enlisted again, this time joining the militia of the 
Janissaries, in which he served for three to four years before escaping back to Spain.  
Pardo’s experience of Algiers was short in comparison to the captivity periods of 
others, who produced similar texts, but the fact that he converted and served as a 
Janissary offered him an insider’s look; this partly explains the degree of detail he 
provides.  Beyond his privileged position, Pardo must have had a talent for spatial 
perception, and an extraordinary ability to translate it into writing.  Urban topography 
was a driving factor in his documentation, and he does not fail to outline how space is 
inhabited and functions socially.  Here is a part of his description of the city gates, and 
the distances separating them: 
The city has five gates… That one is followed by the New Gate which is near the 
Kasbah, and from this to the other there is a seven-hundred feet distance and from 
this gate, underneath the ground, the water runs inside the town through domestic 
caves all the way to the barracks, the king’s house, and city, and without it, no 
water mill could function and it could be easily disconnected, and the city [could 
be easily] put under siege as it has no other [source of water] but that one. And in 
addition, the water they have is little and brackish and not good to drink. And 
because the Turks and the salaried men are the first to benefit from the water, 
sometimes when there is a shortage of water and they drank of the little that is 
available, they became sick… and the rest of the city gets its drinking water from 
a few wells outside the city…361 
Additional points of reference – such as the city towers, the Kasbah, the main streets 
crossing the city, and the forts outside it – are provided with the same minute detail.  
Pardo lists their respective distances as well as their locations vis-à-vis one another so as 
to enhance the potential usefulness of his detailed information.  
Other reports were not so detailed as Pardo’s but their authors compensated for that 
by attaching plans. For instance, the report that Símon Catena sent to the Spanish crown 
artfully combined text and image, narrative and plans, which complemented each other.  
Catena, a Sicilian, was taken captive in 1596 and spent eighteen years as a slave in 
Algiers; eventually, in December 1614, he engineered his escape to Spain.  Shortly after 
                                                 
361
 “La ciudad tiene cinco puertas… A esta sigue la puerta nueva que esta junto a la alcaçaba y desta de la 
otra seteçientos pies y por esta puerta y debaxo del tierra entra el agua en caña de cueba a las encaxerias, 
casa del rrey, y ciudad que con toda ella no puede moler un molino y con facilidad se puede cortar y poner 
de todo punto en aprieto a la ciudad porque no tiene otro respecto de que él además que ay es de pocos y 
estos salobres y no buena para beber. Y porque los turcos y gente de paga son los primeros que goçan de el 
agua algunas vezes que les ha faltado y an bebido de los pocos an enfermado… y toda la demás gente de la 
ciudad beben de algunas fuentes que están afuera della.” AGS, Estado, Leg. 1950. 
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that, he joined a certain Pablo Pedro Floriano, an engineer, and compiled a report on the 
city, indicating how the Spaniards might overtake it.  The plans he devised and attached 
to his report, probably drawn up by his engineer friend, described in detail various 
elements of the landscape.  Assigning an index of letters to the forts and gates he lists, the 
reader is able to quickly move back and forth between the written text and visual aids – 
“Which are in the fort marked B in the plan which accompanies this report… many could 
go with explosives to the gate marked C and the gate ‘of Babazon’ marked D.”362  
The intent behind these reports was always strategic.  In contrast to the imperial 
desires expressed in the works of de Torres, Mármol, and De Sosa, the goal here is 
narrower – the conquest of Algiers.  Thus, whether the authors of the topographic 
narratives wrote in response to direct request or as an entrepreneurial act, they all pointed 
out what they claimed was the city’s Achilles’ heel, meaning the easiest, cheapest, and 
safest way to conquer it.  Catena, for example, claimed the key for an easy conquest was 
a tunnel that ran underneath the city, in which he had hidden for three days prior to his 
escape:  
A cave which is near the port and it goes underneath the grand mosque… and it 
runs a large distance in the city… it is about eighteen feet high and fourteen wide 
and in the middle there is a man-made channel that becomes the aqueduct through 
which the waste and sewer liquids of the city are washed out.363  
He suggested that the crown send fifteen or twenty galleys with eight thousand men.  
Based on his experience, he explained, upon the sight of arriving galleys, especially 
Spanish and Italian, everybody in the city would run to the mosque, as it provided the 
best panorama of the coast – “and the people who go there, go so quickly, that it is 
certified that the city (lugar) [immediately] depopulates, and the first who go are the 
soldiers.”364  The arrival of the galleys, he urged, should be carefully orchestrated with 
the explosion of mines installed beforehand in the cave.  As everybody filed into the 
mosque, the explosives would kill many, break the walls, and leave the rest of the 
                                                 
362
 “…[Q]ue están  en el fuerte señalado B en la planta que va con este memorial… podrá también acudir 
alguna gente con petardos a la puerta señalada C y la de Babazon señalada D.” AGS, Estado, Leg. 1952. 
363
 “…[U]na gruta que está cerca del puerto y passa debaxo la mosquea grande que es como decir la iglesia 
mayor y va adentro gran trecho de la ciudad… tendrá diez y ocho píes de alto y catorce de ancho y por 
medio ay un canal hecho a posta que viene a ser el aquaducto por donde salen las vertientes y immundiçias 
del lugar…” Ibid.  
364
 “…[L]a gente que acude es con tanto extremo que puede certificar se despuebla todo el lugar y los 
primeros que acuden es la gente de guerra.” Ibid. 
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survivors “atemoriçado[s]” and unable to protect themselves. His plan, then, was based 
on his direct experience in the city and an understanding of its rhythms, fleshed out with 
in-depth knowledge of explosives substantiated by the evocation of his engineer friend.  
Others boosted their authority as experts by making references to connections with 
insiders who promised to hand the city over to the Spaniards.  Mathias Murillo, a Catalan, 
was captured in 1612 by Algerian corsairs on his way back home from Flanders, where 
he had fought for fifteen years.  Under unknown circumstances, he arrived back home in 
Barcelona after only a few months.  Three years passed before he came to reflect on the 
painful experience of captivity, compiling a long report about Algiers.  Murillo claimed 
that he had befriended a Catalan renegade, Haçan Masul, a Janissary division captain, in 
the prison’s tavern, a space which invited less violent interactions among renegades, 
Turks, and Christians.  Haçan Masul missed his mother and brothers and was 
disenchanted with the life of a Muslim.  He promised to take advantage of his position 
and “help to hand over” Algiers to the Spaniards.  According to Murillo, the Spaniards 
should arrive with thirty galleys and four thousand men to Algiers, march to the New 
Gate, break in with explosives, and proceed to the Kasbah.  The attack would not end 
there, but the key to success, according to Murillo, was taking over the Kasbah.  Murillo 
goes on to explain that four thousand soldiers – a small number in comparison to the 
military manpower in the city – might easily succeed in the takeover since many 
Janissaries were either too young or too unfit to fight.  
In this as in other cases, the Crown wanted to verify the facts before risking a 
fortune in the execution of the plan.  The authors of these texts were usually exact in the 
topographies they laid out, but their plans turned out to be unfounded or the connections 
they laid claim to retracted. In the case of Catena, the Crown decided to accept his advice 
and send the engineer Pedro Pablo Floriano to investigate and verify the feasibility of the 
plan.  Floriano’s report claimed Catena’s plan was unfounded but he presented an 
alternative.365  In the case of Murillo, Prince Filiberto sent a second lieutenant − disguised 
as a merchant − to Algiers to see whether Haçan Masul was still inclined to help the 
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 6.1.1615, Ibid 
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Spaniards to take over.366 Masul was reluctant to speak with Filiberto’s messenger about 
anything other than business.  
Pardo, Catena, and Murillo employed different strategies to authorize their plans.  
We have seen how Catena enhanced the authority of this plan by providing, on the one 
hand, a graphic representation of the narrative, and, on the other, by evoking his friend’s 
professional background as an engineer and as the son of the major engineer of the state 
of Milan.  Such details were meant to compensate for the relative dullness of the reports, 
and perhaps for other weak points.  The fact that his plan relied heavily on the presumed 
terror that would paralyze the residents of Algiers and prevent them from responding to 
the attack is not terribly convincing. This reliance on fear, functioning as it was as a 
strategic fulcrum, was echoed in his preference of the subjunctive over the indicative 
mode, a grammatical mode reflecting feelings rather than facts, and his use of qualifying 
expressions such as ‘it is hard to believe.’ Taken together, these spurious rhetorical 
tactics de-authorized his ambitious plans – “and it is hard to believe they would or could 
resist, as they find themselves so terrorized with so many dead and improviso 
attacked.”367  Catena was aware of this. He also claimed that further investigation was 
needed – “first, there is a need to go back [to Algiers] to better know the cave”368 – 
volunteering to return to Algiers for that purpose with his friend Floriano.  The security 
arrangements at night at the port, he explains, were sloppy – “there are no guards, but one 
Moor, who, upon seeing an arriving ship, asks, ‘who is there?’”  He goes on to add that 
with his knowledge of Arabic, “[a] language in which he is very skilled,” he could easily 
sneak in.369 The fact that the Spaniards followed Catena’s plan and sent someone to 
examine its feasibility reflects the crown’s need for such initiatives; further, the need 
must have been common knowledge among people like Catena who marketed such 
adventure’s designs. The crown accepted Catena and Floriano’s offer to return to the city 
“dressed like a merchant,” to understand how much gunpowder would be required, and 
what the chances were that the plan would work.  Perhaps the fact that the two promised 
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 5.8.1615, AGS, Estado, Leg. 1948, fol. 230. 
367
 “Pues hallándose el pueblo tan atemoriçado  con tantas muertes y asaltado al improvisso no es de creer 
que hagan ni puedan hazer resisetncia…” AGS, Estado, Leg. 1952.  
368
 “Lo primero ha de volver a reconoçer la dicha gruta…” Ibid. 
369
 “…[N]o ay ningunas guardas más de tan solamente un moro que viendo llegar algún navío pregunta 
quién es y para respondelle posee la lengua de que es muy plático…” Ibid. 
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that “everything they offer would cost nothing to his majesty nor risk anyone beyond 
their own lives” helped. 370 This promise, however, did not prevent them from asking 
later for a compensation for their troubles and expenses.  
Pardo’s authorial personality is different.  His status as a Janissary provided him 
with a privileged perspective on the city when compared to that of the average captive.  
He had been captured at a young age and became a professional soldier early.  He 
undoubtedly  mastered Turkish and probably knew at least some Arabic.  This must have 
marked him, from a Spanish point of view, as an authority on military information about 
Algiers.  But the same features that made him a valuable insider also related to his 
conversion to Islam, and hence cast a shade of doubt on his moral persona, his intentions, 
and the reliability of the information he was producing.  In his account, he had to 
negotiate the tensions created by his boundary-crossing position.  At stake was more than 
convincing his interlocutors of the veracity of the topographic and military details he 
provided; as a convert, he was forced to convince them of his sincerity as a royal subject. 
The majority of renegades who ended up in the Holy Office were pardoned with 
relatively light punishments, but a few were burnt at the stake. Thus, theoretically, his 
conversion to Islam brought him great risk beyond the danger of being caught while 
providing false information about the ramparts of Algiers.   
In light of this potentially dangerous situation, Pardo employed a few strategies in 
constructing his narrative.  The first concerned his conversion and return to Spain.  He 
stressed the mitigating circumstances of his conversion, recounting how he had been 
captured as a boy during military service forced to convert under violent circumstances.  
The context of his return was also favorable to him.  Unlike other converts who were 
caught by the Spanish armada, Pardo risked his life in order to return. His account 
emphasizes his escape with three other renegades, after they took over the Muslim crew 
of a settee, and returned to Alicante.  But beyond that, he also constructed a careful and 
balanced description of the city identifying himself as a credible witness.  As we have 
seen, his narrative is exceptionally detailed, yet he explicitly acknowledged the limits of 
his knowledge and distinguished between what he saw himself and what he had heard 
from others. Thus, depicting the casbah, he reported:  
                                                 
370
 Ibid. 
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And as there is no entry to it and only those he [Pardo] mentioned above…. are 
allowed in, he [Pardo] does not know in detail the defenses and fortifications it 
has. But he [Pardo] heard from people who were in that…”371 
Finally, even as Pardo measures and quantifies, his narrative goes beyond the mere 
formal description of a grid and portrays a living social space, the kind of detail that 
reflected his intimate knowledge of it.  His description of the casbah’s moat, for example, 
first provides strategic information: “The casbah and the city have a moat that should be 
more or less twenty feet wide in some parts and about twelve in others.”372 But then the 
text unfolds in other directions.  As a defensive structure, he adds, the moat no longer 
functions:  
It is weak and has little defensive importance… and it is in the process of turning 
into a place in which the children play and where the households placed against 
the wall throw their waste and in some parts [of it] there are orange [trees] and 
other trees.”373  
This addition signals Pardo as a keen observer, sensitive to the social pulse of the urban 
topography and the sense of place attached to the space.374 It also marks a major 
difference between the reports he and others examined in this section produced and de 
Sosa’s Topography. While the latter has repeatedly claimed that he “knew everything that 
occurs in Algiers,” he also described in detail the horrors of his captivity “locked in a 
dungeon, covered with chains, and shackled to a stone.”375 His knowledge of the city then 
was mediated, always transmitted to him by others with whom he had the chance to 
communicate – Muslims, Jews, renegades, and captives. In contrast, the reports of Pardo, 
Catena and Murillo were based on experience which enabled them to claim expertise. 
The numerous reports of this kind produced in the first two decades, then, reflect a 
continuity between the printed elaborated books written by de Sosa, de Torres, and 
Mármol. 
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 “y por no haber entrada en ella ni permitirse sino solo a los que arriba se ha dicho…  no sabe particular 
la defensa que tiene ni que fortificaçión. Pero sabe de personas que entran allí que…” AGS, Estado, Leg. 
1950.  
372
 “Esta alcaçaba y ciudad tiene foso que será de ancho veinte pies por algunas partes y cosa de doçe por 
otras poco más o menos” 
373
 “…[El] qual es baxo y de poca consideraçión y defensa… y biene a ser sitio donde los muchachos 
juegan y se hechan las ynmundiçias de las casas que están arrimadas a los muros y en algunas partes ay 
naranxos y otros árboles.” 
374
 Here, he adds information on what was already written by Sosa, years before, See, De Sosa, chap VIII 
375
 Garcés, “An Early Modern Dialogue with Islam,” p. 45. 
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7. Conclusion 
Captives played an instrumental role in the production and circulation of knowledge 
about Morocco, the Ottoman Maghrib as well as the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The 
works of Mármol, Torres and Sosa, published at the turn of the century, are indicative of 
this fact, but so too were a mass of reports, chronicles, letters, interviews and rumors. 
Placing the published, well-known works within the same historical trajectory of other 
modes of knowledge transmission and circulation suggests continuity, rather than rupture, 
in the West’s objectification of the Maghrib before and after the signing of a peace treaty 
between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in 1581. These forms of knowledge were 
produced in different contexts and were unequally distributed and received.  In some 
cases, information carried across the sea by captives could disseminate quickly in a large 
city and cause public hysteria within the course of a few hours. Other kinds of 
knowledge, more elaborated, such as the chronicles compiled by the captives-spies may 
have, at least in some instances, reached their destination too late, only to become 
irrelevant. 
Linking the violent practice of captive-taking with the production and circulation of 
strategic knowledge on the Maghrib illuminates some of the ways in which the 
‘Mediterranean’ was created and recreated as a product of discourse in the early modern 
period. In previous chapters, we have seen how captivity, while disrupting the lives of 
those who had been taken captive and of their kin, enhanced connectivities across the sea 
and shaped it as a social space. I demonstrated how captives and renegades were subjects 
that an institution like the Inquisition suspected, on the one hand, while, on the other, 
they were the only one who could provide information that would refute such suspicions. 
In this chapter, I have also shown how the traffic in persons across the Mediterranean 
turned captives into knowledge producers and transmitters, participating in a discursive 
articulation of the sea. In this context, as before, captives occupied this dual position: that 
of valuable but suspicious informers. And yet, it was only captives who could put an end 
to such suspicions. The knowledge that captives produced and circulated was strategic in 
nature, and targeted questions of military offence and defense, thus, portraying the sea as 
a vast and conflicted space wherein self-contained political entities found themselves in 
violent struggle. The divisive discourses that these captives produced and spread, 
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however, were blind to their own role as a form of connectivity, furthering links and ties 
between the Maghrib and the Habsburg Empire.  
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Chapter	5:	
Trusting	Masters,	 Faithful	 Captives:	 Small	 Scale	Networks	
of	Ransom,	Credit	and	Trust	
“Privateering was an 
ancient form of piracy . . . with 
its own familiar customs, 
agreements and negotiation.  
While robbers and robbed were 
not actually accomplices before 
the event, like the popular 
figures of the Commedia dell’ 
Arte, they were well used to 
methods of bargaining and 
reaching terms, hence the many 
networks of intermediaries.”  
Fernand Braudel 
1. Introduction	
In this chapter, I examine small-scale networks of credit, ransom and trust and the 
intermediaries that formed them. I posit that these networks thrived throughout the early 
modern period facilitating the ransom of captives independently of the missions of the 
Orders of Redemption.  I demonstrate this by reconstructing and analyzing the mechanics 
that characterized these networks in the seventeenth century, the modalities of ransom 
they facilitated, and the strategies that captives employed to obtain ransom through the 
networks. The focus, then, is on the function of the networks and on moments of friction 
and I examine numerous interactions, conflicts and agreements evolving around ransom 
and involving captives, their kin, and “go-betweens”. Captives could ask their relatives to 
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send money to the Maghrib, arrange credit via “go-betweens,” negotiate their exchange 
for a Muslim enslaved in the Hapsburg Empire, or leave a family member as a hostage in 
captivity and return to Spain to raise the ransom money.  These networks, which 
facilitated a wide array of exchanges, posed serious problems for captives, captors, and 
intermediaries. Contrary to usual commercial practice, ransom was a hostile and fleeting 
business: the parties to ransom agreements were not relatives or colleagues, but rather 
potential enemies; yet they bound themselves in a single business deal, knowing they 
would never be involved in future transactions.376  Trust based on long-term shared 
experience could not be established under these circumstances.  Many deals were 
completed only after captives crossed geographical and imperial boundaries into 
territories that supposedly protected them from their debtors; thus, the task of raising cash 
or getting credit became even harder. In light of the physical violence and religious 
hatred involved in the situation of captivity, how could trust be established? What 
mechanisms enabled such deals and enforced their realization? My analysis stresses the 
surprising role that socialized trust played at different stages of the process and the way 
some modalities of ransom placed captives in positions of power over their captors and 
mediators.  Rather than an unconditional trust between Muslim captors, Jewish “go-
betweens,” and Christian captives, the sentiment of trust in this system was a social 
relation grounded in and guaranteed by an array of royal bureaucracies and legal agents.  
Iberian ransom operations began to leave archival traces as early as the twelfth 
century. They were conducted by individual intermediaries, called alfaqueque (from the 
Arabic al-fakkak) in Castile and exea in Aragon, who ransomed captives across the 
Muslim-Christian and the Castilian-Aragonese frontiers. They were usually active only 
within the vicinity of a single municipal center. The office was codified in the Siete 
Partidas but only in 1410 did the crown nominate a royal alfaqueque, who partly 
coordinated the operations of municipal alfaqueques. The latter, however, maintained 
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independence while the royal office was annulled in the fifteenth century.377 Until the 
fourteenth century, Jews usually occupied this position but then Christians and Muslims 
came to outnumber them.378 The governors and residents of Grenada and Valencia also 
employed al fakkakīn who were sent to Aragon or Castile to ransom Muslims.379 At least 
from the fourteenth century, merchants joined alfaqueques and exeas helping captives 
retrieve their liberty.380 While Afaqueques benefitted from diplomatic immunity, 
merchants took advantage of their commercial contacts across the borders. In that they 
offered their clients similar advantages: they knew the territory better than anyone else, 
acted on the spot and did not wait to collect large sums of money for the ransom of many 
captives as the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians did. Captives’ kin knew that turning to 
alfaqueques or merchants increased the chances they would quickly unite with their 
beloved ones. On the other hand, ransom via alfaqueques was expensive enterprise and 
did not suit everyone..381  
Until recently, scholars have assumed that in the sixteenth century, when the 
Spanish crown began inspecting and regulating the work of the Orders of Redemption, a 
theme I examine in the next chapter, these “go-betweens” were marginalized and 
eventually disappeared. A couple of recent articles have challenged this periodization and 
pointed out the persistence of small scale ransom networks throughout the sixteenth 
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century.382 Such studies do not radically challenge the assumption about the withering 
away of non-institutional networks as part of state-formation, bureaucratization and 
centralization in the early modern period but rather debate the periodization, claiming 
these shifts took place only during the seventeenth century.383 The regulation the Spanish 
crown imposed on the redemptive labor of the Trinitarians and Mercedarians in the late 
sixteenth century multiplied their documental production and it enabled the future 
historical study of their activity; however, it failed to eliminate ransom practices of low-
key players that had developed over a longue durée.  
2. Negotiating Liberty 
Captives in the Maghrib, as we saw in the first chapter, were positioned as parties 
in different kinds of exchanges.  They were given as gifts, rented on a daily basis, 
borrowed on a seasonal basis, given in return for debts, exchanged for other goods, and in 
some cases, were bought in order to be converted and adopted.  These temporary and 
permanent changes were moments of redefinition of captives’ status, privileges, and 
living conditions, but did not bring the desired liberty.384  To achieve that, captives had to 
negotiate other kinds of exchanges.  Via relatives or friends, they could contact the 
Trinitarians or the Mercedarians, orders charged with liberating captives form the 
Maghrib, and asked to be ransomed by the orders. The crown often ransomed its soldiers 
employing the Orders of Redemption or European consuls in the Maghrib for this 
purpose. Captives could also pay for their liberty or arrange an exchange for a Muslim 
enslaved in Christendom.  Many ransom deals involved a combination of payment and 
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exchange, as well as different ransom agents.  Each of these ransom agents and 
modalities of rescue presented masters and slaves with distinct problems.  Rescue via the 
orders may have been safer and more certain but also much slower. Paying ransom 
required borrowing or arranging for money to be sent from home; in some cases, captives 
could arrange for credit or leave a hostage until they paid their debt, a modality that I 
soon discuss.  Exchange of slaves, on the other hand, required captives to participate in 
tracing a Muslim slave in Spain in whom their masters were interested, and negotiating 
the Muslim’s release.  
Some slave owners were reluctant to set their enslaved captives free, and most 
European captives were not ransomed, remaining in North Africa, and becoming an 
integral part of Muslim society.385  When Jerónimo de Pasamonte, who served as a 
galley’s pace-setter, first solicited his ransom, his master refused, saying that he needed 
him in his galleys.386  Diego Galan did not receive an explanation; his master just yelled 
at him, saying that “even if they offer me a thousand ducats, I won’t sell you. . . .”387  For 
the lucky minority who had owners interested in a deal, the first stage was setting up a 
ransom price.  Over the century that this chapter treats, ransom prices ran roughly 
between 150 and 300 escudos, almost a thousand escudos less than what Gracián ended 
up paying.388  Scholars have also pointed out that captives’ values were determined by 
variables such as age, sex, status, wealth, and professional skills.389  But rarely is value an 
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inherent quality of commodities, especially in the case of captives, who form a unique 
commodity being at once object and subject.  
During the negotiations over price, captives intended to manipulate the qualities 
imagined as bestowing them with value, pretending to be poor or rich, healthy or sick, 
possessing or lacking professional skills. Both parties acted coolly, demonstrating 
reluctance to reach a deal.  The first advice Jerónimo Gracián, confessor of Saint Teresa, 
received from a fellow captive in his prison cell in Tunis was, “even if the Pasha talks 
about it, don’t think for a second about dealing with the ransom or talking [about it].  
Rather, answer that you’re ready to die here and that there is nobody in a Christian land 
who remembers you, because there is no other way of winning back your liberty.”390  By 
feigning detachment, captives tried to convince their masters that they would not be able 
to afford a fat ransom price.  Only when the masters’ suspicions were transformed into 
belief (mixed with disappointment) could the parties reach feasible agreements.391 
But if time was the only resource available to captives, how did they win this 
passive interaction?  Supposedly, their time was much more precious than that of their 
masters, who had nothing to lose in comparison with the hardships captives suffered.  
Captives, it is true, suffered more, but slave owners occasionally needed cash.  Captives 
knew, or thought they knew, when masters were prone to break down and reach an 
accord.  In his autobiography, written after the fact, Gracián neatly ties the Pasha’s 
willingness to sell him for a fair price to the Pasha’s acute need of money.  But the letters 
he wrote from Tunis show he was wrong more than once about the Pasha’s intentions and 
priorities.  In June 1594, he excitedly wrote to his mother that the best circumstances for 
an agreement were when the Pasha ended his triennial term.  He should approach the 
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Pasha then, telling him, “you see that much [money, it’s yours] if you want [it], if not, 
stay with me as your captive.”392  A month later, he wrote to Andreas de Córdoba, an 
auditor in the Roman Curia, telling him that when Ottoman office holders end their terms, 
“they have appetite for money and they take anything.”393  However, it took more than 
another year until a deal was signed and he was set free.  Notwithstanding his erroneous 
predictions, captives had assumptions about the “right moment,” and they constantly tried 
to manipulate the circumstances in their favor. João Mascarenhas, captive in the Maghrib 
between 1621 and 1626, took advantage of his poor health to buy his liberty for a low 
price.  As he was recovering, possibly during one of the plagues that occasionally 
devastated the Maghrib, he went to a Morisco doctor and persuaded him to tell his master 
he was about to die.394  His owner, fearing he would earn nothing on his slave, agreed to 
the price Mascarenhas offered.395  Mascarenhas was taking a chance. Plagues could lead 
to a sharp rise in ransom prices, as happened in Algiers in 1691, when the average price 
was doubled from 500 to 1000 ducats.396  But by hoping to make great gains on their 
captives, slave owners risked losing it all, and Mascarenhas, who must have known his 
master better than the latter knew him, was successful in his bet. He succeeded in his plot 
only because of the plague that devastated the city. His case serves as an example of the 
ways in which variables such as age, sex, health and wealth become meaningful and 
determinant only within concrete contexts. 
In the second chapter we have seen how rumors regarding the value of captives 
circulated in the Maghrib. Masters were on the search for such information which they 
perceive as means of gaining information about their captives.  Emanuel d’Aranda, held 
captive in Tunis in 1640, mentions a merchant who, taking advantage of the mail services 
he provided, read captives’ letters to get information about their value.397  For this reason 
he wrote, “it was necessary for a new captive to dissimulate for a while until he would be 
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well informed who was a liar and who was sincere.”398  He was thinking of slaves who 
served their masters as informers, befriending new captives and attempting to extract 
information about their value.399  With that knowledge, slave owners went shopping in 
the slave market and later negotiated profitable ransom deals.  Aranda’s words point out 
the difficulty of establishing trust and striking deals under these circumstances. Beyond 
the preliminary suspicion that must have dictated the relations between Muslim captors 
and Christian captives, Aranda discovered that dissimulation was the norm, and that 
captives could not even trust members of their own confession.  In negotiating their 
identity, captives discovered that things could easily get out of control as in cases of ill-
intended or sincere misidentification, and in the spread of rumors.  Information and 
disinformation mostly carried by captives across the sea constantly circulated between 
the Maghrib and the Habsburg Empire.  But misidentification and rumors were not the 
only reasons for complications in the process of fixing a ransom price, as the case of 
Gaspar Biancalli demonstrates.  This Italian chaplain from Modena had been captured on 
his way to Rome with the luggage of his abbot and held captive in Tunis for at least 
fifteen years.  Inspecting the baggage he carried with him, his captors decided he must 
have been a cardinal.  While he never admitted to being one, he told his owner he was a 
gentilhomme, a tactical mistake which cost him his liberty.  From that point on, his owner 
refused to ransom him for less than two thousand crown.400  
Employing a network of informers and reading captives’ letters were probably the 
masters’ secondary recourses.  For many, it was enough to examine their slaves’ hexis, or 
bodily dispositions.401  The slave owners’ trained gaze easily read through captives’ 
bodies, which often betrayed the latter’s performance of poverty.  When Aranda tried to 
convince his owner’s wife he was a simple soldier, she replied, “[S]ay whatever you’d 
like; nevertheless you’re not like Grégoire.”  Commenting for his readers on her 
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response, Aranda explains that Grégoire was her Galician gardener who was a fisherman 
in his village—“this slave had the right body for work.”402  In like manner, in a scene 
depicted by many captives, slave masters inspected captives’ bodies and teeth in the slave 
market, estimating and calculating their potential exchange and labor value.403   
Captives then could manipulate both the willingness of their owners to sell them 
but also the desire of potential buyers for them. And as surprising as it may sound, they 
often collaborated with their masters and together manipulated a go-between. This 
happened when masters who sought to convince Trinitarians or Mercedarians that their 
slaves were badly ill or expressed their will to convert to Islam and thus had to be 
immediately ransomed, promised their slaves a share of what the Orders would pay 
them.404 
Political circumstances could also radically alter the value of captives. The peace 
agreements negotiated between France, and later the Dutch Republic, and the Ottoman 
Empire and its North African regencies meant that Algerians, Tunisians, and others were 
obliged to set free all French and Dutch captives they owned.405 While this affected only 
French captives and not Habsburg subjects, it sheds light on larger dynamics that 
structured the market.  The fact that such agreements were negotiated meant that the price 
of French captives was cheaper than that of others. Laurent d’Arvieux had already 
noticed that phenomenon: “[M]asters always fear that the King would take [their slaves] 
because of whatever treaty and that they would be obliged to give up [their slaves] for the 
price they [originally] paid for them.”406  It is clear that once peace negotiations began, 
the price of French subjects decreased. Guillermo – or Morat, the name he received after 
his conversion – was captured together with other French subjects and, as he later (in 
1634) recounted to his inquisitors, “was sold [in a] very cheap [price] because peace was 
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negotiated between the King of France and the Moors.”407 Buyers were willing to pay 
less in such moments as they knew that they were risking their money; and sellers fearing 
they would lose all their money, consented to reduced prices. Political, non-economic 
events such as these radically stirred the market, lowering the prices of captives as their 
future status became unclear.  
Peace agreements had further implications. Slave owners possessing French slaves 
refused to give them up without a struggle. One way of avoiding the concession of 
captives to the French consul was to convert them. Conversion of slaves immediately 
devaluated them from a Christian perspective.  The fact that the market of ransom was 
not the only one in which captives functioned as commodities was important. Captives 
had an exchange value, but always also a use-value, and the two worked together 
influencing each other in various ways. While captives lost exchange value as Muslim, 
they maintained their use-value and could still serve their masters as manpower. Thus, 
following the signing of such truces, and towards the actual execution of the articles in 
the signed agreements that related to captives, owners did what they could to convert 
their captives. 
As argued in the first chapter, only rarely masters pushed their slaves to convert. In 
contrast to early modern Christian propaganda, Muslims did not try to convert their 
captives – excluding children, whom they converted when they could. Masters were 
reluctant to convert their slaves for reasons mentioned above. Once converted, slaves lost 
their exchange value, while the masters lost their revenues.408 Once Muslims, they could 
not be sold as captives. In fact, as demonstrated in chapter one, there is plenty of 
evidence of Muslim masters objecting to Christians’ requests to convert to Islam. 
Moreover, in contrast to how Christians imagined conversion within this context, it did 
not imply automatic liberty. Nevertheless, converted captives gained more freedom of 
movement and over time manumission.  The signing of peace agreements, though, 
formed exceptional moments during which masters did what they could to convert their 
slaves. Several French renegades who voluntarily returned to Spain or were brought back 
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there by Spanish forces attested to how their masters, fearing losing their investment in 
their captives, forced them to convert. The same Guillermo whose case I just mentioned 
recalled how the Muslim infantry captain who bought him “treated him badly saying that 
he should not lose his money because the French ambassador would go and get him free, 
and this way he was forced to convert.”409 A similar story was told by Abrahán Clemente 
or Suliman: “As then the Algerians negotiated peace with the Dutch in the same way they 
did with the French these years, out of fear that he would be liberated, his owners treated 
him badly and forced him to convert.”410 Conversion then was employed by Muslim 
masters to manipulate their slaves’ confession and hence to devaluate them in the market 
of ransom while preserving their value as manpower.411  
Conversion, however, could be used to manipulate value in other contexts, for 
example, vis-à-vis the Mercedarians and Trinitarians. Mercedarians in a ransom 
expedition in Algiers, in September 1661, described how one day four Catalan boys 
appeared in the house where they lodged, threatening them that if the Mercedarians 
“would not ransom them they would immediately convert in their presence.” As 
mentioned, Muslims rarely accepted conversion of Christians to Islam, but the fact that 
the Catalans were boys makes the story plausible. In threatening the Mercedarians with 
conversion and forcing the friars to rescue them, the Catalans revealed the religious 
ideology behind the Orders ransom expeditions. What was important for the 
Mercedarians and Trinitarians was not the termination of the institution of slavery but 
rather the salvation of Christian souls.412 Since the redemptionists had already spent all 
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the money they brought for ransom, one of them remained in Algiers as a hostage, 
allowing the Catalans to return home with the rest of the rescued.413  
3. Raising Cash 
Once a ransom price was set, captives had to find cash or arrange for credit in 
order to execute the deal.  In the first chapter, we have seen some of the ways in which 
captives earned money. Some used their savings and sold their belongings; others 
received money their relatives sent them, or took loans from intermediaries.  Collecting 
the money independently without the help of local intermediaries was a task that could 
last years and the majority of the captives could not save enough money for such an 
expensive operation. 
A common solution to the problem of money was begging. The abundance of 
petitions for begging permits that were submitted by captives’ kin to the Council of 
Castile testifies to this. The basic story in these petitions was the captive’s. Whether 
captives wrote their kin or addressed the bureaucracy directly, they always recounted 
how they were captured. There is little if any information about life in captivity. Where 
this is represented, two opposing and complementing tropes are used – misery and 
heroism. Miguel de la Varrera, who was captured with his pregnant wife and taken to 
Algiers, left her behind as a hostage and returned to Spain to find money for her ransom. 
In his petition, he asked for a begging permit “in light of the heavy troubles and labors 
they suffered.”414 Often, the danger of forced conversion to Islam is evoked. Its mention 
could have reflected masters’ attempts to scare the captives into urging kin to send them 
money. But equally, this could have been the attempts of captives’ kin to convince the 
magistrates of the merit and the pressing necessity of their petitions.  
Some captives, albeit not necessarily soldiers, rendered a variety of services to the 
Crown. These services were later described at length in the requests written during their 
time in captivity.  For instance, Simón Méndez recounted in his petition how:  
[he] was held captive thirty-two years in Barbary in the hands of King Muley 
Xeque. He received many favors from the said king and gained many temporal 
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goods, which he spent on ransoming captives and helping their needs and in 
accompanying them on their way out of captivity, and he provided the agents of 
your majesty with many reports about matters concerning the service of your 
majesty…415 
Mendez added that he “mastered the Arabic language” and “was experienced in the 
entries and exits of all Barbary.”416 He was not alone in “ransoming captives” and acting 
as a spy during his captivity. Bautista Fernández asked a begging permit to pay the debts 
caused by the payment of his ransom claiming that he remained in Istanbul for a while 
after his ransom “providing many services such as giving reports to spies and [helping] 
Christian captives to retrieve their liberty.”417 While they fashioning themselves as what 
we may call experts on practical knowledge of the Orient, Méndez, Fernández, and others 
were hinting, often in explicit words, that the debt they were hoping to pay with the 
king’s help was the result of their services to the king. When such claims were supported 
with the right evidence they usually achieved the desired outcome. In addition to spying 
and helping other captives, the promise of future service was a third motif appearing in 
many soldiers’ petitions. In the case of captives captured during their military service, 
this promise sealed the story-line that framed their petition. 
Like other bureaucratic autobiographies,418 the petitions formed polyphonic 
artifacts coauthored over time and by various authors.419 Masters were also parties in the 
letters’ writing process. The traces of the negotiation and information that only masters 
could provide are clear in many petitions. First, the masters were partly responsible for 
the agreed ransom price. Second, when a Muslim enslaved in Spain was demanded in 
return for a Christian, the master dictated to his captives the name, description, and place 
of enslavement of the Muslim they hoped to ransom. Diego Lopez de Acosta, for 
instance, wrote a letter to Tomas Velásquez de Oliver explaining that his master would 
exchange him for a Muslim slave. He directed Velásquez de Oliver to buy “in Sanlucar 
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[de Barrameda in western Adalusia] a Turk that lives in the street of the Bretons, and his 
owner is called Nicolás Rubin” information doubtlessly dictated to him by his master, 
who must have received it from the ‘Turk.’420 
Military service, sufferings or heroic actions, promises of future service, fear of 
forced conversion, and abject poverty were the elements forming the petitions. These 
elements made for pathetic or exciting stories; surely these were true for the captives and 
their families. However, they were not enough to convince the addressed magistrates of 
the narratives’ truthfulness; the captives were aware of this fact. These bureaucrats were 
the addressees of the petitions but also their coaxers. I am referring to them as coaxers 
not in the sense that they solicited the petitions,421 but rather that the petitions were 
formulated and supported according to a logic emanating from the bureaucracy in 
question. This logic was known to all the involved authors, and thus must have circulated 
as far as the Maghrib. 
Bureaucrats framed the standards for writing petitions by making the submission of 
supporting documents almost mandatory. Official guidelines regarding the records that 
made a petition meritorious were never issued. And yet petitioners seem to have known 
what these were. They knew they had to support their case with evidence in the form of 
documentation – letters, testimonies, accounts – and the more, the better. Despite the fact 
that these rules were only implied, many of the surviving records make explicit 
references to the originary instance that led to the petition’s inception. The comments on 
supporting records as well as their tone attest to the records’ importance, and reflect how 
captives and their families tried to accommodate the logic of the bureaucracy. The 
minutes from May 18, 1590, for example, summarized on behalf of the Dominican Lucas 
Sardo and the Franciscan Viçincio Alcamo, refer to the letter the two sent from Algiers– 
“by a letter that they sent his majesty from Algiers in that year…“422 And in the petition 
of Catalina Gutierez regarding her son’s captivity in Istanbul, the magistrates indicated 
that Gutierez “presented a summarized interrogation of witnesses (información) and a 
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letter which she says are from the said captive.”423 The magistrates of the Council of 
Castile and of the Council of War almost always commented in their minutes on the 
submitted evidence – “[P]resents an interrogation of witnesses (información) by which 
what he claims in his petition is proved.”424 When dealing with poorly supported 
petitions, the magistrates expressed their doubts emphasizing the petition’s weakness. In 
the case of the Franciscan, Antonio Castro, the bureaucrats commented that Castro 
submitted nothing but the memorial unfolding his story and the help he requested.425 The 
importance of the captive’s original letter, as evidence authenticating claims about past 
captivity, also stands out in Mencia Alonso’s petition. Alonso, whose son was captured 
during his military service, somehow lost the letter he sent her. But being aware of the 
importance of documentary evidence, she presented a record in which the village priest 
attested to seeing her son’s letter. Her record reads, “[Alonso] presents a certificate from 
the priest of the said village in which the latter says that he saw a letter written by the said 
captive [informing] how he is doing.”426 
The petitions’ goal was to find the money with which to execute the ransom. 
Captives caught during their military service sent their kin to the Council of War. So did 
those who had to exchange for their liberty Muslims enslaved in the Spanish royal fleet. 
Families of captives with no military record and no money of their own applied for a 
begging permit from the Council of Castile. Hardly ever did captives expect the king to 
fully fund their rescue and return home. Their requests were usually much more modest. 
Many simply asked for a one- or two-year begging license. Soldiers asked for the salaries 
the Crown owed them for the years they served before falling prey to North African 
corsairs. The begging permits were usually conceded for one year and were limited to 
certain defined regions. Sometimes captives asked their kin to sell their property.  
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Money loans were not available for all captives and some captive had no relatives 
upon whom they could rely. Captives who were captured with other family members 
often collected money together, ransomed one of their group who had promised to leave 
for Spain and either return with money or with smugglers to smuggle the rest who 
remained in captivity.  In Miguel de Cervantes’ “Captive’s Tale,” the narrator, a captive, 
describes how he, along with his fellow captives, arranged the money to ransom one of 
them. They all volunteered to return to Spain promising to rescue the rest but a renegade 
in the narrator’s group objected the arrangement saying: 
Under no circumstances would he consent to one man escaping to freedom until 
all of us could escape together, for experience had taught him how badly free men 
kept the promises made in captivity… [Because] the freedom they obtained and 
the fear of losing it again erased from their memories every obligation they had in 
the world.427 
 
Credit could be produced in alternative ways in which trust played an even larger role.  
Confiding in their captors, captives who were enslaved with family members negotiated 
their ransom price and then left their dear ones behind as they went to search for money 
to buy their liberty.  This was the case of María de Mendoça, a pregnant woman who was 
captured with her husband and their sons by the Ottomans in 1574.  Her captors killed her 
husband and took her to Istanbul, where she gave birth to a daughter.  Thirteen years 
later, she finally reached an agreement with her captors according to which she and her 
children would be freed at the bargain price of 600 ducats.  Leaving behind her sons as 
hostages, she returned to Spain with her daughter, applied for a begging license, and 
begged alms in hopes of gathering enough money to ransom them.428 Bárbara Truiol, 
from the island of Minorca, described in a petition sent to the Council of Aragon how, 
together with her husband and children, she was captured by corsairs and taken to Tunis. 
Truiol and her husband negotiated an agreement according to which her husband and 
three-year-old baby stayed as hostages, while she and the rest of their children returned 
home.429 These alternative forms of producing credit reflect the active role women often 
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occupied in ransom agreements, a point to which we will return in the next section. At the 
same time, they left us with some of the earliest testimonies of female captives.430 
Usually, however, it was the husbands who left their wives behind as hostages 
while they crossed the Mediterranean back to the Peninsula and tried to collect money.  
Salvador Losacato, resident of Trapani, served in the Spanish forces in the fort of la 
Goleta near Tunis.  When the Turks occupied Tunis and the fort in 1574, he was taken 
captive with his wife and children and taken to Istanbul.  More than a decade later he 
negotiated an agreement with his captors—“he left [his wife and children] cut in 700 
ducats.”  He had a year and a half to execute the agreement and he petitioned the king for 
the salaries owed him for his service.  The crown’s debt, however, was less than a 
hundred ducats.  Nevertheless, the Council of War recommended helping him, as he fell 
captive during his service, and ransoming his wife and children was considered good 
Christian works.431  Others had to ask for a permit to beg alms. Miguel de la Varrera, 
resident of Seville, was captured with his pregnant wife, María Fernández, and twenty 
other passengers of a sailing boat.  They were taken to Algiers where Abrahán Colirio, a 
slave trader, bought them.  De la Varrera had to leave his wife and the baby she gave 
birth to, return to Spain, and beg alms to collect the money to ransom her.432   
The element of mutual trust in these exchange deals should not be underestimated.  
The images of the cruelty of captivity in Muslim hands must have made it hard for 
mothers, husbands, or brothers to leave their relatives alone with their captors.  Jerónimo 
Gracián, for example, wrote that whenever the Turks celebrated and got drunk, they “laid 
their hands on the little boys and force[d] circumcision on them.”433  Similar images of 
abuse circulated in the Iberian Peninsula.  Consequently, María de Mendoça and others 
must have developed a sense of trust in their captors. And to some extent, the 
establishment of trust must have been mutual.  As unlikely as it may sound, Muslim 
captors had to believe their captives’ promises to return to ransom their relatives when 
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they issued them safe passes without being paid. This was especially true in the case of 
weaker family ties and friendships.  
4. “…[P]ara que me saque cabesa por cabesa…”: Exchanging 
Slaves 
Captivity and slavery of Muslims and Christians suggest striking similarities. 
Despite the parallels, such narratives do not form part of the same historiography. The 
underlying scholarly assumptions are that, despite the structural similarities and the 
systematic connections between the two cases, we are dealing with two distinct historical 
phenomena: enslavement of Muslims in the south of Europe, and captivity of Christians 
in the Maghrib. Yet, the captivity trajectories of many captives do intersect just before the 
moment of their ransom when they were exchanged, one for the other. Let us examine the 
stories of Babçain and Domingo Alvarez. 
In the winter of 1613, Babaçain left the port of Algiers captaining a saetia, one of 
the ships with Latin sails used by North African corsairs, and headed north to the Spanish 
coast in the hope of capturing Christians to sell back at home. At the time, Babaçain was 
seventy years old and probably already had plans to retire. This could have been his last 
embarkation. Sadly, two leagues—around five miles—away from Cartagena, the 
Algerian ships ran into a Spanish royal squadron. After a brief battle, the Algerians had to 
acknowledge defeat. Babaçain was taken captive by the captain of the Patrona Real, the 
galley leading the squadron. He and his crew members were interrogated, enslaved, and 
put to work as oarsmen in the royal fleet. 
Two years earlier, in 1611, Sergeant Domingo Alvarez, a Spaniard serving Philip 
III, was posted with his company—a body of close to 150 soldiers—in Oran, the largest 
Spanish fort-city in North Africa. Unfortunately, en route, his ship ran into Algerian 
corsairs. After a brief battle, the Spaniards had to acknowledge defeat, and Alvarez and 
his comrades were taken captive and enslaved as rowers on the galleys of the Algerians' 
corsairs, possibly of the kind that Babaçain had captained. 
In the years following his capture, Babaçain never lost hope, and kept writing 
letters and sending messages through a network of merchants, soldiers, and ransomed 
captives—both Christians and Muslims—that crisscrossed the Mediterranean. Providing 
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his wife with the name of the galley on which he was enslaved was only the first step 
towards retrieving his liberty. However, from that point on, she had to take the lead in 
arranging his release. The chance of the king’s slaves – such as Babaçain – buying their 
liberty was even smaller than that of urban household slaves. Rather than independently 
negotiating it, they had to find a Christian proxy who would do it on their behalf. Some 
of the intermediaries who ransomed Christian captives also ransomed Muslims, but the 
Muslims they ransomed were not galley slaves.434 The surest way of finding a Christian 
agent who would free her husband, a galley slave, was to force someone to do it. 
Yet how might an old Algerian woman force a Spaniard to act on her behalf, and 
safely return her husband home? Purchasing a Christian captive, preferably a soldier, was 
her best shot. Indeed, that’s exactly what Babaçain’s wife did. She bought Domingo 
Alvarez from his owner, neither to have him as a servant in her household, nor to profit 
from his ransom, but to use him to get her husband back. Her selection was not arbitrary; 
she must have first asked around, ascertaining that he would fulfill her needs. Alvarez 
belonged to the massive class of poor captives who rarely had the means to ransom 
themselves. Given this, his price would not have been too high and, if he wanted to return 
home, he would have to obey her demands. But there was another reason for which she 
preferred him over other captives: he was a soldier with many years of service behind 
him. As such, he was in a better position than “civil” captives to ask favors from the king. 
And that is exactly what he was expected to do: write to the king and ask to be exchanged 
in return for her husband. Poor Alvarez was happy to cooperate. In the petition he sent 
the Council of War in April 1616, he wrote that “after serving his majesty for many years 
in the royal navy . . . he was captured by the Turks of Algiers,”435 thus stressing his 
history of service. He added, likely at the urging of Babaçain’s wife, that “he has no 
possessions with which to ransom himself, and the said moor, his mistress, was 
determined that no sum could convince her to give him his freedom other than her own 
husband’s liberty.”436  
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The crown was reluctant to accept this kind of deal and the archive of the Council 
of War preserves many orders the king issued to the royal fleet throughout the 
seventeenth century, prohibiting the concession of galley slaves to individuals.437 The 
crown resisted such exchanges for three reasons. First, the royal fleet was in constant 
shortage of slaves; second, Spanish bureaucrats feared that Muslim ship captains would 
revert to their earlier practice of predating Spanish ships and coasts and capturing 
Spaniards; third, although the crown prohibited handing over enslaved Muslim corsairs to 
Christian petitioners hoping to save their dear ones, it was occasionally involved in and 
even initiated such exchanges when the captives were influential powerful nobles or 
officers.  
The somewhat confusing classification system of Muslim slaves developed by the 
bureaucrats of the Spanish fleet reflects these reasons. The fleet officers distinguished 
between “corsairs” or “captains of Arab ships” (arraezes) on the one hand and “Moors of 
ransom” (moros de rescate) and “important Moors” (moros de consideración) on the 
other.  Somewhat ironically, these petitioners were granted the slave they asked for only 
if he was not classified as “a moor of ransom,” in which case the crown kept him for 
future exchange of rich or important figures. Petitioners, familiar with this system, 
employed the fleet’s classifications when applying to the crown. María de Puçeula, 
hoping to exchange her husband captured in Tétouan, petitioned the crown in 1587 for 
the brother-in-law of her husband’s master. In her petition, she wrote that the requested 
slave is “neither an arraez nor (a Moor) of importance."438 Similarly, in 1616, Juan López 
Malvada stated in his petition that Ahmed, the slave he asked for “was not an arraez or (a 
Moor) of ransom.”439 
The abundance of archival documentation reflecting the objection of the crown to 
such exchanges attests to the persistence of this practice. The petitions Spaniards 
submitted to the crown placed in motion investigations regarding the status of the 
requested slave. The story of Elvira García, a widow from the city of the Port of Santa 
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Maria, near Cadiz, illustrates the bureaucratic trajectories of these petitions. Elvira’s story 
is more typical, as it generally fell to women on both sides of the sea to negotiate such 
exchanges on behalf of husbands, brothers, or sons. García’s only son, Diego, enlisted as 
a cabin boy on a ship that, in 1593, was captured by the galleys of the Sultan of Morocco. 
The eighteen-year-old youth was enslaved with the rest of the sailors. Despite her 
poverty, García did all she could to ransom Diego, but without success. Two years later, a 
Moroccan widow whose son Ahmed was enslaved on the Spanish royal galley La 
Granada contacted García. The Moroccan wrote to her, saying, “she will ask the king (of 
Morocco) to give her as alms the other Christian (García’s son) so [that in exchange for 
him] they will give her back her son.”440 García immediately addressed the king through 
his Council of War, recounting the sufferings of her child and the offer made to her by 
Ahmed’s mother. She asked that, “in light of that the king will give her as a favor the . . . 
Moor in order to complete the exchange with her son.”441   
As in the case of Alvarez and Babaçain, the Council of War deferred to the king for 
instructions and was ordered to contact the contador of the royal galleys, the person in 
charge of the books listing the slaves working in the galleys, and to ascertain Ahmed’s 
status. In this way, the Council would determine the Muslim slave's role on the ship on 
which he was held, the circumstances of his capture, and his current age. If the fleet 
officers decided that the slave in question was not “a Moor of ransom” and thus, 
ironically, exchangeable, they would send their decision to the Council, which would in 
turn pass it on to the king. This was the case of the petition of Jerónimo de Arambuza, a 
Christian who dealt in ransom and occasionally worked with the crown as ransom agent. 
In response to his petition in which he requested a Muslim enslaved in a Spanish galley, 
the fleet officers wrote the crown that “[we] examined the entry [this slave] has in the 
books of our offices, and it does not seem [that he] is either an arraez or [a moor] of 
ransom.”442 
Problems arose when the petitioners and the contador or other fleet officers 
disagreed about a slave's status. Such disagreements resulted from incorrect or debated 
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enlistment of Muslim slaves at the time of their capture, or when they were delivered to 
the fleet officers. Sometimes, captains who caught Muslims falsely claimed they were 
corsairs, in order to get a greater bonus. Juana de los Santos argued in her petition that the 
captain who caught Hamete Muxi lied when he listed him as an arraez – “and the captain 
who captured him, in order to increase his benefits, despite the fact he [the Muslim] was 
someone else, handed him to them [galleys’ officers] as an arraez.”443 When petitioners’ 
requests were refused due to the status the crown attributed to the slave in question, they 
tried to trace Christian captives that had been previously held on the Muslim ship where 
the slave they wanted was captured. They took the testimonies of these ex-captives, 
hoping to convince the fleet officers of the petition’s merit. Juana de los Santos acted 
differently: she provided the testimony of Luis de Guerra, a Portuguese Trinitarian who 
was held hostage in Tétouan for many years, who swore that Hamete Muxi, the Muslim 
slave de los Santos requested from the crown, was "of no importance (baxo)."  
Juana de los Santos soon discovered that even this was not enough—the 
adelantado denied her the slave she needed for the ransom of her husband.  In her 
petition to the crown, she complained that the adelantado was “always looking for 
excuses and not feeling the sufferings of the Christian captives.”444 The adelantado stood 
in the way of others as well. Ysabel Hernández, Antón Rodriguez’s wife, claimed “that 
even though she went to the adelantado with the two said writs (cedula), he refused to 
give her the said Turk whom she demanded.”445 In other words, getting royal writs 
ordering the fleet officers to hand over slaves to petitioners was not always sufficient 
evidence, and different officers along the chain of command could prevent the execution 
of such exchanges. 
Barring objections from the fleet officers, the petitioners could advance to the next 
step. These deals involved a twofold exchange. When and if the crown finally agreed to 
concede its galley slaves, it demanded alternative ones in return. While the slaves 
petitioners sought were usually old, weak, and sick—or at least that was how petitioners 
portrayed them in their requests—the ones that the crown demanded in their place had to 
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be young, healthy and strong. Thus, before the petitioners got the slave they needed, they 
had to obtain another with whom they would pay the crown. This point is important, as it 
suggests that not all captives in the Mediterranean were purchased either for profit from 
ransom or for their enslavement. At least some North Africans bought Christian slaves in 
order to exchange them for their dear ones enslaved in Spain; at least some Christians 
bought Muslim slaves in order to exchange them for another Muslim slave, by which 
they may obtain the release of their relatives. Thus, enslavement of Christians and 
Muslims was, in some cases, interdependent. That Spaniards who formed parties in such 
ransom coalitions had to provide the crown with alternative slaves further complicates 
this interdependence, and points out the self-perpetuating nature of these violent practices 
and exchanges. 
 
5. Providing Credit, Intermediating Ransom 
 
Captives who sought ransom could commission one of many intermediaries who 
provided such services as well as occasionally the much needed credit. Jews played a 
central role in the economy of ransom both independently of the Orders of Redemption 
and in collaboration with them. In contrast to Christian merchants, following their 
expulsion, Jews needed a special permit, from the Inquisition, the governors of the 
Spanish garrisons in the Maghrib, or a royal Council in order to enter the peninsula to 
take care of their ransom business. This was true both for Jews living under Spanish rule 
in the North African presidios and for Ottoman or Moroccan subjects. The better studied 
case of the Jewish community of Oran, the largest and most important Spanish fort-town 
in the Maghrib, demonstrates that.446 The leading families of the community, the 
Çaportas and the Cansino families, participated directly and indirectly in ransom 
operations. They donated large sums of money for ransom deals that individuals 
negotiated and to the Mercedarian convent in Oran. In fact, the Mercedarians in Oran felt 
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so indebted to members of the Çaportas family that in 1653 Diego de Majares and Juan 
Trevinos, brothers in the Mercedarian convent in town, faked municipal documents in an 
attempt to help the family in its struggles against the Governor General, probably as a 
sign of gratitude for the favors granted by family members to Christian captives.447 But 
Jews also actively rescued Christians, taking advantage of their social networks that 
stretched across the Maghrib. There was a rough geographic division of labor between 
the families. The Çaportas had better links in Fez and Marakesh, the Cansino in 
Tlemecen and even in Algiers.448 In 1613, for example, in one of the failing attempts to 
ransom the Trinitarian Bernardo Monroy from Algiers, the Çaportas family agreed to 
donate ten thousand ducats for his rescue.449 The power and contacts of these families 
were known among Spaniards who served in the Maghrib. Pedro de Bricuela, a captain in 
the Armada del mar Oceano, captured in 1614 and taken to Algiers sent a petition to the 
Council of War. Bricuela pleaded the members of the Council to ask Yaho Çaportas, via 
the governor of Oran, to assist with his ransom.450 The Çaportas and Cansino facilitated 
the ransom of Christian captives until their expulsion from the city in 1669.451 
Moroccan Jews also cooperated with the Orders on many levels. In the next 
chapter, I examine in detail Jewish “go-betweens” that worked with the Orders in 
Tétouan, a central destination of the Orders. Here, it is enough to mention one Jewish 
merchant from the community. Jacob Crudo had commercial links in Algiers and even as 
far as Annaba and the ransom deals he cut may have stretched east across the sea to 
Livorno.452 Crudo worked with the Mercedarians renting them his house in Tétouan when 
they came to buy captives in 1590 and 1596 and negotiated on their behalf better prices 
and deals.  In establishing these contacts, Crudo hoped to facilitate his immigration to 
Spain.453 Indeed, in 1596, he moved to Seville but was arrested for wondering its streets 
“dressed in a Christian habit and dealing and trading out in the open thus causing a great 
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scandal.”454 To his inquisitors, Crudo presented warm letters of recommendation from the 
governor of Ceuta, the duke of Medina-Sidonia and two Mercedarian brothers to whom 
he helped in Tétouan but the letters did not help, and by the end of the year he was back 
in Tétouan dealing again with the Mercedarians. The situation was similar in the rest of 
the Maghrib. Large cities like Algiers and Tunis often had two Jewish communities: a 
local one and the Livornese. European authors described the first as poor and despised by 
the Muslims while the latter benefitted from the same privileges as Christian merchants 
and were extremely involved in the ransom market. Tassy claimed the Livornese 
controlled the commerce in goods, slaves and captives in all the towns of Algiers.455 
Jerónimo Gracián held captive in Tunis between 1592 and 1594 was ransomed by Simon 
Askenazi, a member of the Jewish community of Tunis, who kept ransoming captives at 
least until 1617.456 Askenzi, one of these merchants whose business stretched across the 
Mediterranean to Italy, agreed to help Gracián in exchange for the recovery of his goods 
confiscated in Naples. Salomon Pariente and Abraham Ben Waish, both active in the first 
decades of the seventeenth century, were other Moroccan Jews who often dealt with 
ransom of captives. The first traded political secrets, and was involved in the negotiations 
between the Moroccan Sultan and the Spanish Monarch over Larache (El Araich);457 the 
second served as a commercial and diplomatic agent of Mawlay Zidan at least from 
1608.458  
The fact that the economy of ransom was never fully monopolized by these 
ecclesiastical and royal institutions was clear to the small-scale ransom agents. Indeed 
some of them manifested a clear sense of their own position within this economy, 
envisioned themselves as more than simple intermediaries, and tried to reshape the 
boundaries of the market and monopolize it. One of these was Judas Malaqui, a Jewish 
merchant from Tétouan who was one of the suppliers of the Peñón de Vélez, a Spanish 
fort in Morocco. Like other Jewish merchants, Malaqui combined ransom with other 
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commercial activities. Due to his ambition, he had left us with a relatively long trail of 
archival traces scattered in various archives. His career illuminates how ransom for these 
merchants formed one of a few commercial activities and how they employed ransom to 
legitimize their position as suppliers of provisions for the Spaniards.  Moreover, it 
reflects how Jews and Muslims formed commercial companies together and were partner 
in ransom deals.  
Malaqui appears in the sources for the first time in 1585 when he was detained 
upon arrival in Málaga. He was eventually released, as he carried a safe pass issued by 
Diego de Vera, the commander of the Peñón de Vélez that allowed him to go to Spain. 
The purpose of Malaqui’s visit was to collect money owed him on account of a few boys 
and girls whom he had already rescued and who were held in custody in Tétouan.  
Four years later, in 1589, he appears again in the archives. This time Malaqui made 
an offer to the Spanish crown, hoping to become its exclusive ransom agent in the 
Maghrib and promising to  
Get all the Christian captives from all of Barbary and Algiers… [and] I offer to 
bring them to whatever part your highness asks me; in two thirds of the price it 
would cost anyone else ransoming them, be they [from] the Holy Trinity or from 
our Lady of Mercy.459   
Malaqui was confident about his skills and contacts and apparently could ransom more 
captives than the Orders of Redemption, in relation to whom he repeatedly positioned 
himself: 
In the journey I have just executed, I brought nineteen captives, among them five 
women and four babies, two of whom are nursing at the breast, and these women 
and children I got out of the house of the king of Fez; and not one of those who 
ransom [captives] could ransom them for any price; and together with these I 
brought ten men with the intention that they will pay me from the alms of the 
redemption of captives of the [Holy] Trinity and the [Holy] Mercy.460 
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His success in rescuing women, babies, and young children was exceptional. Many 
narrative sources, histories and pamphlets published by Mercedarians or Trinitarians and 
literary works, attest to the reluctance of Muslim captors to let Christian women and 
children free. Philip II accepted Malaqui’s offer and he became a professional ransom 
agent of the crown, a position he occupied until at least the end of 1595. The contract he 
negotiated with the crown obliged him to send hostages to Málaga. Two Spaniards were 
to be held hostages in Fez or Tétouan.461 As hostages, Malaqui sent two Muslim business 
associates; one of them, the merchant Hamete Madan from Fez, stayed there until at least 
1595.462  At the same time, Malaqui also invested in the mining business in Spain, and 
the hostages he provided, who were experts on mining—“two Moors of Barbary which 
understand a lot [in mining]”—worked for him in this field. 463 Beyond the fulfillment of 
the formal requirement of the contract, and probably in order to solidify his connections 
in the peninsula, one of Malaqui’s sons was sent to Málaga, where he converted to 
Christianity and was baptized as Juan Bautista de Padilla.464 
Ransom was just one of the commercial activities in which Malaqui dealt. When 
he was arrested in Málaga in 1588, he claimed he was “well-known” in the Peñón de 
Vélez and had: 
Many friendship[s] and business and that he provided there many services to his 
majesty provisioning the residents with many kinds of food supplies and gifts for 
the sick in time of hunger and need [and] providing many important reports 
risking his life and ransoming captives with his efforts in very moderate prices.465 
 
The spectrum of his activities reflects the density of the net of relations he established in 
the garrison. He provide its residents with “olives, meat, clothes, and footwear” and was 
also involved in the local Christian economy of salvation giving alms to the sick and 
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needy, and ransoming Christian children, saving their souls from conversion to Islam. 
Ransom served the rest of his business and never became his main trade. That is why he 
demanded to be paid with “woolen cloth, hats, and silk” rather than with money.466 His 
ties in Fez and Tétouan provided him access to information valuable for the Christians—
“very beneficial to the service of his majesty”467—which he submitted in the form of 
reports of espionage. The fact that he represented the Muslim and Jewish merchants in 
legal debates against the Christian authorities of the fort marked him as possessing 
important social capital,468 and probably bestowed further credibility regarding his access 
to information sensitive for the Christians. His links, influence, and position among Jews, 
and more importantly Muslims, were just as important in boosting his power among the 
Spaniards. But the economy of reputation and influence worked both ways and Malaqui’s 
regular travels to Spain must have strengthened his position among the Muslims and 
Jews. There are no traces about Malaqui and his involvement in the market of ransom 
after 1595, but the mention of his name in an Inquisition case in 1600 suggests that, at 
some point, he converted to Christianity and moved his base to the Peninsula, perhaps in 
order to enhance his influence in the Peñón de Vélez and other Spanish posts in North 
Africa.469 
Jews, however, were not alone in the trade. Despite the fact that fewer sources 
mention Arabs, Moriscos, and renegades dealing with ransom, these groups also 
mediated between masters and enslaved captives.  Often, Renegades could employ their 
relatives in the Habsburg Empire for the execution of ransom deals they negotiated. One 
Bautista Fernandez, who had been ransomed by a renegade in Istanbul, applied for a 
begging license in 1589 in order to raise money and pay his debt to the mother of the 
renegade, to whom his relatives had given guaranties.470  Similarly, Muslims and 
Moriscos dealt with captives and acted as intermediaries for the Orders of Redemption. In 
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1588, one Agi Mami, “a native of Africa,”471 ransomed eighteen soldiers captured in La 
Goleta and Tunis.  Upon their arrival in Naples, they escaped without paying their debts.  
Mami asked the crown to pay him from the salaries it owed the soldiers. Until 1588, the 
Canary Moriscos used to ransom Christian islanders captured and enslaved in the 
Maghrib. But then, the tribunal of the Inquisition in the Canary Islands wrote the Council 
of the State, demanding it to prohibit the islanders from commissioning Moriscos for this 
task.  After their final expulsion from Spain, between 1609 and 1614, the Moriscos kept 
playing a central role in the economy of ransom both as slave owners and as 
intermediaries participating in the ransom of Christians and of Muslims. In 1613, for 
example, a few recently expulsed  Moriscos from Algiers, whose names the sources do 
not disclose, offered the crown to ransom up to fifty Christian captives in return for 
permission to go back to Spain.472 Their offer represents another non-commercial use of 
ransom – an attempt of nostalgic exiles to return to the land from which they were 
expelled – and amplify the continuum of contexts in which ‘go-betweens’ rescued 
captives. But more often, Moriscos, like others, did so for the sake of profit or as charity 
to their co-religiosnists. The archive of the French consulate in Tunis is replete with 
documents recording Morisco “go-betweens” buying and selling Christians especially in 
the years following the expulsion and until 1650, when the community’s power 
dwindled.473 Muslims obviously traded Christian captives. Malaqui worked with Muslim 
partners, and, as we have seen, the hostages he provided as guarantees were Muslim 
merchants. Some Muslims specialized in the ransom and rescue of Muslims from 
Christian lands. In 1571, a Muslim slave in Naples, who had converted to Christianity 
years earlier and was baptized as Aniello Tarantino, was accused by the Inquisition of 
blasphemy. During his trial, the inquisitors discovered that he took advantage of the 
liberty that conversion to Christianity provided him, and arranged for North African 
slaves to escape back to the Maghrib for costly prices.474 
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Although many captives earned money for their work, only a few managed to 
transform it into capital they could reinvest.  Nevertheless, we know of captives in Tunis 
who during the seventeenth century invested their savings in the commercial activities of 
European merchants.475  Their final goal was to use their profits to ransom themselves. 
Gracián was one of these. During his captivity, with the money he borrowed from 
captives and the alms he received from renegades, he managed to ransom at least twelve 
Christians.476 Gaspar de los Reyes, captured and taken to Tunis in 1658, used the money 
he earned working in a tavern in Algiers to help captives in need, occasionally lending 
them money for their ransom.  In 1670, when he used his savings to ransom himself, he 
continued with the ransom business and struck an agreement with two captives he 
knew—“and for being his friends . . . he gave them his word he would get the money sent 
to them from these islands [the Canary Islands] which was in the hands of Don Pedro de 
la Fuente, a resident of the city of the Port of Santa María.”  The two captives, originally 
from the Canary Islands, “provided him with letters so that he [Don Pedro de la Fuente] 
would hand him the said ransom [money]”.477   De Los Reyes left for the peninsula, 
where he collected the money the captives’ relatives had sent them. In addition, he 
bought two “Turkish” slaves who were to be exchanged as part of the deal.  But De Los 
Reyes was ambitious, and he negotiated new deals with others in Málaga promising to 
ransom their loved ones captured in Algiers.  He took back to Algiers eighteen “Turkish” 
slaves he had purchased in Spain in order to exchange them for Christians held captive.  
Even if we do not exclude the possibility that friendship may have played a role in 
directing his activities, it is clear that De Los Reyes had other motives as well.  After 
having worked for five years in a tavern in Algiers, he believed he knew all the secrets of 
the Algerian liquor market.  Before leaving Spain for Algiers, he invested the money he 
received from the captives’ relatives in Málaga’s famous sweet wine, hoping to sell it at 
great profit. Unfortunately, upon arrival in Algiers, he discovered that seven French ships 
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were unloading their wine cargo.  As wine prices collapsed, De Los Reyes lost a lot of 
money, and could not execute the agreements for which he had been paid.478 
For the intermediaries that formed the networks that facilitated the movement of 
captives, the positions of pirate, ransomer, or captive meant different stages in complex 
professional trajectories. This is demonstrated by ex-captives turned into ransomors who 
offered the perfect skills required for captive-redeeming. The time they spent in captivity 
prepared them for the trade and some developed a reputation as experts. Not only did 
they learn Arabic and Turkish during the years they spent as captives, but they also knew 
the procedures, had connections, and mastered the entries and exits of Maghribi ports. 
Mario Cortoño, a native of Sicily, was taken captive at the age of fourteen near the turn 
of the seventeen century. He was sold in Algiers to a Turk and served him twelve years 
until he managed to escape from the corsairs’ ship, in which he probably rowed.  
Returning to his land, he was commissioned to go to Tunis and ransom captives: 
[A]s he knew the Morisco language, a treasurer, who had his brother captive in 
Tunis, armed a little boat for him with which Cortoño left to the kingdom of 
Tunis, and he entered the city and communicated with the said Christian captive, 
and going to inform the others [who came] in the boat, he could not find it where 
he left it, and having waited for four days he was discovered and imprisoned.479 
Cortoño’s task was to smuggle the treasurer’s brother back to Sicily. He failed in his 
mission; but the reasons for which he was commissioned to execute such a risky 
enterprise were the skills he acquired during his captivity: mastering the “Morisco” 
language and knowing the small ports near the main Maghribi cities.480 
European merchants, both Spaniards and merchants from communities of other 
origin, were interested in ransom for a diversity of reasons.  The case of the Majorcan 
skipper Già is a good example, as it shows the unexpected uses of ransom.  In 1668, on 
behalf of a mercantile company from the island, Già exported tar to Algiers. Obtaining a 
license to trade with Muslims in the Maghrib was an easy task. Spanish official 
discourses, it is true, echoed religious rhetoric that prohibited the trade with the infidel 
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but in practice, trade with North Africa became a normal practice in seventeenth century 
Spain. It functioned under the system of ‘permanent exception[s]’ and the special licenses 
the crown issued over and over again for merchants trading with the Maghrib turned in 
fact into a form of tax.481 Unlike other commodities, however, tar was deemed a material 
of war, and its sale to Muslims was absolutely prohibited. Già was arrested by the 
Inquisitorial tribunal of Majorca in 1669.482 In his defense, he claimed that he used his 
profits to ransom captives.  Sadly, since the majority of the captives that left Algiers with 
him claimed they paid for their liberty with their own money, the argument did not serve 
him.483 
We see then, the difficulty of generalizing about the intermediaries’ motives. 
Anyone who was on the spot might and often did engage in the ransoming process. 
Gracián, for example, ransomed Christians out of compassion to his coreligionists. Others 
rescued their friends, kin, or fellow countrymen. Profit was central for many ransomers, 
but it would be wrong to reduce participation in the trade to simple economic motives. 
Jews, residents of the Spanish garrisons and of Moroccan and Algerians settlements, 
employed the ransom to facilitate the commercial contacts with Spain and enable their 
entry to the Empire that had expulsed them. Già ransomed captives to whitewash his 
illegal arms export, in other words, for a goal opposite to that of the Jews. Christian 
merchants ransomed co-religionists to lubricate commerce with the infidel.  
6. Breaking Agreements 
The fact that ransom was usually practiced in the service of other goals may 
explain the fact that so many of these intermediaries had bad reputations among captives. 
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Gracián, for example, suspected the merchants who ransomed captives, despite the fact 
that he himself had been ransomed by one.  In a letter dated July 1594, he warned his 
friends against dealing with such merchants lest “they [his friends] lose the money they 
gave to the merchants, in addition to the interest they would pay.”484  And in a later letter 
sent the same year, he added, “based on my experience I know there is no greater damage 
to captives than giving money to merchants, and only because of that there are 
innumerable captives who will never leave their captivity.”485  Gracián’s suspicions were 
well-founded, because in some cases merchants tried to take advantage of the captives’ 
relative helplessness.  The Spaniard Jerónimo de Pasamonte, held captive in Istanbul in 
the same years as Gracián, had to threaten with a knife a merchant who had access to his 
money and refused to pay him.486  The same is true for Gaspar de los Reyes, who 
invested the money he received from the captives and their relatives in the liquor market, 
and did not pay them back after he lost it all with the collapse of the market. The 
presence of many charlatans claiming to have contacts and the skills required to ransom 
captives, while only interested in the money of the captives’ kin, was another reason for 
the distrust towards ransomers.  Diego de Pacheco, the bastard son of the Marquis de 
Villena, was taken captive around 1608.487  He spent various years in Algiers and later in 
Istanbul, was the object of a few failed attempts of ransom for money and exchange for 
Muslim slaves, and eventually converted to Islam. But before that, in October 1614, a 
certain Pedro Muñoz Montefrío, a vetrean, who convinced the Marquis of Villena he 
could ransom Pacheco for a hefty sum of money, was accused by the duke of Osuna of 
fraud and of trying to rob the marquis de Villena, playing on his desire to ransom his 
son.488   
Captives had means of avoiding some of these problems and of solving them once 
they occurred.  One way to avoid a scam was to provide merchants with letters of credit 
instead of cash, as Gracián’s relatives did.  Merchants were not able to cash these letters 
until the captives had been ransomed.  The system was facilitated by various Christian 
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enclaves spread over the Ottoman Empire, and within a few Italian cities.  Tabarka, an 
island near Tunis, leased from the Spaniards by the Genoese Lomellini who dealt in the 
coral fished there,489 was such a haven.  The same functions were also fulfilled by the 
Venetian embassies and fundagos in Istanbul, Cairo, and elsewhere,490 as well as by 
Spanish fort towns in North Africa.491  In addition to banking services, these institutions 
also provided legal services in cases of conflicts between Christians, Jews, and Muslims.  
When the merchant who held Jerónimo de Pasamonte’s money refused to hand it over to 
him, Pasamonte went to the Venetian Bailo, or embassy, in Istanbul where “they provide 
justice.”492 He turned to more violent, though efficient, means only after he was not 
allowed in because of political tensions between Spain and Venice.  
But these spaces did not exclusively protect the captives; in some cases they served 
the needs of slave owners and go-betweens.  The case of Livorno, although somewhat 
exceptional because of its location on the Italian peninsula, serves as a good example.  
According to Emanuel d’Aranda, the grand duke of Tuscany had made an agreement with 
Algerian authorities according to which he would imprison ransomed captives who had 
recently arrived from Algiers until they collected enough money to pay the debts they 
owed their captors.493 Although a formal agreement may have been exceptional, the 
practice was quite common. Merchants who ransomed captives could order their 
imprisonment upon arrival in a Christian settlement until they paid their debt. The 
authorities usually cooperated. Pedro Brea, who ransomed a few captives from Tunis in 
1595, left two in the castle’s prison in Trapani, in the west coast of Sicily, because “they 
owed him 175 ounces [a coin worth 329 reales].”494 While he was away, the Count of 
Olivares, viceroy of Sicily at the time, visited Trapani and released one of Brea’s 
prisoners, who promised he would immediately pay his debt. When Brea returned, the 
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Count was gone and the ex-captive, now a released prisoner, disappeared. Brea wrote the 
Council of War and asked it to provide him help.495  Gaspar Discle, a squire from Oran, 
who was captured by the Algerians in 1593, recounted a similar story in his petition for 
help, only from the captive’s perspective.  In 1596, with money his wife sent after selling 
their property and a loan he took from Valencian merchants, he believed he had bought 
his freedom.  But soon after his return to Oran, the merchants demanded his 
imprisonment because he could not pay them his debt.496 This practice further explains 
captives’ distrust towards the intermediaries who ransomed them. While captives needed 
the go-betweens, they knew they might be turned into prisoners again, this time by those 
who ransomed them.497  While merchants could count on such cooperation, the 
imprisoned captives expected the authorities to examine their petitions for help with an 
attentive ear to the post-captivity imprisonment. Pedro de Prado, from Ibiza, was 
captured by corsairs during his military service, but managed to borrow money and return 
home. Unable to pay his debt, he was imprisoned. In the petition he sent the crown in 
1590, he asked: 
In consideration that he was captured while in the service of his majesty, he 
petitions that for the love of God, [his majesty] help him with alms to help and 
pay his ransom, [and] in consideration that he is a very poor soldier and in charge 
of children and the authorities imprison him in order to force him to pay the said 
ransom and he does not have anyone to support him . . .498 
The trading zones that facilitated ransom, located in the Ottoman Empire or the 
Spanish and Portuguese forts of the Maghrib and the Atlantic coast of Morocco, varied in 
their degree of autonomy and sovereignty, in the forms of social and ethnic life they 
generated, and in the kind of transactions they enabled.  Tabarka, as portrayed by 
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Gracián, provided a safe exchange space that guaranteed the captives that they would not 
be sold back to slavery immediately upon paying the “go-between,” while assuring the 
latter that he would be compensated upon releasing the captives he ransomed. The 
location of the island—only 80 miles away from Tunis, 216 miles from Mazara del Vallo 
(located at the eastern tip of Sicily), and 317 miles away from Algiers – and the fact that 
the Algerian and Tunisian authorities respected its autonomy while benefiting from the 
functions it fulfilled, made it a perfect space for exchanges of Muslim and Christian 
captives.499 In fact, this specific value of the island was acknowledged in two reports the 
Spanish ambassadors in Genoa submitted to the Council of the State in 1582, and again in 
1603.  Pedro de Mendoza, the ambassador, wrote that “the only benefit of that place is 
the ransom of Christians, [since] the corsairs of Bizerte, Annaba, and all the coast of 
Barbary go there, and [we also receive] a few reports from the Levant, and [I] fear that 
[once the island is] deserted, the French neighbors would take over and become lords of 
the entire coast . . . ”500   
While Tabarka served parties to ransom agreements at the east of the Maghrib, 
Ceuta, only fourteen miles from Algeciras in Spain, and Tétouan, a city heavily populated 
with Moriscos since 1609 located only twenty eight miles from the Spanish garrison of 
Ceuta, filled similar functions for the western tip of North Africa.  In 1646, for example, 
Algerians who hoped to ransom their kin enslaved in Spain bought Diego Hernández, a 
Christian captive, for that purpose. They hired one Sid Ahmed [Zigamete], an Algerian 
residing in Tétouan, and ordered him to take Hernández to Ceuta to meet Domingo 
Alvales, a Christian intermediary representing Hernández’s wife, Juana Ramirez. Alvales 
had to hand over to Sid Ahmed the relative of the Algerians whom he received from 
Ramirez, and in return receive Diego Hernández.501  A decade later, Diego López de 
Acosta, held captive in Algiers, was trying to engineer his exchange for a Muslim 
enslaved in Sanlúcar de Barrameda. He sent instructions to doctor Tomas Velásquez de 
Oliver, asking him to buy the Muslim slave: “[S]end him to Ceuta with heavy guard, and 
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make him write [to me telling me] to leave [Algiers] to Tétouan in order that the 
exchange will be executed there as is the custom (emphasis added).”502   Beyond 
stressing the importance of Ceuta and Tétouan as spaces of exchange, De Acosta’s words 
demonstrate how ransom procedures followed rules and created expectation among the 
parties they involved.  
The Venetian fundagos located in the urban Muslim centers, in addition to 
providing storage services and serving as inns hosting pilgrims and European merchants, 
offered spaces to negotiate all kinds of deals.  Their location, embedded within Muslim 
territory, offered them less autonomy than places like Tabarka, however, and the local 
authorities, upon suspicion of crime, could search the rooms and the goods of the guests. 
Pasamonte, who organized a few failing revolts during his long captivity, mentions this 
when discussing his last attempt to mutiny in Alexandria. He describes how, when the 
authorities discovered that he and his friends had obtained weapons from the fundago, 
they broke in and arrested the monk who provided the weapons.503  Another institution 
filling similar functions was the European consulates in the Maghrib and in the Ottoman 
Empire.504   
We owe much of what we know about ransom in Tunis to the documents archived 
by the French consul there and the notarial services he provided.505 Captives, 
intermediaries, and sellers took advantage of these services to validate and later debate, 
upon need, the terms of the deals they negotiated. French consuls elsewhere in the 
Maghrib provided similar services and more. Gracián, for example, stayed in the house of 
the consul in Tunis a month after the payment of his ransom until Askenazi, the merchant 
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who ransomed him, took him to Tabarka.506  The French consul in Tétouan lodged the 
Trinitarians in their expedition in 1661. In some cases, intermediaries misused the 
services these consuls provided. The Majorcan Già, who exported war materials to 
Algiers, claimed, in his defense, that he used his profits to ransom Christian captives, thus 
saving souls from potential conversion to Islam. The truth was that Già rescued the 
captives in an attempt to legitimate the illegal tar deal. He went as far as issuing a 
certificatoria at the French consul, testifying he bought the captives from his gains on the 
tar. The document, of which there are no traces in the inquisitorial folder, did not help 
him, because most of the captives he ransomed claimed they were ransomed with money 
sent by their relatives from Majorca.507 
The Spanish fort towns presented other kinds of anomalies. As Jean-Frédéric 
Schaub has recently argued, the continuation of the movement of the reconquista into 
North Africa in the first few decades of the sixteenth century, ironically, reproduced the 
Spain of the three cultures in the Spanish presidios established in the North African 
littoral.508 Jews reestablished themselves in these colonies of a monarchy that pretended 
to have cleansed its territories of Jews, by making themselves invaluable for the 
Spaniards. The official justification for the presence of the Jews was the translation and 
interpretation services they provided; however, the leaders of these communities also lent 
money, provided grains, traded in strategic information, trafficked slaves, and often 
facilitated the ransom of Christian captives or their exchange for Muslims. 
In addition to the European institutions, captives and intermediaries also benefited 
from Maghribi legal institutions. The case of Gracián reflects one of these mechanisms. 
Late in the summer of 1594, Gracián’s Italian relatives intervened to help Simon 
Askenazi, a Jewish merchant from Tunis whose goods had been confiscated in Italy, and 
perhaps he himself was arrested.509  In return, they asked Askenazi for aid in securing 
Gracián’s ransom. Askenazi was provided with a letter of credit in the sum of 600 golden 
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escudos which he was to cash at the governor’s office in Tabarka, once Gracián had been 
ransomed.510  The Pasha who by then had given up the hope for a large sum of money for 
Gracián was willing to accept Askenazi’s offer, and sold Gracián to him for 1,300 golden 
escudos.  Gracián and Askenazi, who had only 600 escudos in cash, borrowed another 
700 escudos, paid the Pasha, and received from him a letter of manumission.  
Immediately after paying them, however, the Pasha accused Gracián and Askenazi, the 
merchant who ransomed him, of cheating him.  His intent to break his word and misuse 
his power was in vain, and Askenazi and Gracián won the trial after presenting the kadi 
with a letter of manumission.  This letter, issued by the Pasha on 11 April 1595, was not 
ratified by a Christian notary.  For the kadi that did not matter, and even though it was a 
Pasha who had accused Gracián in a fraud, he affirmed the validity of the ransom and 
Gracián remained free.511 The case of Gaspar de los Reyes shows other political-legal 
institutions in Maghribi cities that defended, at least in some cases, the fair executions of 
ransom agreements, even when none of the parties was Muslim.  This former captive, 
who had lost his fortune in the Algerian liquor market and could not repay the captives 
who had given him money to ransom them, took a drastic measure when the captives 
became more vehement in their demands: he decided to convert to Islam—“and because 
they asked him to pay them, he went to the hall of the Divan where Haziali governed . . . 
and he told him he wanted to renounce the law of god and turn moor, and the said Haziali 
responded that first he should pay to whom he owed [money] and then he could turn 
moor.”512 Muslim institutions, then, often intervened or acted as courts of appeal in cases 
of dispute around ransom related issues among Christians and between Christians and 
Muslims. 
While some intermediaries took advantage of captives who sought their ransom, 
most captives seemed to be content with the services these mediators provided.  
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Moreover, many captives could not arrange for cash to be sent, and thus negotiated 
ransom agreements according to which they promised to pay only upon returning 
home.513  Emanuel d’Aranda’s owner agreed to set free some of his slaves “on condition 
that they would board a ship that was just about to set sail to Livorno in Italy, and that 
there, they would reside in prison until their ransom would be paid.”514  Because of the 
risk involved, and the chance that captives would flee, the price in such agreements was 
significantly higher than when captives paid immediately.  The first offer d’Aranda’s 
owner made him was “two thousand patagons in Livorno or fifteen hundred in cash.”515  
But as a rule, in such agreements, it was the merchants’ turn to hope their clients would 
pay them back.  After all, once free in their homeland, what prevented these redeemed 
captives from disappearing?   
Thus, looking at the full duration of these exchange processes, the power relations 
between captives, captors, and “go-betweens” were more balanced than it first seems.  
Again, trust had to play a major role, and despite the temptation to vanish, many captives 
did their best to pay back their debts.  And the price was high—not only the amount of 
money, but also the time it took to get it, hardly ever shorter than a year.  Spanish 
captives usually applied to the crown for a one-year license to beg for alms in order to 
pay their debts, which, given the ransom prices, meant they had already paid part of it.  
For example, the Franciscan Antonio Castaño applied for such a license immediately 
upon his return to Spain.  Expressing in his petition his unease at not paying his debtors 
on time, he claimed that if he were not to raise the money “he would be forced to return 
to captivity . . .”516 
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Did he feel threatened by the moneylenders and the ill reputation suffered by that 
class?  Or was he behaving according to the famous Spanish code of honor easily 
triggered by matters involving debt and credit?517  It is unclear who or what could have 
made Castaño return to captivity.  Apparently, it could not have been the Spanish 
authorities.  Whatever Castaño had in his mind when he submitted his request, the near 
absence of formal regulating and enforcing mechanisms did not often lead to breaches of 
trust, and the parties tended to fulfill their obligations.  This point needs to be further 
elaborated.  The history of the early-modern political geography of the Mediterranean 
developed in such a way that after their expulsion in 1492 and 1609, Jews and Muslims 
were, at least theoretically, not permitted on Spanish soil. Vanishing in Spain should not 
have been too difficult for captives who wished to avoid paying debts to Muslim and 
Jewish “go-betweens.”  
That said, even Jewish and Muslim middlemen were not totally helpless in such 
cases.  Just as a set of Christian enclaves in the Ottoman Empire protected captives from 
crooked merchants who tried to abscond with their money, did so Christian and Muslim 
authorities protect these merchants from being cheated by ex-captives.  In September 
1608, for example, Muley Zidán, the Sultan of Morocco, directed a letter to Phillip III 
through the Duke of Medina Sidonia, asking the Spanish monarch to help a Jewish 
merchant called Abraham Ben Waish. The latter had lent ransom money to Spanish 
hidalgos captured in Morocco but they never repaid him.518  We do not know whether 
Zidán's request for help was attended to, but exactly one year earlier, the Inquisition had 
responded positively to a similar request from Abraham de Loya and David Hocico, 
Moroccan Jewish merchants.  The two asked for passports to enter Spain in order to sue 
Portuguese nobles held captive in Morocco to whom they had lent ransom money they 
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never redeemed.  The Inquisition acknowledged their legal rights in the matter and issued 
two passports for them.519  
Zidán cared less about the human traffic and more about the commerce between 
Morocco and European polities.  The letter he sent to Phillip III reflects the friendly 
policy towards merchants enacted by his father, Ahmad Al Mansur, soon after he won the 
sultanate in 1578.520  Zidán asked that his subjects, whether Jews or Muslim, be treated in 
Christian lands just as Christian merchants were treated in Morocco—“the merchants of 
the Christian congregation . . . wherever in these provinces of ours . . . they come with the 
protection of custody and guard . . . and with this they and their goods are safe, 
surrounded by our help . . . and they, in all our kingdoms, travel safe from troubles and 
dangers.521  Abraham Ben Waish, the Jew for whom Zidán asked a safe pass, did more 
than just pursue the nobles he rescued: later he negotiated Morocco’s relations with Spain 
on Zidán’s behalf.522  But similar requests and letters of recommendation for “go-
betweens” were also issued by less important figures.  Judas Malaqui, arriving in Málaga 
to deal with matters regarding ransoms he was negotiating, presented the governor with a 
letter of recommendation issued by Diego de Vera, the commander of the Spanish fort 
called Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera.523  And, in at least one case, Moriscos Muslims 
converted to Christianity who had been expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614, 
were promised permission to return to live in the peninsula in return for ransoming fifty 
Christian captives.524 
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7. Conclusion 
In contrast to the bitter accord that almost ended Gracián’s ransom, he chose to 
close his tale of captivity with a vignette stressing how ransom agreements were 
respected, even by the most untrustworthy Muslim corsairs.  In his autobiography, he 
recounts that in the summer of 1595 he boarded a ship in Tabarka, and was ready to leave 
for Genoa.  At the time, a galley of Morat Arraez, a famous North African corsair, 
harbored in the port.  Its sailors, who noticed Gracián, informed their captain that Gracián 
was about to depart, and urged him to order them to capture him again.  According to 
Gracián, the corsair replied, “[W]hat do you want of the poor little guy?  Didn’t he pay 
his ransom?  Let him go free!”525  Gracián seals the paragraph with the words, “and these 
goods works I owe Mataarraez,” misspelling the latter’s name.  This conclusion, which 
we might interpret as merely stylistic, nevertheless reflects a decision to represent the 
system of ransom I have discussed in a particular way—denying its institutional aspects 
and suggesting it was based on the good works of exceptional personalities. However, the 
documents relating to Gracián in the Historical National Archive in Madrid reveal that 
Morat Arraez did not allow Gracián to continue on his way because of a pure sentiment 
of friendly trust, but rather because of the legal instruments I have described. Arraez 
detained Gracián and demanded the safe pass issued to him in Tunis.  Only after 
affirming its validity did he sign it, allowing Gracián to continue on his passage home.526 
Gracián’s description of his ransom offers an example of how an individual author 
contributed to the overshadowing of the networks that facilitated his own rescue and 
return home. The silencing of these networks, however, was an institutional phenomenon 
and cannot be explained by the analysis of a single text. These networks of captive-
redeeming hardly left any archival traces. Only a few of the ransom deals channeled by 
them are represented textually. As I demonstrated, that does not mean they were marginal 
or escaped interaction with church and royal bureaucracies. Records testifying to the 
mechanics of the networks can be found in the Council of War, the Council of the State, 
the Royal council, the Inquisition and other archival repositories. But even when they are 
represented, the traces they left are sparse. In fact, the few traces they left in the archives 
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reflect moments in which the system failed. For example, when intermediaries who 
ransomed Christians complained the latter escaped without paying their debt or when ex-
captives petitioned the crown to help them pay their debt they could not cover. Ironically 
then, the more efficient this system was, the less it left traces. The more it formed a 
socially linked Mediterranean, the less it was represented and registered in the archives. 
As the work of the Orders grew larger, to some extent with the help of the other networks 
– as I show in the next chapter, the networks became less visible. Thus, ironically, again, 
it is the success, rather than failure and withering away, of the redeeming of captives by 
such networks, which allows the Crown’s Mediterranean (via the Orders) to dominate 
and de-socialize the social space the sea was.  
In light of the archival representation of these networks, the reconstruction of their 
mechanics and of the regularities that governed them had to be based on moments of 
friction and conflict. In other words I had to reconstruct the norm on the basis of its 
exceptions. The analysis pointed out how the relationships formed between captives, 
captors, and middlemen were expressed, in some cases, in unusual trust and ad hoc 
alliances grounded in legal agreements, which enabled captives’ ransoms.  Merchants 
transferring money that relatives sent across the Mediterranean, middlemen providing 
credit, exchange of Muslim slaves for Christians, and captives leaving their beloved as 
temporary hostages were the modalities that characterized the early-modern 
Mediterranean network of ransom.  Despite political violence, religious hatred, and 
suspicion involved in the situation of captivity, trust among captives, captors, and 
middlemen of different faiths was crucial to the success of such agreements.  Trust took 
various forms, and was developed over time in trajectories of captivity and ransom.  Trust 
had first to be established in order for masters to accept their captives’ claims regarding 
their identity, and hence, the value of their liberty; it was subsequently required in order 
for captives to get credit, or alternatively when they left their kin behind as hostages.  
Masters and intermediaries had to trust the captives to whom they provided credit. But 
trust here, as we have seen, was by no means an unconditioned empathy to the religious 
other.  Rather, it was a socially grounded and institutionally guaranteed sentiment which 
implied certain rules of conduct. 
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At least in the Spanish context, this network of ransom with its unique procedures 
had implications for the Habsburg desire for a religious, cultural, and legal cleansing of 
the peninsula.  Lauren Benton, who developed the term “legal regimes,” homologous 
legal spaces, implicitly assumes in her discussion of Spain that with the expulsion of the 
Jews and the Muslims, Spain lost some of the legal pluralism by which it had previously 
been characterized.  But when Spanish captives, Maghribi captors, and Jewish, Muslim, 
and converted Christian “go-betweens” negotiated ransom deals, they bound themselves 
to mutual legal agreements, and thereby subverted the desired political boundedness of 
their legal regimes.  At the same time, as I have stressed, trust in this system was not 
established across lines of faith solely by the subjective wills of the individuals involved.  
This network of ransom was supported by an institutional umbrella, in the form of 
embassies and port cities on the one hand, and the intervention of royal, religious, and 
legal bureaucracies on the other, which guaranteed the flow of transactions. Christian 
posts in the Maghrib and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, such as the Venetian and 
French embassies and fundagos, and the Muslim legal system, provided legal spaces to 
debate disagreements.  Islands such as Tabarka, owned by powerful merchant families, 
and the Spanish forts and towns in North Africa, provided safe spaces for intermediaries 
to exchange the captives they ransomed. Spanish bureaucracies cooperated with the 
network and acknowledged the legal validity of the agreements reached through it, both 
implicitly—by conceding begging licenses— and explicitly, by facilitating entry to Spain 
for those who had been exiled from it many years earlier. Spanish royal bureaucracies, by 
accommodating the needs of released captives and injured intermediaries, acknowledged 
the validity of such agreements, and ipso facto, the fluidity of their legal regimes.527
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Chapter	6:	
The	 Trinitarians	 and	 Mercedarians:	 the	 Orders	 of	
Redemption	
1. Introduction 
After exploring the ways in which ransom networks continued to thrive throughout 
the seventeenth century, it is now time to examine the better-studied history of the 
Trinitarians and the Mercedarians, religious Orders charged with liberating captives from 
the Maghrib. In recent years, a few solid studies of the medieval history of the Orders and 
of their early modern institutional history have been written. The chapter builds upon 
these studies in charting the Orders’ history from their establishment in the Middle Ages 
to the slow process through which the Spanish Crown appropriated their redemptive labor 
during the sixteenth century. It briefly explores shifts in their sources of funding, the 
result of the sixteen century royal take-over and discusses the procedures that governed 
the ransom expeditions they sent to the Maghrib. The chapter differs from previous 
studies of the Orders in the way it emphasizes tensions and disagreements between the 
Trinitarians and the Mercedarians and between the Orders and other ransom agents, on 
the one hand, and various critics who opposed their redemptive labor, on the other. 
Tensions and discord characterized the relations between the Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians: throughout their history, the Orders struggled against each other over the 
monopoly over ransom. While we have less evidence of it, the Orders also targeted 
individual ransom agents as competitors. Such struggles entailed constant litigation over 
begging zones, which were important for the Orders as sources of funding, and the 
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publication and circulation of propaganda that praised the success of each Order in the 
redemption of Christian souls. The propaganda campaigns functioned both as part of the 
competition between the Orders and also as an on-going justification of their redemptive 
labor against critiques launched from the seventeenth century onwards by politicians, 
merchants and arbitristas. The latter claimed that the money that the Orders spent on 
imperial aims achieved the negative goal of funding arms for the Empire’s enemies. 
Instead, the critics argued, the money should be spent on a squadron which will protect 
the Spanish littoral. Understanding these tensions as well as the image of the sea that the 
Orders shaped in their propaganda and through their expeditions to the Maghrib is 
important both in order to understand the shifting contour lines of the Mediterranean 
economy of ransom, examined in the next chapter, and as preliminary explanations for 
the manner in which the contemporary historiography has constructed the history of the 
Orders. 
2. The Orders of Redemption: Formation and Early History 
This section presents the history of the Trinitarians and Mercedarians from their 
inception until 1574. It surveys their sources of funding and reconstructs the power 
struggles between Trinitarians and Mercedarians as well as between the Orders and other 
ransom agents over these sources. It ends by examining the attempts of the Crown to 
regulate the work of the Orders and how historians of the Orders framed this royal 
intervention. Even before the Orders were established at the turn of the thirteenth century, 
ransom agents, ecclesiastical and private were active in Iberia. Alfaqueques, exeas and 
ransoming merchants, whose history I discussed in the previous chapter, enjoyed a 
monopoly over ransom in the twelfth century. And yet, already then, religious 
institutions, such as the Order of St. James of the Sword (La Ordem de Santiago da 
Espada) and the Dominican Order ransomed Christians.528 Around the turn of the 
century, the Order of the Holy Trinity and the Order of Our Lady of Mercy, the main 
religious orders to specialize in captive-redeeming, were founded. The older of the two is 
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the Order of the Holy Trinity whose first house was formed by the Provençal Juan Mata 
in 1198 in Cerfroid near Paris. While it is likely that the order was founded in response to 
the crusaders’ defeat in the battle of Hattin outside of Jerusalem in 1187, its orientation 
was soon directed south to the Muslim-Christian frontier and, in 1202, Mata established a 
second house in Marseille.529 From there, Trinitarian houses spread throughout France, 
Austria, the Crown of Aragon, Castile and Portugal. At the Crown of Aragon, however, 
the Trinitarians encountered obstacles. The fact that they were supported by the French 
monarchy, the great feudal lords in France, and Pope Innocent III, placed them in 
opposition to the Crown of Aragon, an ally of the Albigensians, who objected to French 
policies in Languedoc.530 Eventually, the Trinitarians struck roots in the Aragonese 
kingdoms, but their status there was always weaker both in comparison to the power they 
came to have in Castile or in France and in comparison with that of the Order of Our 
Lady of Mercy in Aragon. The latter was established in 1218 by Pere Nolasc and Ramon 
de Penyafort under the patronage of the city of Barcelona and of James the Conqueror. Its 
first houses were established in the Crown of Aragon and in the second half of the 
thirteenth century.  With the support of the Castilian crown, the order began establishing 
houses in Castile.531  
Unlike, merchants or royal ransom agents who worked for the crown, for whom 
ransom was either business or a royal office respectively, the Orders’ mission was 
spiritual. They did not seek to terminate the institution of slavery, and even ending the 
captivity of individuals was secondary to the redemption of Christian souls in the risk of 
conversion.532 This spiritual mission necessitated money and the Orders funded their 
costly ransom operations by employing public and private sources. Revenues from 
private property played a major role. During the Middle Ages, the Portuguese, Castilian 
and Aragonese kings conquered increasingly numerous Muslim territories which they 
granted to soldiers and settlers but also to various religious orders.  Over the years, the 
Orders of Redemption had accumulated many property grants, acquired land 
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independently and received land grants from individual patrons. These assets were leased 
out, but the income they yielded would not have been enough to fund the rescue 
operations.533 Testators also bequeathed their estates to the Orders and the friars used 
begging bowls to collect money in churches and other places.534  To excite and compel 
the believers to donate, the orders staged processions in which former captives were 
forced to accompany the orders and perform their past captivity for six months to a year 
following their ransom.535  
While the foundation of the Orders and the distribution of their sister houses across 
the peninsula might have reflected political tensions between Aragonese and French 
kings, the Pope, and French magnates, the competition could not be fully reduced to royal 
politics. The Orders fiercely competed over the monopoly over ransom and begging 
zones and even refused to admit their adversaries into their ranks. The Mercedarians, for 
example, accepted former members of other orders upon the approval of the chapter 
general.536 But their constitutions stipulated that under no circumstances could 
Trinitarians join it – “Who ought not to be admitted as brothers: No brother of the Holy 
Trinity is to be admitted to our Order. And if any [brother] from our Order goes to theirs, 
let him never be readmitted to this, our habit.”537 From 1366, the competition manifested 
itself in disputes over licensed areas for begging. Pre-modern kings attempted to regulate 
begging by conditioning it upon the granting royal permits. Such licenses were usually 
valid for a year or two and limited to one or a few dioceses. In 1363, the Trinitarians 
asked Pedro the Ceremonious (1319-1387) for a license to put begging bowls in churches 
in the Crown of Aragon. Once the king granted the Trinitarians the coveted license, the 
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Mercedarians demanded its annulment. The Trinitarians protested but to no avail. Only in 
1384, did the Trinitarians manage to win back the privilege but by then they had lost the 
battle against the Mercedarians in the Crown of Aragon. In 1388, Juan I issued a royal 
provision that granted the Mercedarians a monopoly over begging in the Crown.538 While 
the Trinitarians had a few victories, progressively the Mercedarians secured their 
monopoly, and by 1477 the Trinitarians ended their activity in the Crown of Aragon 
altogether.539 The zeal with which the Orders fought over their begging privileges was 
also directed against individuals they perceived as unlicensed intruders. In 1306, the 
Mercedarians complained about charlatans who had obtained a royal begging permit 
under the pretext of former captivity.540 The complaint could be read as intent to protect 
the believers from tricksters, but the friars also tried to prevent real captives from 
begging.541 This was the case of Nicolás Gil and Juan of Seville, for example, whose only 
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vice was to obtain their liberty by means other than the help of the Mercedarians. Nicolás 
Gil and Juan of Seville petitioned Pedro the Ceremonious in 1374 for begging permits 
that not only authorized them to collect alms but also explicitly stipulated that the 
Mercedarians had no right to prevent them from doing so.542 This episode echoes tensions 
which go beyond the struggles between the Orders. It shows how indirectly, on the back 
of ransomed captives, the Orders also struggled with alfaqueques and exeas. The Orders 
continued to quarrel about begging zones at least until the mid-seventeenth century and 
probably later.543 But they never succeeded in preventing individual captives or their kin 
from begging, as is attested by the hundreds of approved petitions from the seventeenth 
century archived in the National Historical Archive in Madrid. 
3. The Trinitarian and Mercedarian Orders in the Early Modern 
Period 
In the early modern period, it was the new royal governing Councils which filled 
the Orders’ money boxes. The most important were the grants of the Council of the 
Cruzada (Consejo de Cruzada). Most of the money it redistributed to the Orders was 
                                                                                                                                                 
trusted alone. He contrasts the reproducibility of documents with the authenticity of mastery of languages 
and the ability to perform it orally. In the rest of his petition, he implies that captivity created a certain 
persona, a captive persona, expressed by oral-linguistic skills that could only be acquired during captivity 
in the Ottoman Empire or Morocco.  Only captives had that persona, were able to perform it, and thus only 
they could expose charlatans as such.   Preparing the grounds for his request, he advised the king to hire a 
ransomed captive who not only submitted documentary proof but also spoke Arabic and Turkish – “it is 
advisable that he who were captive submitting an account and speaking the Arabic and Turkish languages 
be ratified in a manner that would serve the king.” (“Es bueno quel que fuere cautivo dando relación y 
hablando la lengua Aráviga y Turquesa sea ratificado conforme v.m. fuere servido,” Ibid.)   Having himself 
this knowledge, de Olmedo proceeded and promised the king that should he get the position, by examining 
petitioners who claimed captivity and exposing tricksters among them, he would save money to the royal 
treasury: “And since the said Juan de Olmedo speaks Turkish and Arabic, he petitions your majesty to 
kindly [order to] give [him] a maintenance in order to sustain [himself] in this court. And when the captives 
come before your majesty asking for gratuities and other benefits, I will examine [them] and this way [your 
majesty] will get rid of many vagabonds and it will be known who was captive and from that your majesty 
would obtain much profit” (“Y como el dicho Juan de Olmedo save hablar Turquesco y Arávigo A v.m. 
supplica sea servido de mandarle dar un entretenimiento para poder sustentarse en esta corte y para quando 
los cautivos que vienen a v.m. pidiendo ayudas de costas y otras ventaxas los exsamine de lo qual se 
quitaran muchos vagamundos y se sabrá quien a sido cautivo y dello se seguirá a v.m. mucho provecho.” 
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given by captives’ kin who restricted the money they donated to the ransom of their 
relatives. In addition, the Council had its own ransoming priorities and demanded that the 
Orders spent the bulk of the grants on ransom of officers, soldiers and sailors.544 The 
Council of Castile and the Council of Military Orders (Consejo de los Órdenes) also 
funded the Orders and had their own ransom agenda. The former sought the ransom of 
imperial soldiers – Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese;545 the latter of captives from 
villages and towns under the jurisdiction of the military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava 
and Alcántara.546 The Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) redistributed alms 
collected in the New World and forced the orders to liberate captives from the Indies and 
those taken captive in the carrera.547 In addition, royal family members regularly donated 
money for ransom.548 An important non royal source of funding were the adjutorios, 
money given to the Orders by captives’ kin or friends,549 which the orders could use only 
for the person the donors designated. On the other hand, alms that the brothers collected 
independently could be used for the ransom of any captive. 
Once the Orders collected enough money, the Trinitarian or Mercedarian General 
asked the Council of Castile to authorize a rescue expedition. Upon announcing an 
expedition, the Council granted a license to the Orders stipulating the names of the 
redemptors, the expedition’s route, and its final destination. It also issued a passport valid 
in Spanish jurisdiction stating that the friars were permitted to travel to North Africa and 
requesting Spanish officials to provide the friars with all the help they needed. One of the 
officials in the Spanish garrisons in the Maghrib or a friar sent for that purpose from 
Spain travelled to the city in which the Orders planned to ransom captives and obtained a 
passport from its governor. This document was supposed to protect the Orders on their 
way to the Maghrib and during their stay there. It also stipulated the number of slaves 
that the Orders committed to buy from the governor and his men thus partially imposing 
on the Orders a Maghribi ransoming agenda.550  
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The procedures that governed the expeditions the Orders sent from the late sixteenth 
century onward were the result of a decision of Philip II, who, from 1575 through his 
Royal Council, began regulating and inspecting the Orders’ finances.551 The monarch 
also demanded that a scribe accompany the expeditions and record the negotiations with 
Maghribi authorities, the identity of the rescued captives, the price paid for them, and the 
sources of funding employed. The scribe was required to make three copies of his books: 
One of which will stay with you [and] the other will stay and be in the custody the 
General-Minister of the Order of our Lady of the Mercy. And the other [book] 
will be submitted to the person that the Council will nominate in order that he will 
know and understand [how many] maravedis you had in your hands and will be 
used for the said redemption.552  
 
The quote is taken from records documenting a Mercedarian expedition that was sent to 
Tétouan in 1645. The friar leading the expedition was to keep one book; a second copy 
had to be deposited at the Orders’ archive; and the third had to be submitted for royal 
inspection. The first time the King issued these instructions was in 1575, but in the 
following years he issued and reissued them, a fact that suggests that they were not 
followed in a way that satisfied the crown. Despite the king’s dissatisfaction with the way 
in which his orders were followed, the instructions led to the creation of thirty-nine books 
(probably more but this is the number of the books that historians have recovered thus 
far) detailing fund raising procedures, the expeditions, and the Orders’ expenses. It was 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, then, that the Orders were transformed into 
a royal arm. This, however, did not happen overnight and not even over a century as the 
repeating attempts to impose ordered book keeping suggests. Nor did it mean, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, that the King gave up or wished to eliminate 
individual ransom agents. 
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4.  Propaganda 
Despite the absence of reliable data for the medieval period, the extant evidence 
suggests that the crown’s monopolization of the Orders’ activity did lead to a sharp rise 
in the number of expeditions. This reflected the rising number of captives and their 
shifting distribution that followed the end of the age of large spectacular maritime battles 
between Mediterranean empires. As more expeditions were sent, more funds had to be 
collected. Competition for funds forced each order to invest time and money in wide 
propaganda campaigns and the Orders circulated printed pamphlets and images. These 
detailed the dangers implicit in their operations, stressed the importance of the Orders’ 
apostolic mission, and enumerated the miseries of those reduced to captivity: compelled 
to hand over their fortunes, captives were sold into slavery, beaten, forcibly converted, 
and worked to death. Their only chance of escape was through the ransoming expeditions 
of the Orders of Redemption.  While stressing the importance of the Orders for the 
redemption of Christian souls, the Orders also articulated an image of the Mediterranean 
and a model of communication and exchange in their propaganda.553 According to that 
model, the sea was a boundary set by God and nature which separated the Maghrib from 
Christian Spain.  While the sea was constructed in religious and environmental terms in 
the propaganda, it corresponded to the Mediterranean articulated through the rhythms of 
the redemption expeditions. The number of expeditions that the Orders sent and the 
complicated diplomatic procedures that preceded them, portrayed the sea as a political 
boundary, one that was rarely crossed.  
A relief carved by Pedro de la Cuadra in 1599, which formed part of the altarpiece 
of the Mercedarian convent of Valladolid in Castile, perfectly expresses in a ransoming 
scene – which may have taken place in Algiers, Tunis, or Fez – the self-image the Orders 
sought to construct.554 On the left side, sitting on a cushion, is a Muslim captor or a 
“Turk,” accompanied by his black slave.  They are counting the golden coins on the table 
                                                 
553
 For further analysis of this propaganda, which stresses the ways in which the images and pamphlets the 
Trinitarians produced and circulated de-socialized captivity, see: Jean-Claude Laborie, “Les orders 
rédempteurs et l’instrumentalisation du récit de captivité: l’example des trinitaire, entre 1630 et 1650,” in 
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 The relief is currently presented in the National museum of Sculpture in Valladolid, Spain, see: Pedro de 
la Cuadra, La redención de cautivos, 1599, Museo Nacional de Escultura, Valladolid. 
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before them.  On the right side are two Mercedarian brothers who have arrived from 
Spain on a mission of redemption.  Four captives stand behind, the heavy chains around 
their necks marking their captive status.  Their placement behind the “Turks” reinforces 
both their identities as captives and that of the “Turks” as their owners.  Negotiations 
over the price to be paid have already taken place, but the greedy “Turks” are unsatisfied, 
and the Mercedarians are adding money to the pile. The captives are portrayed as mute 
objects in, or even worse, “dead bodies,” as the Portuguese Antonio de Sosa described 
them in his famous Topography and History of Algiers published in 1612.555  
Commoditized first when sold in the slave market after their capture, they are now 
experiencing a second commoditization.  They have no agency and are deprived of any 
legal persona; they cannot take care of themselves and are, therefore, grateful for the 
Mercedarians’ help. This image, like textual descriptions of the ransom expeditions, 
places the friars at its center and excludes the intermediaries and the networks of credit, 
ransom, and trust – discussed in the next chapter – that captives employed to ransom 
themselves independently of the Orders. 
Their propaganda, however, did not only celebrate the Orders success in redeeming 
Catholics and forcefully shape their religious role as saviors of Christian souls. It also 
created an image of the Maghrib and even of the Mediterranean, despite the fact the sea 
was never at the center of their propaganda. In fact, the adjective ‘Mediterranean’ hardly 
ever appears in any of the documents I have examined. And yet, both the sea and the 
Maghrib as the arenas in which captive-redeeming took place are carefully constructed by 
the orders. The framing of the rescue expeditions began before the Trinitarians and the 
Mercedarians embarked on the ships that took them to North Africa and continued after 
their return to Spain. Their voyage began when they left Madrid, marching south to one 
of the ports from which they left Spain. It ended after their return, with orchestrated 
processions in which rescued captives, dressed in the rags of their captivity and 
displaying their chains, enacted their captivity. . The processions framed the ransom 
expeditions, the Mediterranean, and the Maghrib as a liminal space, ritually separated 
from the regular order of things. They pointed to the crossing of the sea as a complicated 
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 Haedo, Topogafía e historia general de Argel, p. 100. On Sosa, Haedo, and the true identity of the 
author of that text, see: Camamis, Estudios Sobre el Cautiverio en el Siglo de Oro and Garcés, “An Early 
Modern Dialogue with Islam.”  
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and dangerous enterprise that required religious ceremonies for its success. The 
pamphlets that described the expeditions, however, always dedicated at least one 
paragraph, usually more, to descriptions of the sea voyage, of its hardships, and of the 
miraculous intervention would bring it to a successful end. The sea emerges as a space in 
which nature and God struggle against one another. This is how the voyage was 
described in a late Mercedarian expedition to Tunis in 1725:  
…[O]n the fourth of March, the [fathers-redemptors] set sail at the bay of 
Alicante, directing the bow to Barbary [and] navigating with fair weather, until 
they could see Ibiza and Majorca; but arriving at half the latitude between that 
island and Sardinia, such a furious storm erupted that they were happy to find 
refuge in the sandy banks of Tortosa. Desiring to see the end of their journey, they 
tried the inconstancy of the restless waves, but the waves embarrassed them with 
their relentless brutality, locking them in the port of Barcelona. They set sail 
again, and among the rolling, frights, and fears that only those who frequented the 
sea can testify to, pushed by the opposing winds, they anchored at the port of 
Cagliari on April 2nd.… and on the seventh day of that month, they directed the 
bow to La Goleta which appeared within [the distance] of a rifle shot; but lacking 
onshore wind, they were vehemently forced to turn back, so that within a short 
time they returned to the port which they had left.556  
 
Wild waves may have been, and still are, a constant feature of the Mediterranean. But at 
the same time they served as a trope in a discourse developed and employed by the 
Orders of Redemption. The Orders’ propaganda portrayed the western Mediterranean as 
an environmentally erratic, unexpected space, which did not submit to human wills, 
expectations, and plans. The sea is represented as playing with the ships that tried to cross 
it, sending them back and forth and not letting them reach their destinations. The 
capricious sea always turns against the voyagers, leaving them defenseless. 
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esse presente año de 1726, in Ignacio Bauer Landauer, Papeles de mi archivo, Relaciones de África (Argel 
– Túnez – Trípoli), Editorial Ibero-Africano-Americana, Madrid: 1922, vol. III, pp. 341-346. 
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Defenseless?  Almost. The fathers had God on their side. The travails they suffered 
– in the above quote – ended with a miracle: the conversion to Christianity of a Muslim 
who was onboard the ship with them. The conversion functioned as an omen that signals 
the end of the trial of crossing the sea. Immediately afterwards, the quote continues – 
“They left the port of Cagliari on April 29th and on May 1st at noon they happily anchored 
in La Goleta, a Tunisian port, two leagues away from the city.”557 While the 
Mercedarians spent almost six weeks trying unsuccessfully to cross the sea, following the 
conversion of the Muslim, they reached their destination in less than three days. The 
Mediterranean as the orders represented it was characterized both environmentally and 
religiously. Setting sail meant entering a space dominated by unruly forces of nature 
which only the miraculous or Godly intervention can defeat. 
How does this image of the sea correspond to the Mediterranean formed by the 
expeditions themselves? The number of expeditions that Mercedarians and Trinitarians 
sent to the Maghrib and their rhythm over time formed regularities which shaped 
maritime movement through the sea.  Between 1595 and 1692 only sixty-one expeditions 
were sent to Algiers and Morocco by the two Orders. On average, only once in every 
three years did the Orders arrive in Algiers, and only once in every three and a half years 
did they arrive in Fez, Morocco, or Tétouan.558 Not only were the operations rare, but 
also the rescue operations were complicated. The friars had to lay careful plans in 
advance of their voyage. They had to interact with Spanish government organs and 
arrange for two kinds of passports (Spanish and Maghribi). A scribe had to accompany 
them and record everything that happened, and interpreters had to be hired. From an 
organizational point of view these were bureaucratically complex. The sea never seemed 
so complicated to cross. The Mediterranean that these rescue missions articulated was an 
imperial space dominated by self-contained political entities – the Habsburg Empire, 
Morocco, and the Maghribi Ottoman regencies. These institutional, political actors 
interacted with each other employing diplomatic mechanisms. And the movement of 
Christians across the sea was highly regulated and bound to bureaucratic supervision. 
Despite the fact, then, that the propaganda constructed the sea as a space dominated by 
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God and nature and their actual ransom rhythms articulated a political space, the sea that 
emerges was similar: it was a space that separated polities and people, not only 
environmentally distanced but also politically so. 
5. Public Debates about Ecclesiastical Ransom  
    Trinitarians and Mercedarians engaged throughout the centuries in law suits against 
each other, expending considerable funds in such competitive litigation. However, they 
immediately united when the idea of ecclesiastical redemption, under royal protection, 
was challenged. This happened several time throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  On May 31st 1612, for example, the Duke of Osuna, viceroy of Sicily, wrote a 
letter to the King listing the reasons for which he believed the redemptive labor of the 
Trinitarians and Mercedarians should be stopped. The Orders, he argued, emptied the 
Empire of its money, ransomed only the old and the sick, and funded Spain’s enemies. If 
no rescue expeditions were sent to the Maghrib, he continued, the Muslims would 
themselves set free the old and the sick in order to avoid their maintenance expenses. The 
Council of State received the Duke’s letter, thanked him but prohibited him from taking 
any measures on the matter unless otherwise ordered by the King.559 The Duke was not 
the only to criticize the Orders. In 1626, in the cortes of Monzón in Valencia, Guillermo 
Garrett, a captain and an arbitrista, claimed that a better use of the money that the Orders 
spent on ransom would be what he called “a preventive redemption,” i.e. the 
establishment of a squadron to defend the Spanish coasts and capture Muslims.560  Like 
Osuna, Garrett accused the Orders of spending too much money, funding the crown’s 
enemies, and ransoming only the old and weak. The squadron, Garrett added, would 
prevent Spaniards from falling prey to Muslim corsairs and even help to capture and 
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CODOIN, Vol. 44, p. 285. 
560
 The arguments of Garrett are summarized toghether with the response of the General of the barefoot 
Trinitarians in a pamphlet published by the Trinitarians in 1632, see: Memorial del General de la orden 
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enslave enemy corsairs. The General of the Mercedarian Order, present in the cortes, 
responded rather woodenly, expounding on the importance of the Orders and calling the 
critics “unauthorized men, merchants by profession and especially idiots.”561 A little 
later, another response to Garrett’s arbitrio was published by the Provincial of Castile.562 
The attacks, however, continued. In 1629, it was the turn of the Count-Duke Olivares to 
attack the costs of ecclesiastical redemption. Again, the Trinitarian Provincial of Castile 
vehemently responded and silenced the Count-Duke.563 The end of the century did not 
bring an end to the objections to ecclesiastical ransom and the polemics continued in the 
following century.564  
In all of these instances, the critics did not distinguish between Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians, attacking them indifferently; in a similar vein, in their responses, 
Trinitarians or Mercedarians stood together. In this context, the Orders discovered that 
the books Philip II made them keep could serve them in unexpected ways. In imposing 
book-keeping on the Orders, the monarch had sought to strengthen his control over the 
use of ransom funds. When Guillermo Garrett claimed that during their expeditions 
Trinitarians and Mercedarians spent too much money on travel, food, and 
accommodation, the friars referred him to their books arguing that “the books of the 
accounts of the redemptions, which the redeemers have given to the Royal Council, 
respond to this charge; in these [books], made by a notary, it is stated that the [expenses] 
are not even a tenth of what the captain [Garrett] claims.”565 Osuna, Garrett, and Olivares 
may have failed in their attempts to eliminate the institution of ecclesiastical ransom but 
in drawing the Orders into the debate, these critics forced the Trinitarians and the 
Mercedarians to represent their redemptive labor in terms of economic efficiency, namely 
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in a language foreign to the way in which the Orders officially presented themselves. If 
originally, the Trinitarians and Mercedarians objected to the book-keeping procedures 
that the King imposed, as suggested by the fact the King had to issue and reissue his 
orders on the matter, ironically, they now discovered that these books could serve them as 
a point of reference to justify their work in the terms their opponents imposed. 
The debate between the Orders and their critics was not a passing episode but 
rather formed a discourse with a long  life.566 The fact that ransom, as is articulated in this 
debate, is a political question, and even more so an economic one, to be discussed in 
terms of efficiency, had a few effects on the historiography of the Orders. First, scholars 
have tended to read the critics’ arguments as justified and take them as a sign of the 
Order’s economic inefficiency.567 In that sense, the language of efficiency might be 
responsible for studies that have reduced ransom to economics and impersonal market 
forces. Second, and along the same lines, the debate must be at least partly responsible 
for the historiographic depiction of the Orders as sharing a monopoly over the economy 
of ransom. Indeed, Osuna, Garret, and Olivares directed their critiques only at the Orders 
and never mentioned small-scale ransom agents.568 The reason was that the latter were 
never directly funded by the Crown and as such had no responsibility for emptying – if 
indeed the Orders emptied – the royal fisc. No matter what the reason, the documents 
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which record the debate contributed to the silencing of the networks I examined in 
chapter four.  
6. The Orders of Redemption and Contemporary Historiography  
Scholars who have studied the process through which the Spanish King came to 
regularize the redemptive labor of the Orders assumed that the regulation marginalized 
and eventually eliminated those small-scale ransom agents discussed in the last 
chapter.569 In this process, scholars have argued, the Orders finally came to share a 
monopoly over ransom and were transformed into two efficient arms of a bureaucratic, 
centralized crown. José Antonio Martínez Torres, for example, has argued that the 
decision of the King to transform the Orders into a royal apparatus was part of a process 
of state formation, bureaucratization, and rationalization.  Facing an increasing debt, a 
growing number of his subjects taken captives and a need to protect dynastic interests in 
Europe, Martínez Torres has explained, Philip II compared the performance of competing 
actors in the economy of ransom from the twelfth century onwards and reached the 
conclusion that the Trinitarians and Mercedarians delivered the best results –
quantitatively and economically. According to this analysis,, the monarch deliberately 
decided to make the orders into a royal arm executing a monarchical agenda.570  
The process that Martínez Torres has described resulted among other things in the 
production of an important documentary corpus that provides a rich source for the study 
of the ransom and fundraising procedures of the orders. The merit of the documents lies 
in the fact that they form a serial corpus, which enables the reconstruction of institutional 
regularities transcending the history of individual captives or redemptors. These records 
made the work of the orders extremely visible at the time, and, just as importantly, 
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provided scholars of captivity with an extremely accessible, perhaps too accessible, body 
of documents for the study of the ransoming process.571 The histories produced on the 
basis of an exclusive reliance on the records that the Orders had left us with offer a 
version of a narrative of state-formation and of centralization. The novelty these histories 
of the Orders offer in respect to state-formation narratives is that a monopoly over 
“humanitarian action” substitutes the traditional monopoly over the means of violence.572  
The previous and the next chapters challenge this history by showing how the regulation 
the King imposed on the redemptive labor of the Orders neither eliminated the ransom 
networks nor intended to eliminate the collaboration with go-betweens. Moreover, in 
1612, the King formalized cooperation with Jewish and Muslim intermediaries who 
provided the Orders with services of outsourcing of ransom.  
7.  Conclusion 
The regulation the King imposed on the Orders facilitated their study and is to a large 
extent responsible for their constructed historical image. As I have demonstrated, 
however, the Orders were active molders of their own image. In wide propaganda 
campaigns that included the production and circulation of images and pamphlets the 
Orders shaped an image of the Mediterranean, the space that separated the Habsburg 
Empire from the North Africa. This image worked in tandem with the Mediterranean that 
emerged from the actual procedures that governed their ransom expeditions and their 
rhythms. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the crossing of the sea was a routine 
practice and corsairs, captives, merchants and ransom agents constantly criss-crossed the 
sea. Both the historiography and the propaganda of the Orders pointed to them as 
exclusive actors in the field of ransom.  I have already demonstrated the importance of 
dense networks of ransom, credit, and trust active alongside the redemptive labor of the 
Trinitarians and the Mercedarians. Now it is time to see how the work of the Orders was 
intertwined with that of small-scale ransom agents. 
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Chapter	7: 
The	Political	Economy	of	Ransom,	1575-1627 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the political economy of ransom – a political economy 
stimulated by violence, piracy, selling of booty and ransom – between 1575 and 1627 and 
on the chief actors who formed it: political, religious, and economic actors as well as 
captives and their kin.573 I argue that the redemptive labor of the Trinitarian and 
Mercedarian Orders was inextricably intertwined with that of local Maghribi 
intermediaries upon whom the Orders relied. The Orders and the intermediaries competed 
with each other, as demonstrated in chapter four, but more often worked in tandem. The 
surprising alliance between the Orders of Redemption (members of the Catholic Church 
and subjects of the Habsburg Empire) and Jewish and Muslim intermediaries (whose 
predecessors were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula) began in the Middle Ages. But in 
1613, in response to the Phillip III’s decision to forbid the Orders of Redemption from 
ransoming Spanish captives directly from Algiers, Mercedarians, and later Trinitarians, 
petitioned the King to allow them to outsource the ransom of Spaniards from Algiers; 
namely, to commission middlemen to do the job on their behalf. In consenting, Philip III 
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 These included the Ottoman Sultan, the Spanish Monarch, Spanish grandees, the Algerian pasha and the 
Algerian Governing Council, Governors of Tétouan, Trinitarians and the Mercedarians, captives and their 
kin, and Jewish, Muslim, and Christian intermediaries. On the term ‘economy of ransom’ see: Kaiser, “La 
excepción permanente” and idem, “L’économie de la rançon en Méditerranée occidentale.” 
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legitimized and formalized the long-term collaboration between the Orders and Jewish 
and Muslims intermediaries.  
Trinitarians and Mercedarians and their Jewish and Muslim partners were not the 
only actors in this political economy. They also interacted with the pashas of Ottoman 
Algiers and its Divan, the governing council, on the one hand, and the governors of 
Moroccan Tétouan on the other, themselves parties in another informal coalition. Indeed, 
the members of this second alliance did not know they formed a coalition, never 
negotiated its terms or intentionally agreed to collaborate. If anything, after years of 
political struggles and Ottoman attempts to conquer Morocco, they must have perceived 
themselves as rivals. Beyond the political tensions that characterized the relations 
between Algiers and Morocco, however, both parties sold the same commodity – captives 
– and competed against each other over the same buyers – the Trinitarians and the 
Mercedarians. And yet, as part of the competition, Algerians and Moroccans were in 
effect seeking to form a cartel by preventing the practice of outsourcing of ransom. 
Diametrically opposed in their goal, they shared the same interest: the control over go-
betweens and direct commerce in captives with the Orders of Redemption. They targeted 
the go-betweens and the outsourcing of rescue because they felt that these came at the 
expense of their shrinking revenues. Spanish, Algerian, and Moroccan ransom policies 
and the intermediaries’ ransom procedures shaped the political economy and geography 
of ransom, as this chapter will explain. In reconstructing and analyzing ransom policies 
and the shifting and loose coalitions between Mediterranean powers, the chapter not only 
explains the making and unmaking of the political economy of ransom, but also of the 
geography of ransom, namely the geographical distribution of the ransom expeditions 
that the Trinitarians and Mercedarians sent to the Maghrib.  
The chapter moves back and forth in time and in space. I open by describing the 
tragic history of the 1609 Trinitarian ransom expedition to Algiers which brutally ended 
when the Algerians arrested the Trinitarians and the captives they had ransomed mere 
hours before they would have set sail for Spain. In the fourth section, I analyze four failed 
attempts to ransom the Trinitarians, while shifting between Spanish, Ottoman and 
Algerian points of view. I show how the rescue of Bernardo Monroy, the Trinitarian who 
headed the 1609 expedition, required complicated negotiations between a multiplicity of 
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actors and numerous ransom plans, the majority of which were never executed. While the 
attempts to save the Trinitarians failed, they served as indices of the state of political 
power relations in Spain, in Algiers, between Algiers and Spain and between Algiers and 
Istanbul. The detainment of the Trinitarians resulted in a royal prohibition against direct 
ransom from Algiers and hence in the formalization of the outsourcing of ransom, a 
phenomenon I examine in the last section. By placing the outsourcing of ransom within a 
broader time span than the Monroy affair, however, I show how outsourcing constituted a 
common practice prior to the arrest of the Trinitarians and, thus, that the affair only 
served to legitimate and enhance such longstanding practice.  
In the end of the last chapter, I showed how recent studies of the Orders of 
Redemption have framed their history within the narrative of the emergence of the 
modern state through the monopolization of “humanitarian action” (instead of the means 
of violence, as in the traditional history).  By analyzing unstudied archival sources, this 
chapter complicates the history of ransom and of the Mediterranean, showing the ways in 
which the labor of the Orders was intertwined with that of small-scale actors who 
continued to thrive throughout the seventeenth century, and how the crown decentralized 
its power by outsourcing the rescue of its subjects. At the same time, I account for the 
shifting positions of the Muslim actors: I reconstruct and analyze political tensions in 
Algiers, between Algiers and Morocco and between Algiers and the Ottoman Sultan, all 
of which influenced the political economy of ransom. In doing so, I bring into the 
account central actors thus far excluded from the historiography. This chapter thus also 
complicates homogenous portrayals of early modern North African Islam. 
2. The Monroy Affair 
Between 1595 and 1627, the Spanish branches of the Order of the Holy Trinity and 
of the Order of Our Lady of Mercy sent ten ransom expeditions to Algiers.574 During that 
time, the Orders also sent fifteen expeditions to Tétouan and other Moroccan cities. In 
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 Trinitarian expeditions arrived in Algiers in 1595, 1599, 1609, 1618, and 1627; Mercedarian in 1596, 
1597, 1604, 1620, 1627. These do not exclude rescue by branches other than the Spanish or Aragonse. 
During that time, the Portuguese Trinitarians arrived twice in Algiers, once in 1617/8 and then in 1620/21, 
Porres, Libertad a los cautivos & José Antonio, Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la Merced ó sea 
historia de las redenciones de cautivos cristianos realizadas por los hijos de la orden de la Merced, 
Imprenta de los herederos de la viuda Pla: Barcelona, 1873. 
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other words, for every three expeditions sent to Morocco, only two were sent to Algiers. 
If we focus on the shorter period between 1609 and 1627, we see that for every two 
expeditions sent to Morocco, only one was sent to Algiers. On the other hand, in the 
following third of the century (1628-1661), the numbers were almost even – eleven 
expeditions arrived in Algiers and twelve in Tétouan.575 How can we explain this shift? 
Does the distribution of rescue operations reflect the geography of piracy? Namely, were 
Moroccan corsairs much more active than their fellow Algerians during these decades, 
causing more expeditions to be sent to Morocco? Or was it that Algerians specialized in 
French, Italian, and other captives but less so in Spaniards who were the preferred prey of 
Moroccans corsairs? Such assumptions stand in contrast to everything we know about 
early modern Algiers. In his discussion of piracy in the Mediterranean, Braudel has 
named these years (1580-1620) as “the second brilliant age of Algiers” during which 
Algiers became the corsair capital of the Mediterranean.576 During that time, Algerians 
captured more Christian captives than anyone else in the Maghrib and Spaniards formed 
the majority of those captives, a fact of common knowledge within Spain. Rather than 
reflecting the geography of piracy, then, the distribution of redemption missions 
camouflages a dynamic political economy of ransom. 
Scholars, who refer to the small number of ecclesiastical ransom expeditions to 
Algiers during the first decades of the seventeenth century, explain it by the fate of the 
Trinitarian expedition sent to Algiers in 1609. This expedition was led by three 
Trinitarians: Bernardo de Monroy, Juan del Aguila, and Juan de Palacios. The last two 
were experienced at redeeming captives in Algiers. Del Aguila had spent seven years in 
Algiers, between 1595 and 1602, and de Palacios had been sent there twice to ransom 
captives (in 1591-2 and then 1595). The three left the Valencian port of Denia on March 
9th and arrived in Algiers on April 1st. Overall, the expedition progressed smoothly as 
planned.  Soon after their arrival, the friars began selling the goods they brought with 
them and used the money to buy captives. By mid-May, they had ransomed one hundred 
and thirty captives and were ready to return to Spain. As was customary, our three 
Trinitarians had obtained passports from the governor of Algiers prior to their arrival in 
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 See the table by the end of chapter seven. 
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 On “the second brilliant age of Algiers,” see: Braudel, pp. 882-886.  
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the city. And yet, despite having the required documents and having followed the 
procedures, on May 13th before the Trinitarians and the captives they had ransomed 
embarked on the ships that would have taken them to Spain, the Divan ordered their 
arrest.577 The reason bore no direct relation to the Trinitarians or to the captives. The 
Christians were paying for the injustice suffered by Mamet Axá, a powerful Algerian 
“Turk.” Weeks earlier, the latter had commissioned Manfredino de Manfredini, a 
Corsican merchant who traded with Algiers on a regular basis, to ransom his daughter, 
Fatima, held captive in Livorno (Map 2, [1]). Fatima embarked on a ship that was about 
to return her to her family in Algiers.578 The ship left the port of Livorno, and then 
stopped at Calvi, a port town in Northwest Corsica (then under the dominion of the 
Republic of Genoa). There, ten-year-old Fatima was forced to convert to Christianity, 
was baptized by the bishop of Saona, and received the name Madalena (Map 2, [2]).579  
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 The Passports protected the Trinitarians on their way to Algiers. They ran into corsairs a few days after 
they left the port of Denia, but the corsairs allowed them to go free once the Trinitarians presented their 
safe-passes, see: Porres Alonso, Libertad a los cautivos, p. 341. 
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 Francisco de la Vega y Toraya, Chrónica de la provincia de Castilla, León y Navarra del Orden de la 
Santíssima Trinidad, Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1729, p. 66. Manfradino had two brothers one of which was a 
renegade living in Algiers, Ibid. He traded various goods and often ransomed captives, Muslims and 
Christians. In October 1609, for example, he arrived in Livorno after having ransomed in Algiers three 
Christian captives, see: Salvadorini, “Traffici e schiavi fra Livorno e Algeria,” p. 72. 
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 AGS, Estado, Leg. 1882, Fol. 273 
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Map 2: Negotiations over Fatima-Madalena’s Ransom 
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Christian law now forbade the converted Madalena to return to her family in Algiers. 
After seeing that the bishop would not let him take Madalena to Algiers, De Manfredini 
left Calvi for Algiers to deliver the bad news (Map 2, [3]). Furious, Axá went to the 
Algerian Divan and demanded redress. In response the Trinitarians were detained.580  
In 1609, none of the persons involved in the attempts to solve the diplomatic 
predicament imagined it would last for more than a decade. After a while, the Trinitarians 
convinced the Divan to allow the scribe of the expedition to leave Algiers and report the 
news in Madrid (Map 2, [4]). When Philip III received the report in October 1609, he 
wrote to his ambassador in Genoa ordering him to urge the Genoese to discover what 
exactly happened in Corsica and whether Madalena had been converted by force (Map 2, 
[5]). The Genoese sent an emissary to Calvi and arranged for testimonies of Muslims 
enslaved in Corsica who questioned Madalena about her conversion and compiled a 
report in Arabic in which they indicated that Madalena converted out of her free will and 
wished to keep on living among Christians (Map 2, [6]).  The report was sent to Algiers, 
but when Monroy presented it to the Divan, no one believed the testimonies, claiming 
that slaves would write what they masters oblige them to write (Map 2, [7]).581  At that 
date ( October 1609), the Spaniards still believed the event would develop in a familiar 
manner. As we have seen in chapter two, whenever Christian or Muslim slaves felt that 
the few privileges they had were violated, they wrote home pleading for help. Soon, their 
sovereigns intervened. When Algerians enslaved in Spain asked their governor for help, 
the governor would threaten to worsen the living conditions of Christian slaves who came 
from the cities or regions in which the complaining Muslims were held. Usually this was 
enough to ease the situation. Thus, in October 1609, at the same time that the King 
communicated with Genoa on the matter, the viceroy of Valencia, in response to a 
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 Like conspiracy theories nowadays ‘explaining’ the September 11 attacks or other disasters, different 
stories and explanations about the reasons behind the arrest of the Trinitarians circulated throughout the 
Mediterranean, years after the event. Two Englishman arriving in Malaga from Algiers, for example, 
carried “certified news” (“nueva por muy sierta”) with them.  They explained that the Trinitarians were 
detained following the request of the “Moors” (referring to the Moriscos) as revenge for their expulsion 
from Spain. Juan Titón de Cervantes, the person who sent the news to the Council of the State ended his 
report by saying that “these English publicized it as a fact” (“lo publican estos ingleses ser sierto”), see: 
AGS, Estado, Leg. 246, 2.1.1612. The background which may have made such a theory attractive was the 
expulsion of the Moriscos during those years (1609-1614).  
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 Vega y Toraya, Chrónica de la provincia de Castilla, pp. 87, 91. 
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memorandum authored by Monroy detailing the circumstances of his arrest and the 
captives’ travails, was sent to Philip III and raised the option of severely punishing “some 
captives present here (i.e. in Spain) from there (i.e. from Algiers).”582 We do not know if 
the monarch took his advice seriously, as there is no further reference to it. But even if 
the Spaniards pursued this line of action, the following years proved that Mamet Axá was 
powerful enough to convince the Divan to leave Monroy in prison despite such counter-
measures. During the following thirteen years until the end of the Monroy Affair, Axá 
never retreated from the conditions he set in 1609 – the return of his daughter in 
exchange for the Trinitarians and the captives they had ransomed. 
 
3. Attempts to Ransom Monroy 
In the following years, the Spaniards and the Algerians made several failed 
attempts to bring the affair to an end.  These attempts involved the Pasha of Algiers,  
aristocrats of the Spanish Empire (the Dukes of Lerma, Osuna, and Escalona, the Marquis 
of Caracena, and the Count of Aguilar), Jewish and Muslims intermediaries, Monroy, 
other captives and their kin, and even the Ottoman Sultan. Out of probably a much larger 
number of plans which never even made their way into the archives, I focus in this 
section on four, none of which ever materialized. These failed dynamics demonstrate the 
political, social and religious aspects of this decentralized economy of ransom. The 
ransom attempts involved several actors dispersed across the Mediterranean, not just in 
two nodes. Moreover, the plans to ransom Monroy demonstrate how for every ransom 
deal that was executed several others were negotiated or imagined, but never realized. 
For the captives involved, as well as for their kinsmen, these deals may have been 
unfortunate failures. Such deals also functioned, however, as representations of the state 
of power relations in Spanish and Maghribi political hubs.  
3.1 Ransom Attempts: the Spanish Perspective 
The documents constantly report the insistence of the Algerians to set Monroy free 
only in exchange for the release of Madalena. The Spaniards never openly renounced this 
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 “…[U]sar de rrigores y prissiones con algunos captivos que aquí se allan de allá…” AGS, Estado, Leg. 
217, 15.10.1609. 
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option, but, at the same time, they never seriously considered it. From a Spanish point of 
view, Madalena’s Christianity obviated that option.583 As early as 1612, the Count of 
Aguilar, then governor of Oran, negotiated Monroy’s release with the Ottoman Sultan. In 
a letter Aguilar sent to the Council of War on November 11th 1612, the only document to 
refer to this negotiation, he reported of his efforts and explained that he arranged for 
letters from Ahmed I, the Ottoman Sultan, ordering Monroy’s release. Axá, Madalena’s 
father, however, used all his political weight and disobeyed the Sultan’s orders. 
According to Aguilar, the Divan ordered Axá to travel to Istanbul, the Ottoman imperial 
capital, and account for his disobedience, but Axá refused.584 That the Algerians 
disobeyed the Sultan’s orders was not surprising. In the first decade of the seventeen 
century, the Ottoman Sultan officially acknowledged his lack of control over the Ottoman 
Maghrib. When Henry IV, the French monarch, demanded from the Sultan that the 
bilateral agreements France signed with Algiers and Tunis be respected, the Sultan 
advised him to negotiate directly with the regencies.585 The same dynamic repeated itself 
in the following years. In a report dated August 1617 submitted by three former captives 
who arrived in Majorca from Algiers, the captives indicated that the renegade Soliman 
from Catania sent from Istanbul to be “King of Algiers” brought new orders from the 
Sultan to release Monroy, but the Divan again disobeyed.586 The surprising point in the 
letter of Aguilar to the Council of War was not the disobedience to imperial orders but 
rather that the Divan did not side with Axá and that the Pasha and the Divan were 
portrayed as not having enough power to impose their will on him. In contrast to this 
letter, later documents suggest that the Divan supported Axá throughout the affair. It is 
probable that, Aguilar’s informers had misled him. In any case, one of the two rulers of 
the inner sea – the Ottoman Sultan – emerged as a weak actor as far as the Maghrib was 
concerned. That is, when it came to power dynamics in Algiers, local actors disregarded 
the Sultan’s orders and had the power to serve their own interests. 
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 According to the Duke of Maqueda, who succeeded Aguilar as the governor of Oran, at some stage, the 
Spaniards addressed the pope in the matter but even he could not do much as the girl was Christian, see: 
AGS, Estado, Leg. 1950, 7.17.1621.  
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What exactly did the Algerians expect? Did they think that the Christians would 
hand them a Christian girl? In October 1617, Monroy wrote the Marquis of Caracena, the 
viceroy of Valencia, that the Algerians wanted Madalena transferred to Tabarka, an 
island located near Tunis a few hundred miles east of Algiers, which the Genoese leased 
from the Spaniards. An earlier letter from Monroy, from August 1st 1617, sheds more 
light on what the Algerians expected. According to Monroy, what Axá required was to 
meet Madalena in Tabarka and to see for himself whether she was a Christian or a 
Muslim – “if she was a Christian he would leave her, and if a Moor he would take her 
with him.”587 Even if in the early stages of the affair the idea of returning Madalena to 
Axá made sense, as time passed, however, this solution became less and less feasible. By 
1618, Madalena was already married in Corsica, a fact that made her return to Algiers 
even less likely.588  
Behind closed doors, the Spaniards acknowledged that Madalena may have been 
forced to convert. Pedro de Bricuela, a captain in the Spanish Atlantic fleet (Armada del 
mar oceano) held captive in Algiers since 1614, mentioned Monroy in a letter he sent the 
Council of the State in August 1617. In the letter, Bricuela complained about what he 
perceived as the Algerians’ unfair conduct: 
Even if the girl was Christianized by force, as they claim, they could consider [the 
fact] that it happened in a different region; that those [Trinitarian] fathers came [to 
Algiers] with an Algerian safe pass; and moreover… that among them [the 
Muslims] it is customary to turn young children into Moor by force. But their 
arrogance cannot acknowledge equality nor can [they] keep their word…589 
 
In this unusual text, a Spanish official, though off the record, speaks in a voice opposed 
to formal discourses and acknowledges the mutual nature of Mediterranean religious 
violence. Bricuela did not think the problem was in forcing a conversion on a ten-year-
old girl. Rather, he argued, the problem was that the Algerians refused to acknowledge 
that both parties practiced forced conversions and that Madalena’s conversion – whether 
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588
 The viceroy of Valencia indicated her marital status in a letter to the Council of the State from October 
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forced or voluntary – was a fait accompli. Moreover, that it was not the Spanish who 
converted Madalena but rather the Genoese meant that it was with them that the 
Algerians should take issue. Bricuela’s frustration apparently stemmed from his feeling 
that the Algerians decided to change the rules of the game without informing the 
Spaniards. At the same time, like most parties on the Spanish side, he acknowledged that 
without the return of Madalena to her family, Monroy would not be freed, even though 
that option was not feasible from his perspective.  
The Spanish grandees were looking for a host of alternative solutions. The Count 
of Aguilar, whose attempt to work out a solution with the Sultan I discussed above, kept 
looking for a way to rescue Monroy. As the governor of Oran, he was the most suitable 
man for the task: he maintained regular correspondence with Monroy, had numerous 
spies in Algiers, and was regularly updated about the events there. His second plan was to 
smuggle (hurtar, literally steal) Monroy from Algiers.590 On April 19th 1613, he informed 
the King that the moment was not ripe yet for action. The Algerians were on guard, the 
Count explained, because a few days earlier Moriscos from Algiers helped captives to 
escape from Algiers to Oran and other captives, with the help of Majorcan smugglers, 
had escaped by sea. And yet, Aguilar sounded confident in his power and explained that 
he had a Morisco who spied for him in Algiers and who could engineer an escape. The 
best way to execute it, he added, was by sea; walking from Algiers to Oran was too 
dangerous.591 
These plans never materialized. But a year later, in March 1614, merchants, or 
perhaps ransomed Muslim captives, brought exciting news from Sicily to Algiers. In the 
previous summer, so the rumor went, the Sicilian squadron had captured Muslim captives 
among whom “a few [were] important and relatives of the [Grand] Turk.”592 At that 
point, Monroy did not know that Mahamete, the Bey of Alexandria, was among the 
captives.593 Nevertheless, as a professional redeemer he understood that one of the 
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 The Duke of Osuna, viceroy of Sicily, who held the captured Bey notified the Council of the State about 
the arrest on October 4th 1613. Six weeks later, the Council convened to discuss the matter for the first 
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Ottoman prisoners could be the key to his release. In a letter the imprisoned Trinitarian 
rushed to the Duke of Lerma via the viceroy of Valencia on March, 21st 1614, he 
presented him with a plan. Mahamete Bey, Monroy explained, would write to the 
Ottoman Sultan asking him to send a cavus (messenger) to Algiers. The cavus would 
negotiate the exchange of the Bey for Monroy and the rest of the detained Christians, and 
ask the Sultan to order the Pasha and the Divan to approve the exchange.594 But first, 
Mornoy insisted, Lerma had to write to the viceroy of Sicily, the Duke of Osuna, and 
order him to keep Mahamete Bey for Monroy. Monroy probably guessed that he was not 
the only party on the Spanish side pulling strings in an attempt to secure the Bey for an 
exchange. The Bey himself, immediately following his capture, offered Osuna twenty 
thousand ducats for his own release.595 Somewhat surprisingly, three out of the six 
members of the Council of the State initially thought the Bey should be set free. They 
justified their stand in that the Bey had already been taken captive in the past and had 
been liberated by the King’s order. Moreover, they added, he was old and on his way to 
receive medical treatment, was not a corsair, and never attacked Christians. In letting him 
go, they claimed, the King would demonstrate royal benevolence.596 But other members 
of the council were looking forward to using the Bey for their own interests. In October 
1614 and probably earlier, a certain Pedro Muñoz Montefrío arrived in Sicily from 
Istanbul and informed the viceroy that the Sultan was negotiating the Bey’s exchange for 
Hungarian knights held captive in Istanbul and for money.597 But there was another 
contender – the Marquis de Villena. The Marquis was using all his influence in Madrid in 
order to arrange the exchange of the Bey for his bastard son, Diego Pacheco, captured 
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near the Balearics in 1609 by the notorious Dutch corsair Simon Dança, and taken to 
Algiers and from there to Istanbul.598 Pedro Muñoz Montefrío was soon exposed by the 
Duke of Osuna as a charlatan whose only intentions were to blackmail the Marquis de 
Villena.599 With one contender down, Monroy was still competing against the Marquis de 
Villena. The Marquis and Monroy attempted to recruit everyone to advocate their case. A 
letter Monroy sent to Spain in 1612, in which he described the miseries and travails the 
captives suffered (as well as the religious services he and the other Trinitarians provided 
the captives with), was printed and reprinted, circulating across Spain and beyond and 
thus contributing to his case.600 The viceroys of Valencia and of Majorca advocated for 
helping him, and on July 19th 1614 the Council of the State decided to support Monroy. 
The conditions of this decision were that Mahamete Bey would be set free only after the 
Algerians liberated Monroy and the other captives.601 
There was not much time. Monroy and Pacheco suffered in their captivity and the 
Bey was dying. This worried the Duke of Osuna who was probably counting on a 
respectable commission for the Bey’s ransom. Osuna urged the King to make up his mind 
because the Bey was “not healthy and [that] he was getting worse in such a way that the 
[Duke] did not dare to [try] and cure him” and the Bey was “old and getting sicker and 
sicker over time.”602 Monroy, who perhaps knew that, did not wait for the Council’s 
decision and worked in parallel channels to advance an exchange. The evidence does not 
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allow the reconstruction of the maneuvers of all the parties involved, and yet it is clear 
that on July 9th, 1614, Morato Aga arrived in Algiers to negotiate the deal.603 Six weeks 
later, on August 25th, in the bagnio of Algiers in the presence of three captives who 
served as witnesses, Monroy and Morato Aga signed an agreement ratified by the 
Trinitarian notary arrested with Monroy. According to the agreement, the Duke of Osuna 
had to transfer Mahamete Bey and his wife to the custody of the Genoese governor of 
Tabarka. In the meantime, Morato Aga had to arrange for a letter from the Sultan 
ordering the Pasha to release the Trinitarians and the captives they had ransomed. Once 
the latter were free, the governor of Tabraka was to free the Bey and his wife and provide 
them with safe passes. In October, the viceroy of Majorca, to whom Monroy sent the 
agreement, shipped a copy to the Council of the State asking for its approval. The viceroy 
urged the members of the Council to make a quick decision before the Algerians 
withdrew their consent to the exchange.604 The exchange of Monroy for the Bey was 
never realized. The struggle continued at least until October 1615, when Diego de 
Pacheco died. The negotiation over Monroy’s exchange for the Bey continued until the 
latter’s death, probably in February 1616.605  
The Spaniards, however, made yet another attempt to ransom Monroy in 1621. 
Again, it was the Governor of Oran, by now the Duke of Maqueda, who orchestrated this 
last failure. A certain Juan Alaba de Luna was sent to Algiers to negotiate the ransom. De 
Luna spent eleven months in Algiers and believed that he had reached an agreement 
according to which, as he later recounted to Maqueda, Monroy would be set free for ten 
thousand ducats. The search for the money began. The natural candidate, Simón Rojas, 
the Provincial of the Trinitarians in Castile, refused to help; he claimed that his Order was 
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too poor. Maqueda found another donor – a member of the Çaportas family, one of the 
leading Jewish families of Oran – who would pay for the ransom.606 Antonio de la Cruz, 
a Portuguese Trinitarian sent to Algiers by Philip III to negotiate the ransom of Jorge 
Mascarenhas, the governor of Mazagán (Al Jadida), was to be the guarantor of the 
transaction.  
Beyond the fact that they all failed, the above rescue attempts share similar 
qualities. They all formed kaleidoscopic coalitions consisting of anomalous Jewish 
intermediaries living under Spanish dominion, the Spanish monarch and the Crown’s 
grandees, the Algerian Pasha and Divan, the Ottoman Sultan, and Spanish and 
Portuguese Trinitarians. Curiously enough, it was the Spanish Trinitarians who, for 
economic reasons, refused to participate in the efforts..607 The failure, though, seems 
typical in that it produced numerous competing attempts to use a prisoner for the rescue 
of other prisoners. The case of Ali Arraez or Francesco Guicciardo from Ferrara that 
evolved over the third and fourth decades of the century demonstrates that. Guicciardo 
who was taken captive in his youth and converted to Islam, gained a reputation as a 
Tunisian corsair, but was captured in 1624 by Alvarao Baçan, the Marquis of Santa Cruz, 
and then submitted to the Sicilian Tribunal of the Inquisition.608 Despite being identified 
by more than a dozen witnesses, he refused to confess to being a renegade and insisted 
that he was born Muslim. As with the Monroy affair, once news about his arrest arrived 
in Tunis, a ransom already concluded was halted and almost all the redeemed captives 
detained. In 1628, six Carmelite priests, captives in Tunis, petitioned the Inquisition to 
permit their exchange in return for Ali Arraez, explaining that otherwise, the Pasha 
refused to set them free. The inquisitors refused.609 Eleven years later, the archbishop of 
Palermo, Cardinal Doria, made a similar petition. He asked the inquisitors to exchange 
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their prisoner for Vincencio Tarsone Corandero, a vicar from Palermo held captive in 
Tunis, but again, the Inquisitors refused.610  
These cases were not exceptional. Most likely, for every deal executed, a few more 
others were planned but never realized. While the actors did not achieve the desired end r 
– freeing a captive – the negotiation provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate, 
evaluate and improve their political power. This was the case in the competition between 
the grandees of the Empire in the hubs of Spanish administration over Monroy and the 
Bey and in the power struggles over Monroy within Algiers and between Algiers and 
Istanbul. Failures, then, should be reevaluated as they shed light on exchange, the 
construction of value and ransom of captives. If in the previous chapter we have seen 
how by pretending to be poor or rich, healthy or sick, captives could manipulate the 
qualities that were imagined as bestowing them with economic value, in the form of a 
ransom price, now, we have also seen how religious, social, and political variables 
intervened in shaping value. Christian and Muslim captives moved in and out of different 
regimes of value which transformed them from objects to be exchanged or sold to 
community members to be protected.611 That was the case of Fatima twice de-
commoditized: once upon her conversion and then after she had married. By converting 
or being converted Fatima-Madalena entered a religious value regime, from which her 
father, despite his political power, could not redeem her. In marrying a Christian she 
establish new social ties, which beyond her conversion put obstacles on the possibility of 
her return to Algiers. In this instance of the Monroy affair, religion and social factors 
were stronger than politics and value was predicated upon them rather than upon 
economic factors. If we look at the struggle over the Bey, value emerges as a by-product 
of political struggles. At the same time, struggles over captives, exchange and value, 
embodied different models of what the Mediterranean was – a religious, economic, or 
political space.   
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3.2 Ransom Attempts: the Algerian Perspective 
Lack of decisiveness or agreement in the Spanish Council of the State was one of 
the reasons that Monroy did not retrieve his liberty. In the attempts to exchange Monroy 
for the Bey, for example, opposing memos supporting Monroy and Escalona were issued 
until the death of the Duke’s son and of the Bey.612 Had the members of the Councils of 
the State of War been more efficient and determined perhaps two of the three – Monroy, 
Pacheco and the Bey – would have gained their liberty. But were the Spaniards solely 
responsible for this state of affairs? Ending the story at this point entails the exclusion of 
major actors – the Algerians. What was their role in the affair? The Spanish grandees 
who informed the King about Monroy rarely made distinctions between different political 
actors in Algiers. Obviously, people like Aguilar and the viceroys of Majorca and 
Valencia were well-informed about political events and the power relations which 
divided the Algiers, but even they did not always voice this complexity in their 
administrative exchange. The image that emerges from the state documents I have 
analyzed thus far is of an Algerian, or Muslim, united front with regards to the Monroy 
affair. Could an insider’s perspective complicate the picture? Unfortunately, we have no 
minutes of the Divan meetings and, in general, Ottoman Algerian archives store very few 
documents for that period.613 However the report of an anonymous spy cum captive from 
Denia (in the Crown of Valencia), sent to the viceroy of Majorca, provides unusual and 
precious information. Unlike the reports composed by Juan Bautista Soriano, Vincente 
Colom, and Juan Ramírez, which we have examined in chapter three, the anonymous 
captive recorded mostly the arrival of prizes in the Algerian port ships, with their captives 
and goods, as well as each of the bimonthly meetings of the Divan. The details the 
anonymous Valencian provided about the meetings suggest that he was either present in 
person or had a valuable informer.  His account covers almost every day between 
September 1613 and March 1614, that is, a period during which the fate of Monroy was 
intensively discussed in bureaucracies across the Mediterranean.  
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Regardless of his source, his account sheds exceptional light on the disagreements 
between the Pasha and the Aga, the head of the janissary militia, who administered the 
meetings of the Divan. Since 1587, Algerian pashas were nominated by the Sultan for 
renewable triennial mandates. Nominees perceived this North African ‘exile’ as an 
opportunity to make a fortune, allowing them to return rich to Istanbul.614  In contrast, the 
office of the Aga, the head of the Janissaries who presided over the meetings of the 
Divan, was elective, and in the seventeenth century each Aga held the office for two 
lunar months.615 The Pasha and the Aga negotiated and decided the regency’s political 
issues at the Divan in meetings that brought together, in addition to these two figures, 
senior officers of the Janissaries, the corsairs represented via the tā’ifat al-ru’asā’, their 
corporation, the mufti, cadi, and secretaries. The main contenders for power, however, 
were not the Janissaries and the Pasha but rather the Janissaries and the tā’ifat al-ru’asā’. 
The role of the pashas who had relatively little authority was limited to mitigating the 
tensions between the corsairs and the Janissaries.616 In 1659, the Janissaries usurped the 
powers of the Pasha, the Ottoman representative, claiming he was corrupt.617 Khirai has 
noted that signs of the dynamic that led to the usurpation had become visible earlier. The 
Monroy affair, however, suggests that the tensions between the Pasha and the Janissaries 
erupted even as early as the Monroy affair, during a period (1570/80-1625/30) which 
Khiari characterizes as stable, one during which Ottoman power, embodied in the figure 
of the Pasha, strengthened.618  
Like the Spanish aristocracy, the Pasha and the Aga constantly disagreed about the 
way to bring the Monroy affair to an end. In Algiers, as in Spain, the Trinitarians’ fate 
was also determined by a political logic external to the affair. The source of debate 
between these office holders was the salaries of the Janissaries, the soldiers that formed 
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the Ottoman militia of Algiers. The Pasha had to pay the Janissaries their salaries every 
two lunar months but Algerian pashas often had difficulties in finding the required 
money. On September 14th 1613, for example, in response to the Janissaries’ complaint 
about a delay in the payment of their wages, the Pasha explained that he could not pay 
until the Janissaries allowed free commerce in captives and free the detained Trinitarians. 
According to the Pasha, the Janissaries prohibited merchants from trading in captives, a 
prohibition that economically burdened the Pasha. The soldiers agreed to consider free 
commerce but refused to set the Trinitarians free. Moreover, they forbade the Pasha from 
negotiating Monroy’s liberty – “[the Pasha] cannot talk or negotiate in any manner [the 
ransom of] those [captives] of the [Trinitarian] redemption and the [Trinitarian] fathers 
that are held here.”619 The next day, the Janissaries decided to allow commerce in 
captives between Tétouan and Algiers but insisted that Monroy and the rest stay in 
prison. The permit probably benefitted individual merchants who could export captives to 
Tétouan and elsewhere while damaging the Pasha who wanted to sell captives directly 
and exclusively to the Orders of Redemption.  
The anonymous captive chronicled several similar instances. On January 5th 1614, 
in the meeting of the Divan, the Aga warned the Pasha that unless he paid the soldiers by 
the next day, the Aga would confiscate the Pasha’s slaves, sell them in the slave market, 
and use the profit to pay the soldiers. The Pasha insisted on cutting a deal with the 
Trinitarians without which, he repeated, he could not pay the Janissaries. It seems, 
however, that the soldiers were also divided in regard to a proper solution to the affair. 
Probably for that reason, in the meeting the next day, the Aga forbade the Janissaries 
from discussing the matter with the Pasha. Disobedience, he warned, would result in 
removal from the payroll list. But the Pasha was not lying. He did not have the money 
and needed a profitable deal with Monroy. A few days later, the Janissaries broke into the 
private prison of the Pasha, took his captives and sold them in the slave market.620 This 
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radical act, however, brought only temporary relief and in the next months the parties 
faced the same situation again and again. When the soldiers demanded money to fund 
military expeditions, the Pasha explained that he could not afford it unless the Janissaries 
would “give him a permit that would allow him to send off the fathers of the [Trinitarian] 
redemption and unless they allow the commerce.”621 A week later, on February 7th, what 
had become a repeated ritual occurred again; only this time, when asked for money, the 
Pasha responded by saying that “he had already dealt and cut [an agreement] with the 
[Trinitarian] fathers allowing them to leave; and in order to finalize it, he wants [the 
Janissaries] to give him their word that they will not hinder [the deal] but would rather let 
the fathers and the Christian [captives they had ransomed] go free…”622 The Aga refused 
but the Pasha kept insisting on the matter and for a brief moment seemed to succeed. On 
March 3rd, the Janissaries agreed to meet the Pasha and discuss the matter but the heated 
meeting became a fiasco. One of the Janissaries, a French renegade, requested that the 
Trinitarians should stay in prison until Madalena returned to her family. As turmoil 
ensued, the Janissaries shouted vehemently, knives were unsheathed, and some soldiers 
threatened to slash the Pasha’s throat.623 Unfortunately, this was one of the last entries in 
the report of the Valencian chronicler and we have no further evidence from within 
Algiers about the Monroy affair. 
In contrast to the rest of the documents that I examined, the anonymous Valencian 
delineates a structural tension and political discord between the Pasha, the Sultan’s man, 
and the Janissaries who had the de facto power in Algiers. The last entry from the 
chronicle demonstrates that the Janissaries acted like a guild protecting one of its 
members – Axá – in their refusal to allow the Pasha to release the Trinitarians. Their 
position on the matter, however, was not motivated exclusively by loyalty to a group 
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member. It also reflected tensions within the political structure of the city. At the same 
time, while the Janissaries formally objected to release Monroy without receiving 
Madalena in return, the chronicler provides some evidence that their stance was not 
unanimous. The political economy of ransom, then, created ad-hoc coalitions that crossed 
religious boundaries – Spaniards relied on Jews for ransom operations and negotiated 
with the Sultan while the Algerian Pasha attempted to reach an agreement with Monroy. 
It also created surprising refusals to collaborate – as when the Trinitarian Provincial 
refused to participate in Monroy’s rescue efforts.  In any case, religion, as we have seen, 
did not lose importance in the seventeen century Mediterranean and had the power to 
transform commodities into non-commodities, thus removing them from the political 
economy of ransom.624 
 Was the agreement the Pasha mentioned, according to the anonymous captive, one 
of the plans I have examined in the previous section? What exactly was concluded and 
with whom? Was it the deal arranged by the Count of Aguilar? Or rather the earlier 
stages of the negotiation about an exchange for Mahamete Bey? The Pasha may have 
referred to an earlier deal he had cut with Monroy, which, as it never materialized, either 
did not leave traces in the archive or the records that documented it still await 
historiographic redemption. For a decade and a half a multiplicity of actors cooked up 
competing deals, none of which ever materialized. It seems as if the attempt of 1621, 
examined earlier in the section, was the last one. Even if there were additional initiatives, 
they did not succeed, and on July 31st 1622, Monroy died in his prison cell and was 
buried in Algiers.  
4. Outsourcing Ransom  
Mercedarians and Trinitarians did not always buy captives directly from Algerian 
or Moroccan authorities. Often, Jewish and Muslim intermediaries bought captives in one 
Maghribi city and sold them to the Trinitarians or Mercedarians in another. The 
arrangement was common and probably reflected medieval practice.  In the remainder of 
this chapter, I turn to examine (1) the relations between the Orders of Redemption and 
Jewish and Muslim intermediaries, and (2) how Spanish, Algerian, and Moroccan 
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sovereigns in seeking to shape these relations were often responding to the pressures and 
initiative of ransom go-betweens. The Algerians always opposed the practice but 
probably because its volume was limited prior the Monroy affair, their attempts to 
regulate it were limited. The Spanish crown on the other hand knew that the Orders of 
Redemption, its ransom agents, employed intermediaries in the Maghrib and accepted it 
as a given without decreeing royal guidelines on the matter. Following the arrest of the 
Trinitarians, however, Philip III put a halt on direct missions to Algiers, a step that led to 
the formalization and legitimation of the outsourcing. In formally approving 
collaboration, the Crown established an uneasy alliance between the Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians and those it had recently expelled – its Jews and the descendants of the 
Muslims.625 The result was that go-betweens gained much more importance in the 
political economy of ransom a fact to which the Algerians and the Moroccans objected. 
By the second decade of the seventeenth century, the Moroccan Sultan and Ottoman 
Algiers shared nearly a century of hostile political relationships. Not only were they 
political enemies but also they were both sellers of the same commodity – captives – that 
competed against each other over the same buyers (the Trinitarians and the 
Mercedarians). And yet, now they found themselves on the same side of the barricade.626 
Despite having diametrically opposed goals on each given case, they shared an identical 
interest overall and did all they could to regulate the commercial activity of the 
intermediaries in order to attract the Orders of Redemption and make them spend their 
funds in Algiers or Tétouan. 
4.1 Outsourcing of Ransom Prior to the Monroy Affair 
Jewish and Muslim intermediaries had always played an important role in the 
Mediterranean political economy of ransom. In the western part of the sea they acted as 
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intermediaries between the Orders and Algiers and Morocco. The fact that Jews resided 
in the Spanish and Portuguese garrison in the Maghrib must have lubricated this 
cooperation. The services Jews provided the Orders with were varied: they served as 
interpreters and innkeepers; they bought the goods the friars exported from Spain thus 
providing them with the funds required to pay for captives. They also sold slaves to the 
Spaniards – both their own and slaves of Muslims. In chapter four, for example, we have 
seen Jacob Crudo, a Jewish merchant from Tétouan, who worked with the Mercedarians 
between 1579 and 1596. In 1579, Crudo and two other Jewish merchants sold twenty-five 
percent of the captives the Orders of Redemption ransomed in Tétouan.627 He was not 
alone. In 1597, Rodrigo de Arce and Luis Matienzo, Mercedarians in Tétouan, obtained 
the cash they needed for ransom by selling many of the commodities they carried with 
them from Spain to Jacob Chicotillo, the Nagid – “jeque de los judíos” – of the Jewish 
community in Fez. Other Jews from Fez, Meknes, and Salé sold the Mercedarians 
captives for goods and for cash. The Mercedarians stayed at Abraham Tubi’s house, a 
Jew from Tétouan.628 Later, in a 1607 rescue operation, Joseph Mexía served as a 
translator for the Mercedarians while José Gibre rented them a room.629  Other members 
of the Mexia family in Tétouan regularly traded slaves and sold their own and others’ 
captives to the Orders of Redemption. In 1614, Mosen and Braen Mexia sold their own 
slaves and slaves of the almocadén, the Muslim Infantry Captain of Tétouan to the 
barefoot Trinitarians (Trinitarios descalzos).630 Members of the Mexia family continued 
to work with Trinitarians and Mercedarians at least until the 1670’s.631 Jews must have 
played a central role in the Mediterranean political economy of ransom at least until their 
expulsion of from Oran, the largest Spanish presidio in North Africa, in 1669. 
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While our knowledge of the services that Jews provided the Orders in Morocco is 
relatively rich, we know a lot less about their role in the overall Maghribi geography of 
ransom. In other words, we do not know how they connected Algiers, Morocco and Spain 
via ransom operations. Intelligence reports compiled by captives-cum-spies who had 
connections in Algiers and access to spaces of decision-making, like the one that the 
anonymous spy from Denia, shed light on the question and suggest that a main service 
that the intermediaries provided the Orders with was outsourcing of ransom. The 
intermediaries would buy captives in Algiers, for example, travel with them to Tétouan, 
and sell them to the friars there.  
The report compiled by Vincente Colom, another captive who spied for the 
Spaniards between 1602 and 1607 is especially revealing in this regard. According to 
Colom, early in 1604, Algerians arrested a group of recently ransomed Majorcan captives 
in Dalis, a settlement around fifty miles east of Algiers. Eventually, the viceroy of 
Majorca and the French consul in Algiers who represented Soliman Pasha, the governor 
of Algiers, negotiated the ransom of the Majorcans in exchange for Muslims held captive 
in Majorca who returned to Algiers with the French consul.632 In light of this charged 
exchange and the fact that by 1604 five years had passed since an ecclesiastical ransom 
operation had been executed in Algiers, Soliman Pasha was  delighted when the corsair 
Morato Arraez informed him, in May 9th 1604, that the Mercedarians were about to 
depart from Valencia to Algiers. According to the information Morato had, the ransom 
budget stood at thirty-thousand escudos, a nice sum that poverty-stricken Algiers badly 
needed at the time.633 The Pasha did not waste time and hurried a letter to the viceroy of 
Mallorca. His tone in the opening lines of the letter demonstrates familiarity and suggests 
continuous correspondence between him and the viceroy: 
We received the letter of your signioria that was delivered to us at the arrival of 
the signor [French] consul, together with the fruit and the Valencia oranges which 
you were pleased to send me [and] for which I thank you a great deal, and we 
have gladly accepted it that you have deigned to send it.634  
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 AGS, Estado, Leg. 198, 3.22.1604. 
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 AGS, Estado, Leg. 198, 9.4.1604. 
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 “La carta de v.sa a la vinutta del señor consulo ch’ fu abon portu havemo ricevutta, insieme la fruta et 
valencia lei piacuto mandarme diech’i la ringatio molto et le havemo acettato con la bona volunta ch’ se 
dignata mandarnela.” AGS, Estado, Leg. 198, 5.17.1604. 
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Despite the appearance of an exchange between old friends, this is an exceptional 
document. While the viceroys of Sicily and Naples constantly reported on the direct 
exchange of information they had with Tunisian and Algerian pashas, I have found only 
one additional reference to a similar letter addressing the Majorcan viceroy, possibly the 
same letter.  And yet, at the same time, the epistle nicely captures the relations between 
the two politicians. Each party knew what was going on within his adversary’s dominion, 
thanks to indirect channels of communication sustained by the constant circulation of 
merchants, captives, consuls and ransomers. In the typical broken Italian that 
characterized much of the correspondence between North Africa and the Christian world, 
the Pasha mentioned the problem in Dalis, which since then had been resolved, and 
added:635 
Now the friars and other Christians who have been ransomed were set free. And 
be sure that from now on no nuisances or troubles will be given to any redemption 
or others who would like to trade, and commerce would be free and fair (libero et 
franco).636  
 
The commerce in captives, the Pasha implies, is a branch of general commerce, and 
merchants should freely practice their trade. As a token of his good intentions – but also 
out of his fear that non-Algerians pirates would capture the expedition and its treasure – 
the Pasha added a friendly warning: 
And because here it is understood that the redemption or other ship from Valencia 
is about to arrive, should it stop in Majorca, your signoria should warn it to be 
careful of English corsairs. And they could take with them a tartan so that if they 
see any corsair, they could put the money in the tartan and escape with greater 
ease than with a larger ship because it is faster than the sail, and they should not 
worry about the [additional] expense of some hundred escudos so as to not make a 
nasty end, and with this God kindly give happiness and felicity637 
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 Italian or some degraded form of it served as the lingua franca in official correspondence between 
Maghribi and Christian governors as well as in North African notorial records, see: J. Cremona, 
“’Acciocché  ognuno le possa intedere’ The Use of Italian as a Lingua Franca on the Barbary Coast of the 
Seventeenth Century. Evidence from the English,” Journal of Anglo-Italian Studies, 5 (1997): 52-69. On 
the Mediterranean Lingua Franca after which all later linguas francas are called, see: “The Lingua Franca,” 
in Glenn G. Gilbert, Ed. Pidgin and Creole Languages, Selected Essays by Hugo Schuchardt, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 65-88. For a recent and first treatment of the Lingua Franca by a historian, see: 
Jocelyna Dakhlia, Lingua franca: Histoire d’une langue métisse en Méditeranée, Actes Sud: 2008.   
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 “Ancora se mandano liberi li frati et altri cristiani, che se anno rescatati et  sirte sicuro ch’ de qua in anti 
non se dara piu fastidij ne desturbo alcuna sia limosina, o, altri che' vollano il trafico e comercio sia libero e 
franco.” AGS, Estado, Leg. 198, 5.17.1604. 
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 “E perque qua se intende che’ la limosina, o, saetia de Valencia sia per venire, se tochassero in 
Mallorcha v.sa li avise si guardino de li inglesi corsarij et potriano menar con loro una tartana acio che’ 
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That the Pasha should warn the Spanish of English pirates was surprising. A few months 
after the pasha sent his letter, James I, King of England, signed a peace treaty with the 
Spaniards, an act which made English ships legitimate prey from an Algerian 
perspective.638 Before the signing of the agreement, however, the English, as the 
Spaniards’ enemy, were allies of the Algerians. His good will as well as the information 
he rushed to convey to the viceroy of Majorca, and by extension to the Mercedarians, 
echoes the acute need for money felt in Algiers.  At the same time, the form and the 
contents of the letter embody the preferred mode of interaction with the Spaniards the 
Pasha envisioned – direct interaction. He allows for emissaries, probably the French 
consul in this case, but the relations the letter assumes and seeks to maintain are 
unmediated: it is the Pasha directly, almost intimately, conversing with the viceroy of 
Majorca.  It is in this light that we should understand his words about free commerce: 
“libero et franco” as far as it concerned the Mercedarians and the Trinitarians, namely 
official ransom agents of the Crown. Small scale ransom actors were not part of this free 
trade zone the Pasha had envisioned. 
Vicente Colom reported in his chronicle that two weeks later, on May 15th or 20th 
1604, the Pasha and the Janissaries made a public announcement: 
The Pasha and the Janissaries have publicly given permission to ransom captives 
and let them go free… with no impediments and [allowed] the merchants to come 
and go and to deal and negotiate as it pleases them. They allow all that because 
the expedition of the redeemers [limosna] is about to arrive and according to the 
rumors it will bring more than one-hundred-thousand ducats and the [Algerians] 
are thirsty for money. 639 
 
The quote provides evidence as to how rumors that crossed the sea were quickly 
transformed while they spread throughout the city, but more importantly, it points at an 
earlier prohibition the Pasha and the Divan had imposed on dealing with captives, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
havesseri vista de alcuno corsario potriano meter la moneta in la tartana, e escampassero piu facilitamente 
che’ non in vaxele grande per essere piu veloce de la vela e che’ non mireno a la espesa di qualibe 
centenario de scudi per non capitar male, et con questo si prigano da y dio contento,” Ibid. 
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 Wolf, The Barbary Coast, pp. 183-184. 
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 “An dado publico licencia el baxa y jenízaros a que se puedan rescatar cristianos y andarse en libertad 
libremente sin ser impedidos y que vengan y vayan mercantes tratando y negociando su placer todo. Lo 
qual hazen porque venga la limosna de la qual tienen mucha anbre principalmente porque dizen que es de 
más de cien mil ducados.” AGS, Estado, Leg. 198, 15 o 20.5.1604 
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was valid until the moment of the Pasha’s declaration. The interest of the Algerian 
authorities, especially of the Pasha, was to have the Orders regularly arrive in Algiers. In 
that way the Pasha could easily impose on the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians his own 
ransom agenda, namely to sell first his own captives, then those of his people, and finally 
those of Algerian small slave-holders and merchants.640 Merchants from other cities, 
particularly those from Tétouan, we may assume, came last on his list. The passage, then, 
demonstrates the attempts of the Pasha and Divan to regulate the market and sell captives 
directly to the Mercedarians and Trinitarians in Algiers, thereby avoiding the intervention 
of local or foreign go-betweens whose profits came at his expense. As long as the Orders 
did not arrive in Algiers, others, the Pasha believed, should not fill in this vacuum.  
Seeking to deal directly with the Orders of Redemption, the Pasha tried to prevent 
go-betweens from installing themselves between the Algerians and the Spaniards. How 
successful were these attempts?  Did the Pasha manage to regulate the market as he 
fancied, namely to make sure that there would not be any market? Colom does not 
provide enough data on the question, but the captive who replaced him scattered a few 
hints in his notes. The second lieutenant Juan Bautista Soriano, who began his Algerian 
chronicle in September 1607, noted how on December 12th 1607 “an English ship 
arriving from Tétouan entered [the port and] it brought Turkish and Moorish and a few 
Jewish merchants. These [merchants] come to take captives for the [Mercedarian] 
Order’s expedition at Tétouan.”641 Three and a half months later, Soriano made another 
reference to the merchants – “Tuesday, 25th of the said [month of March 1608], the ship 
to which I referred before left with some Christian [captives] the merchants have bought 
in order to hand them in to the said ecclesiastical ransom expedition in Tétouan.”642 A 
later entry in Soriano’s chronicle provides further evidence that this practice was 
common and suggests that the Pasha and the Divan had little control over the merchants 
who trafficked in captives. On Tuesday, September 2nd 1608, Soriano wrote: 
                                                 
640
 In June 2nd, the Mercedarians arrive in Algiers where they stayed for two months ransoming hundred 
and four captives, see: 6.2.1604 and the 7.14.1604, Ibid and Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la 
Merced, pp. 277-278. 
641
 “Sábado 14 del dicho, entro una nave inglesa que venía de Tetuán trae mercaderes turcos y moros y 
algunos judíos, los quales mercaderes vienen a llevar cristianos para la limosna de Tetuán.” AGS, Estado, 
Leg. 210, 12.14.1607. 
642
 “Martes 25 del dicho, se partió la dicha nave que tengo referida lleva algunos cristianos que han 
comprado los mercaderes para en Tetuán darlos a la dicha limosna.” Ibid, 3.25.1608. 
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The galiot of Jafer the French, I mean of Marjamami, left to Tétouan. Its captain 
is Jafer the French. The Divan ordered him not to take Christian [captives] from 
the ones brought by the merchants or owned by Algerians to Tétouan under any 
circumstances, and under the threat of death punishment. Because they [the 
merchants] are the reason that the Spanish Trinitarians and Mercedarians do not 
arrive in this city [Algiers] and the Pasha is losing his fees…643   
 
The chronicler places the Divan in the same position the Pasha occupied before, that of a 
regulator of trade, who seeks to prevent commerce in captives between Algiers and 
Teoutan. Elsewhere, Soriano mentioned sharp tensions and disagreements between the 
Pasha and the Divan, but, unlike the clashes that erupted around the arrest of Monroy, in 
1607 the Pasha and the Divan were united on this front.  
According to Soriano, the practice of outsourcing of ransom was extremely 
pervasive. First, the way in which he describes the Divan’s warning echoes earlier, lighter 
ones. Second, unlike the first reference to the practice, in this entry the ship that left for 
Tétouan was Algerian and not English, and owned by Marjamami, an important Algerian 
corsair and probably a member in the Taifa, whom Soriano mentions various times in his 
account. Not only merchants, then, but also corsairs participated in indirect redistribution 
of captives across the Maghrib, despite the fact that as Taifa members these corsairs were 
represented by the Divan. Moreover, according to the chronicler, the Divan pointed an 
accusatory finger at the “go-betweens,” explicitly linking their trade with Tétouan with 
the loss of revenues that the Algerian authorities suffered. The fact that this was not the 
first time Soriano and others described Algerian attempts to regulate the market suggests 
that, overall, the Pasha and the Divan failed in their attempts at monopolizing it.  
The sparse evidence prior to 1607 does not allow us to spell out the exact 
dynamics that characterized the exchange at this early stage but it is sufficient to 
determine that outsourcing of ransom was practiced for a long time.644 Most likely, 
merchants from Tétouan, like their Algerian counterparts, traveled to Algiers when the 
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 “Martes 2 del dicho se partió la galeota de Jafer Francés, digo de Marjamami para Tetuán. Va por arraez 
della Jafer Francés. A le mandado la aduana que de ninguna manera lleve cristianos a Tetuán de los que 
han comprado los mercantes ni tampoco de los que tienen en Argel sus patrones, so pena de la vida, porque 
ellos son causa que las dichas limosnas dEspaña no vengan a esta ciudad y que el baxa pierde sus 
derechos…” Ibid, 9.2.1608. 
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 An even earlier reference to this practice is found in the autobiography of Gracián. He mentioned a 
renegade who, in 1595, bought a Franciscan captured in Tunis and took him to Algiers, whereupon he sold 
him to the Trinitarians, see: Gracián, Tratado de la redención de cautivos, p. 64. 
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Orders were there to sell them captives from Tétouan. The Orders never asked the 
Spanish King for permission to employ intermediaries. It might be that the intermediaries 
first sold the captives from Algiers to merchants in Tétouan who then sold them to the 
friars, thus camouflaging the mediation. It is possible, but unlikely. The King knew the 
importance of Jewish intermediaries in the Maghrib, especially for the Spanish garrisons 
scattered there, and must have known about the working relations the Orders established 
with them.645 The fact that he did not try to prevent or limit it suggests that the volume of 
ransom of captives that go-betweens controlled was limited, and the King was satisfied 
with the practice.  The discord hides competing models of Mediterranean interaction and 
exchange. Working with intermediaries, rather than negotiating directly with the 
Algerians, seemed like an efficient communicative and commercial model for the 
Spanish crown at that time. As far as the evidence allows, it seems that this was not the 
model Algerians sought to establish. Theirs was one based on face-to-face or direct as 
possible interaction and exchange. Despite that fact, and perhaps because the volume of 
captives exchange via outsourcing was limited, their attempts to regulate the market were 
less pronounced and they came to accept and share the market with intermediaries. 
4.2 Outsourcing after the Arrest of Monroy  
As early as 1612, and probably earlier, the Spanish monarch prohibited the Orders 
from executing ransom operations in Algiers unless the Trinitarians and the captives they 
had redeemed were freed. Since the prohibition did not prevent Algerian corsairs from 
capturing Spaniards, the Orders began searching for ways around the prohibition. As we 
have seen, go-betweens had been buying captives in Algiers and selling them to the 
Orders for years. The Orders could keep on working with intermediaries, but now they 
had to rely solely on their work, make them into the exclusive agents of ransom of 
Spaniards form Algiers. The regulations the crown imposed on the Orders in the 1570’s, 
however, prohibited them from deviating from the royal instructions regarding the way 
they employed ransom funds. Commissioning Jewish or Muslim merchants to ransom all 
the Spanish captives in Algiers went beyond what the crown allowed for an expedition to 
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 Schaub, Les Juifs du roi d’Espegne. 
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Morocco and hence was necessary. The shifts in the working relations between the 
Orders and the intermediaries restructured the political economy of ransom.  
The shift required a royal permission. On March 3rd, 1612, Pedro de Medina, who 
headed a Mercedarian expedition to Tétouan, petitioned the Council of War for a 
permission to redeem captives from Algiers.646 He was expressing an authentic need: the 
Orders had not directly ransomed captives from Algiers since 1604 (excluding Monroy’s 
failed attempt). Spaniards held captive in Algiers had to rely exclusively on go-betweens. 
These facilitated the ransom of many and provided faster relief than the Orders, but were 
more expensive and thus did not suit all. Medina claimed that “many important people 
from this court have asked him to ransom captives who at present are in Algiers and 
offered [him] alms and adjutorios for that matter.”647 He requested from the crown a 
license to commission a captain in Ceuta, a Spanish garrison,648 or in Gibraltar, to sail to 
Algiers with Jewish or Muslims merchants who had commercial contacts in Algiers. The 
merchants, he explained, would ransom the captives, return them to Ceuta, and hand 
them over to the Mercedarians. This way, Mercedarians would not risk arrest in Algiers 
and the Spanish captives would obtain their liberty.  
Six weeks later, the Council of War recommended that the King consent to 
Medina’s request.649 In the following years, similar petitions were resubmitted and 
permits reissued. Two years later, in 1614, the Trinitarians applied for a similar license 
before they left for Tétouan. The license they received, just like that of the Mercedarians, 
allowed “[that] a captain from Gibraltar, Ceuta or Tangiers could go with his ship to 
Algiers, taking with him a few Jewish or Muslims merchants who have contacts among 
the Muslim merchants of Algiers, to execute the said ransom.”650 Indeed many of the 
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 AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 767, 3.9.1612. 
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 “…[P]orque muchas personas graves de esta corte le an pedido rescatarse algunos cautivos que el 
pressente están en Argel y ofrecieron limosnas y adjutorios para ello…” Ibid. The second lieutenant 
Domingo Pérez, petitioned the Council of War to help him ransom his nephew from Algiers, see: AGS, 
Guerra Antigua, Leg. 768, 11.9.1612. María de Hierro, possibly following instructions from Medina, 
specifically petitioned the Council to allow Medina to execute his plans. She was hoping to ransom her 
husband who was held captive in Algiers, see: AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 767, 4.2.1612. 
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 Ceuta was a Portuguese garrison which became Spanish during the sixty years of union between the 
kingdoms. 
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 AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 764, 4.16.1612. 
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 “…[P]ara que un raez de Gibraltar, Ceuta o Tánger pueda ir con su navío a Argel, llevando consigo 
algunos moros o judíos mercaderes que tiene su correspondencia con los dichos moros mercaderes de Argel 
para que haga la dicha redención.” Apud Porres, Libertad a los cautivos, p 345. 
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captives they ransomed in this expedition were brought to Tétouan from Algiers.651 
Likewise, in 1617, Mercedarians in Marrakesh who redeemed Christians were formerly 
held captive in Algiers via Muslim and Jewish merchants probably on the basis of a royal 
permit.652 
At the same time, the Mercedarians were seeking other solutions. In 1613, the 
Mercedarians examined the possibility of using Oran as a base to ransom a large number 
of captives from Aragon held in Algiers. In February, the General of the Order of our 
Lady of the Mercy asked the Count of Aguilar, the governor of Oran, to see if Monroy, 
with whom the Count frequently exchanged letters, could buy captives for the 
Mercedarians and arrange their transfer to Oran. On February 28th, the Count reported to 
the Council of War that Monroy was convinced that the Pasha and Divan would approve 
of the plan.653 Aguilar intended to employ Çaporta, member of one of the leading families 
in Oran, to fund the operation. The Count hoped that the Algerians would deliver the 
captives to Mostaganem, a city located fifty miles east of Oran. Four months later (on 
June 25th), he reported to the Council the latest disappointing news from Monroy. 
Echoing the internal political tensions in Algiers I discussed in the previous section, 
Monroy informed him that “under no circumstances, the Pasha and the Divan are willing 
to allow ransom by the Orders of redemption unless it takes place there [in Algiers].”654 
The Mercedarians’ plan never took off, but Monroy believed he had an alternative. He 
suggested that he would buy the Aragonese captives, one by one, by employing funds 
from Oran, without letting the Algerians know he was acting on behalf of the 
Mercedarians. He would send the captives, he added, with French merchant ships to 
Barcelona and Valencia. There is ample evidence that Monroy ransomed captives 
throughout his arrest but it is unclear whether he ended up ransoming the Aragonese. 
These attempts demonstrate the general importance of intermediaries in ecclesiastical-
royal rescue operations – the governor of Oran relied on a Jewish intermediary and 
Monroy, a ransomer-turned-captive intervened for the Mercedarians. Monroy’s behavior, 
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 Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la Merced, pp. 280-286 
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 AGS, Guerra Antigua, Leg. 785, 2.28.1613. 
654
 “…[Q]ue de ninguna manera quiere el duan ni birey se aga rescate de la limosna si no es allí…” AGS, 
Guerra Antigua, Leg. 786, 6.25.1613. 
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however, also suggests that the power struggles between the Orders that I examined in 
the last chapter were limited to Spanish soil. In the Maghrib, the religious agenda of the 
redemption of captives mattered more than the competition and economic efficiency.  
The granting of these licenses had somewhat contradictory effects on the crown, 
the Orders, and the intermediaries. In commissioning non-Habsburg subjects to execute 
the work of the Orders, the Crown killed two birds with one stone: it obviated the risk 
inherent in sending the Orders to Algiers and yet ransomed its own subjects. In making 
the Orders apply for a license for a procedure that deviated from the crown’s instructions, 
the King also affirmed his control over the Orders and strengthened it. At the same time, 
in repeatedly guaranteeing such permits, the crown was legitimating the outsourcing of 
ransom of captives from Algiers. The King came to rely more and more on Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslims merchants for protecting his subjects. In the process, the King 
strengthened the position of these merchants in the Maghrib, while imposing on them his 
own ransom agenda. Finally, in doing so, the Crown was not only subverting royal 
ideologies but ironically decentralizing its own power.  
Once go-betweens were formally charged with the task of negotiating and 
executing ransom in Algiers on behalf of Trinitarians and Mercedarians, they came to 
control a greater portion of ransom deals. The Orders recommenced sending expeditions 
to Algiers on a regular basis only in 1627. Until then, they were completely dependent on 
go-betweens for. Members of the Orders knew they could do little without the help of 
intermediaries and often expressed their discomfort about it. Referring to the Jewish 
merchants’ offer to bring captives from Tétouan to Ceuta, where the friars resided and 
kept their money, the Mercedarian Pedro Ortiz de Loyando wrote: “It does not seem 
advisable, nor will it ever be, that the redemptions would be executed by intermediaries, 
especially not by Jews.”655 Similarly, the pamphlets that the Orders printed and 
circulated, which praised their redemptive work, also diminished and indeed silenced the 
degree to which they were dependent upon local intermediation. Ortiz de Loyando, 
however, knew that he and his fellow Mercedarians were incapable of ransoming 
captives independently of these go-betweens.  
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 “No Pareció inconveniente, ni lo serán jamás, que las redenciones se hagan por personas interpuestas, y 
mucho menos por judíos.” Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la Merced, pp. 287-288.  
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A third experiment the crown made in outsourcing occurred in 1618 when Philip 
III surprisingly ordered a Trinitarian expedition to change its plans and sail to Algiers. 
The friars were terrified. Their initial plan was to cross the straits and ransom captives in 
Morocco but they did not even make it to Andalusia. On August 18th, in Toledo, they 
received an urgent order to return to Madrid. There, they were informed that instead of 
proceeding with their original plan, they had to turn to Valencia and from there to 
Algiers. The reason was that a little earlier, Algerian corsairs had taken over a royal 
galley carrying infantry soldiers. The monarch, who hoped to rescue as many soldiers as 
he could, commissioned the Trinitarians for the task.656 For the ransom of his imperial 
soldiers, the King was willing to risk the life and liberty of the Trinitarians, despite the 
prohibition he issued a few years earlier. The decision may have been influenced by the 
additional time that outsourcing through Tétouan may have required or, more likely, by 
the Algerian refusal to allow intermediaries to interfere between them and the Spaniards. 
At any rate, in light of the history of Trinitarians in Algiers, the monarch allowed them to 
execute the ransom, if necessary, “by means of merchants.” The Trinitarians signed an 
agreement with Antoine Masued (or Masuer or Massuer), a French merchant based in 
Valencia who bought and sold goods in Andalucía, the kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon, and North Africa,657 and had experience with ransom of Christians from 
Algiers.658 In return for eighteen percent of the total cost of the ransom, Masued’s agent 
in Algiers had to ransom the captives that appeared on the list the Trinitarians prepared. 
From Valencia, the Trinitarians named two captives, Blas Gonçalez and Sancho de 
Hurdaniçia, who had to be present during the negotiation and inspect the work of 
Masued’s agent.659  
The Algerians refused to negotiate with intermediaries and demanded to work 
directly with the Trinitarians. At first, they even refused to allow the Trinitarian Andrés 
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 One of the two captives, Sancho de Hurdaniçia (or Urdambia), described Masued’s agent in a petition 
for help he later submitted to the crown as “a man of little importance and credit,” see: AGS, Guerra 
Antigua, Leg. 833, 10.18.1618. 
 243 
 
Mancera, who insisted on employing go-betweens, to participate in the expedition. The 
provincial of Castile replaced Mancera with Lope González de Frías but the latter, it was 
claimed, “was not fit to cross to the said city of Algiers because of illnesses and his 
disinclinations.”660 Eventually, Mancera and Castillo, the Trinitarians originally assigned 
to the mission in Morocco, left for Algiers. The reputation of the Order was damaged, at 
least according to the Trinitarian and royal preacher Hortensio Félix Paravicino y 
Arteaga.661 While the Trinitarians were forced to appear in Algiers in person, Masued 
joined and helped to negotiate the ransom.662 On July 10th, the Trinitarians had exhausted 
their funding and were ready to leave, but by then their worst fears had been realized. The 
Algerians refused to issue a departure permit and the Trinitarians were forced to stay in 
the port until September 2nd. The Algerians also forced the friars to buy more captives. 
Since by then they had exhausted their funds, the son of the Secretary of the Spanish 
Royal Chamber held captive in Algiers arranged a loan for the friars from a French 
merchant and from the English Consul.663 Like the failed attempt to use Oran as a ransom 
base, this attempt was exceptional. Ransom via Tétouan remained the preferred solution 
until 1627.  
Earlier, I quoted the Mercedarian Pedro Ortiz de Loyando who complained about 
Jewish go-betweens and declared the Mercedarians should avoid their help. He and his 
colleagues, however, were not the only ones dissatisfied with the growing power of 
intermediaries and the pervasiveness of the outsourcing of ransom. The intermediaries 
partially resolved Spanish problems with captives in Algiers, but the authorities in 
Tétouan were unhappy with it. They felt that the arrangement came at the expense of 
their profit from selling captives to the Mercedarians. From their perspective, the 
Algerians and the go-betweens were taking over their share of the ransom. The records 
that document expeditions sent to Tétouan reflect the ways in which disagreements 
between the friars and the Moroccans developed gradually. When the Mecredarian 
expedition led by Medina, which had received a royal permit to hire intermediaries, 
arrived in Ceuta in December 1614, the first thing it did was to nominate a French captain 
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 “…[E]l qual estaba ynpodido  para poder passar a la dicha ciudad de Argel por enfermedades y 
yndispusiciones que etnía…”AHN, Códices, Lib. 125, Fol. 56V (second foliation). 
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 Ibid, fol. 58 (second foliation). 
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 Ibid, fol 22-27V (First foliation). 
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 Benítez, “La tramitación del pago de rescates,” p. 207. 
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to sail to Algiers with intermediaries from Tétouan. Then the Mercedarians headed to 
Tétouan, where they agreed with the merchant Hamete Bordan that he would finance the 
ransom journey to Algiers and employ his contacts with Ali Pichilin, a powerful slave 
owner from Algiers. Moises Mexia, a Jew from Ceuta, agreed to be the guarantor of the 
transaction. On January 18th, the Mercedarians met Amu Ben Amar, the governor 
(alcaide mayor) of Tétouan, presented him with their ransom agenda and apologized for 
ransoming first captives from Algiers. At first the governor did not object and promised 
to help the friars. They reiterated their plans to the Infantry Captain, and added “that the 
best of that redemption was to be used [for ransom] in Algiers and this was the most 
important and most necessary.”664  The Infantry Captain echoed the governor’s consent 
but asked the Mercedarians to leave securities that they would spend sixteen-thousand 
ducats on ransom in Tétouan upon the completion of the Algerian part of the operation. 
The Mercedarians agreed, but a little later, the Captain informed them that the governor 
had changed his mind and now refused to help unless they first spent their money in 
Tétouan. The governor’s people, he explained, were unsatisfied with the plan, and the 
governor feared a rebellion. In this case, the Spanish ransom agenda faced obstacles that 
originated in the limits of power the Moroccan governor felt he could exert on his people. 
Disappointed, the Mercedarians returned to Ceuta where the Marquis de Villarreal, 
the governor of the garrison, encouraged them to proceed with their plan without the help 
of the Moroccans with the ties he had in Algiers. The Mercedarians obeyed and the 
French captain they commissioned left for Algiers on February 10th1615. He returned 
empty-handed in less than two months and explained that Ali Pichilin, the Marquis of 
Villarreal’s contact in Algiers, claimed that the Marquis owed him large sums of money 
for the captives Pichilin had provided him on credit. Pichlin insisted that until the 
Marquis pay his debt, he would not cooperate with him. The contours of the Moroccan 
policy on outsourcing of ransom continued to develop in encounters between the Orders 
and Tetouanite officials. Two years later, in 1617, a similar disagreement erupted.  The 
Infantry Captain of Tétouan forbade the Mercedarians from contacting foreign merchants 
before they bought the captives of the governor of Tétouan, of his men, and of Tetouanite 
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 “…[L]o mejor de su redención se había de emplear en Argel, y que esto era lo principal y lo forzoso.” 
Mss 3,870, BNE, Apud Gozalbes Busto, Los Moriscos en Marruecos, p. 278. 
 245 
 
merchants. At first, Pedro Ortiz de Loyando and Juan de Santiago, the Mercedarians, 
agreed, but as soon as they discovered that many of the captives that the Tetouanite had 
to offer were French and English (and worst of all Protestants), they refused to proceed 
and prepared to return to Spain.  The Jewish merchants convinced the Mercedarians to 
stay in Tétouan, telling them that if they would buy a few of the governor’s slaves, they 
could proceed with their own ransom agenda. De Loyando, who a year later expressed his 
unease with his dependence upon Jewish intermediation, wrote that “this wasn’t  bad 
advice.”665 After buying forty captives in Tétouan, the Mercedarians proceeded to 
negotiate ransom according to their own priorities.  
What were the Algerian policies toward go-betweens after the arrest of Monroy? 
Again, there are no extant Algerian sources which can help us to answer this question, 
but as before, the reports of Spanish spies shed some light on the question. In September 
1614, Yxo de Bovdobal, as the anonymous spy from Denia spelled the name of that 
‘Moor,’ left Algiers with a frigate and thirty three Christians whom he intended to sell in 
Tétouan. The chronicler does not indicate if the Christians were Spanish or from another 
nation, with which the Algerians dealt through go-betweens. About a league away from 
Algiers, however, Yxo dropped anchor and embarked three Christians, who had 
previously been ransomed by Monroy and arrested with the Trinitarians and the rest of 
the captives they had ransomed in 1609. Yxo and the Christians must have planned that 
in advance and doubtlessly he had charged them an extra for the service knowing the risk 
he was taking. The Algerians found out about the plan and on September 20th stopped 
Yxo’s frigate and strangled him to death in the exact same spot in which he picked up the 
three captives. It is hard to generalize on the basis of this scant trace, and yet, in 
comparison to the measures taken before the arrest of Monroy, it seems as if now the 
Algerians were much more reluctant to allow intermediaries to operate against their 
prohibitions.666  
The arrest of Monroy was a blow to the continuation of direct ecclesiastical 
ransom operations in Algiers. The practice of outsourcing ransom, however, preceded the 
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 “No fué mal consejo,” Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la Merced, p. 283. Bordan, the same 
merchant who was commissioned to deliver captives from Algiers in 1615, was still involved in this cross-
regional slave trade. Now however, he tried to condition the ransom of a captive from Tétouan in whom the 
Mercedarians were interested in buying of twelve other captives from Algiers. Ibid, 284. 
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 AGS, Estado, Leg. 255, 20.9.1614.  
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affair by decades and was probably practiced for decades after the death of Monroy.667  
The affair, however, created a new articulation of the political economy and geography of 
ransom. In the sixteenth century and during the first decade of the seventeenth century, 
the Algerians objected intermediation pushing towards direct interaction and exchange. 
In contrast, the Spanish King was satisfied with tacit collaboration with Jewish and 
Muslim go-betweens who intermediated part of the ransom of Spaniards from Algiers.  
The differing positions of the Spanish King and the Algerian Pasha embodied opposed 
models of interaction, communication, and exchange in the Mediterranean. The Algerians 
and later evidence demonstrates that the Moroccans as well, perceived the sea as a space 
in which political powers negotiate directly with each other. That off course did not 
necessarily entail peaceful relations or a frictionless interaction. In addition, the Algerians 
sought a cartel or a monopoly shared with the Moroccans which would have allowed 
them to be the exclusive sellers of captives to Trinitarians and Mercedarians. The 
Spaniards, on the other hands, felt comfortable with intermediation, and in that sense, 
preferred a market of ransom, one in which governments do not exclusively negotiate 
with each other and allow go-betweens to intermediate between them. As much as these 
models differed, the division of labor between go-betweens and the Orders of 
Redemption was such that none of the parties felt an acute need to take radical measures 
and impose its preferred model. Intermediaries, on the one hand, and the Trinitarian and 
Mercedarians on the other, were not perceived to be mutually exclusive options but rather 
as complementary ones. The affair, however, changed the situation. Now the Spanish 
crown prohibited the Orders from sailing to Algiers and formally commissioned 
intermediaries to execute ransom that the Orders would have previously executed. 
Intermediaries gained power, became more important, and de-facto monopolized the 
ransom of captives from Algiers.  The Monroy affair then re-signified the relations 
between go-betweens and the Orders of Redemption.668 Now, ransom via the Orders and 
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 It is probable that during the decade between 1664 and 1674 and between 1674 and early in the eighteen 
century (see the table by the end of the chapter), years during which the Orders did not arrive in Morocco, 
similar outsourcing arrangements were functioning. In chapter two, for example, we have seen that in 1692 
and 1694, the Trinitarians had excellent working relations with Algerian governor. 
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 We should not forget larger dynamics within Spain which may have contributed to the King’s 
willingness to formalize the working relations with Jewish and Muslim merchants. Between 1609 and 
1614, Spain expulsed its Moriscos. The idea of expulsion was not new but the decision was executed only 
in 1609 exactly the same time when Philip III signed the ‘Twelve Years’ truce with the Dutch rebels. 
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ransom via intermediaries were perceived as two alternatives, a fact leading to further 
tensions vis-à-vis both the Algerians and the Moroccans.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The decision of Philip II in 1575 to inspect and regulate the work of the Orders did 
not entail the elimination of the long collaboration between Trinitarians and 
Mercedarians and North African Jewish and Muslim intermediaries. Throughout the 
seventeenth century, the Orders and the go-betweens continued to work together 
ransoming Christians form the Maghrib. Intermediaries competed against the Orders, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter, but more often provided them with 
accommodation, food, and services of translation and ransomed Christians on their behalf 
from cities to which the Orders could not travel. In chapter four, we have seen how the 
Spanish crown implicitly acknowledged the validity of ransom agreements between Jews, 
Muslims, and Christians, providing the latter with aid, when necessary, to pay their debt 
to the go-betweens that rescued them. The Monroy affair rearticulated these working 
relations. Following the arrest of Monroy, Philip III explicitly allowed the Orders of 
Redemption to delegate royal powers to Jews and Muslims who turned into Spanish 
ransom agents. In doing so, he was formalizing long-term outsourcing arrangements 
between intermediaries and ecclesiastical ransom institutions. This decision strengthened 
the intermediaries by bestowing them with the lion share of ransom of Spanish captives. 
Not only did the Orders become less involved in ransom, but also Algerians and 
Moroccans felt that the change was at their expense, and that the Crown was trying to 
impose a conception of the Mediterranean which was different from theirs. Ironically, 
then, the same process that enhanced the alliance between Jewish and Muslim 
intermediaries and the Spanish crown, made two other political enemies, Algiers and 
Morocco, share the same interest – the regulation of intermediaries and direct commercial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scholars have suggested that the proximity between these operations was not accidental. By expulsing the 
Moriscos the Crown sought to recuperate the prestige it felt it had lost in signing the cease fire agreement, 
see: Feros, El Duque de Lerma, pp. 353-372. While there is no direct evidence for that, the cleansing the 
crown of the Moriscos was an action that could have legitimated the formalization of working 
arrangements with Jews and Muslims.   
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relationship with the Spanish crown via its official ecclesiastical agents, the Trinitarians 
and Mercedarians. 
The study of the traffic in humans engendered by piracy and corsairs, a 
phenomenon that ranged from the trivially small – as we have seen in the previous 
chapter – to the spectacularly large, requires a shifting analytical frame which combines 
various geo-political scales.669 A trans-Mediterranean scale that includes political actors 
such as the Ottoman and Moroccan Sultans and the Spanish King and their relations with 
imperial peripheries (Algiers, Sicily and Naples); An institutional scale that is focused on 
the Orders of Redemption and their movements between Spain and the Maghrib; A 
Maghribi scale that includes Jewish and Muslim “go-betweens” and their interactions 
with the Orders and with Algerian pashas and Moroccan governors; and a smaller single 
polity scale focused, for example, on Algiers or Spain and their internal strife. Only a 
perspective that combines these scales allows the reconstruction and analysis of the 
political economy and geography of ransom in all its complexity. The problem, however, 
is not only one of scale but also of accounting for the complex and shifting relations 
between economy, politics, society and religion. The political economy of ransom, then, 
was not as part of an autonomous economic sphere but rather as an activity determined 
by political, religious and social power dynamics. A captive’s value in the political 
economy of ransom was determined by his or her religious identity, wealth and skills, but 
also political power struggles represented in the various scales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
669
 See the recent article of Schayegh that focuses on narcotic trafficking in the Middle East from a 
transnational perspective, see: Cyrus, Schayegh, “The Many Worlds of ‘Abud Yasin; or, What Narcotics 
Trafficking in the Interwar Middle East Can Tell Us about Territorialization,” American historical Review 
116 (2011), pp. 273-306. 
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Table 1: Trinitarian and Mercedarian Ransom Expeditions to the Maghrib, 1595-1692670 
  Algiers Tétouan   Algiers Tétouan 
1595 Trinitarians (225) Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [208]) 
1645  Mercedarians (212) 
1596 Mercedarians (100)  1646 Mercedarians (293) Trinitarians (124) 
Mercedarians (325) 
1597 Mercedarians (279)  1647 Mercedarians (115)  
1599 Trinitarians (250)  1648  Mercedarians (225) 
1601  Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [166]) 
1650 Mercedarians (230)  
1604 Mercedarians (104) Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [154]) 
1651 Mercedarians (241)  
1605  Trinitarians (119) 1652 Trinitarians (136)  
1607  Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [196]) 
1654 Mercedarians (82)  
1609 Trinitarians (130, 
failed) 
Mercedarians (132) 1655 Mercedarians (302)  
1612  Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [141]) 
1656  Trinitarians (320) 
1614  Trinitarians (125) 1660 Mercedarians (406)  
1615  Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Marrakesh [258]) 
1661  Trinitarians (136 also 
from Arzila) 
1617  Mercedarians (152) 1664 Meredarians (261) Trinitarians (79 also from 
Arzila) 
1618 Trinitarians (208) Mercedarians (140) 1667 Mercedarians (211)  
1620 Mercedarians (121) Trinitarians (36 also from 
Fez) 
1668 Mercedarians (122)  
1624  Trinitarians (109) 
Mercedarians (and in 
Ksar el-Kebir and Sale 
[115]) 
1669 Mercedarians (200)  
1627 Mercedarians (383) 
Trinitarians (162) 
 1670 Trinitarians (212)  
1630  Trinitarians (85) 1674  Mercedarians (and in Fez 
and Sale [56]) 
1633 Mercedrians (100) Trinitarians (72) 1675 Mercedarians (519)  
1635  Mercedarians (93) 1677   
1636  Trinitarians (93) 1678 Mercedarians (450)  
1639 Mercedarians (114) Trinitarians (111) 1679 Trinitarians (163)  
1640   1681 Mercedarians (153)  
1642  Trinitarians (118) 1682 Mercedarians (446)  
1644 Mercedarians (152)  1692 Trinitarians (156) 
Mercedarians (642) 
 
Captives ransomed by Mercedarians: 10,526 
Captives ransomed by Trinitarians: 4,240 
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 This table is based on data extracted from Gari y Siumell, La orden redentora de la Merced and  Porres, 
Libertad a los cautivos. The numbers of expeditions and of ransomed captives the table include are bigger 
than the numbers offered by José Antonio Martínez Torres. The reason is that Martínez Torres included 
only expeditions of which he found the account books in the archives. Martínez Torres is careful with 
histories such as Porres and Gari y Siumell as their authors are members of the Orders on which they write 
and hence might aggrandize uncritically the results of the redemptive labor. I chose a more liberal, 
however, because I found supporting evidence for expeditions Porres and Gari y Siumell mentioned for 
which Martínez Torres did not find the account books. If indeed the numbers of captives ransomed and 
expeditions sent is smaller than what Porres and Gari y Siumell offered that might be an index for the even 
larger importance of the networks discussed in chapter four. 
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Chapter	8:	
Conclusion	
The end of the age of spectacular naval battles between the Ottoman and Habsburg 
empires in the Mediterranean, reflected in the peace treaty the empires had signed in 
1581, transformed the structures of mobility in the western Mediterranean. The peace 
agreement enabled corsairs to take over the sea, and increased the total volume of 
captives while spreading out their distribution over time and across space making it more 
balanced. The frequent movement of captives, escaping, and ransomed Christians and 
Muslims across the Mediterranean, intensified the webs of connectivity between the 
Maghrib and Spain by allowing the circulation of various kinds of information, of which 
captives were producers and carriers. Ironically, then, despite the fact that Spain turned 
its attention northward and westward, away from the Mediterranean, the sea continued to 
flourish, with reshaped boundaries and a host of new links that connected the Habsburg 
Empire, Ottoman Algiers and Morocco. Corsairs played an important role in the process, 
but so did ransom networks and the intermediaries that formed them. Jewish, Muslim and 
Christian go-betweens came to mediate the relations between the Spanish monarch, 
Algerian pashas and Moroccan governors who sought to impose competing ideals of the 
Mediterranean. 
I have suggested that we should examine the formation of regions as a process of 
interaction between cross-boundary practices (such as captive-taking, ransom, conversion 
and more) and competing region making projects, understood as political attempts to 
reshape the religious and social boundaries of the sea via the imposition of agendas of 
exchange and interaction. I have focused on one instance of such a process that took 
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place in the western Mediterranean, in the stretch of the sea between Spain and the 
Maghrib and demonstrated that, rather than a religious space dominated by the spirit of a 
trans-historical Jihad, or a space quartered into national units and governed by the spirit 
of capitalism,671 the sea was made and remade throughout the seventeenth century by the 
constant constitution and unraveling of social and political ties. Captivity and ransom 
were a vantage point for the study of the sea’s transformations. The information the 
captives produced and exchanged served them in negotiating their captivity and 
improving their living conditions, while also providing institutions of their home 
communities with news about renegades, strategic information, and a foothold on the 
opposite coast of the sea.  Similarly, the interactions between captives, ecclesiastical 
ransom institutions and small-scale ransom agents, on the one hand, and between ransom 
intermediaries and institutions and Spanish, Algerians and Moroccan political authorities, 
on the other, formed another arena of Mediterraneanization. Despite the large corpus of 
studies that focus on the themes of captivity and ransom the majority of scholars conceive 
of captivity as a self-contained experience and a period during which captives had lost all 
contact with their home communities. For this reason, the manner in which the 
circulation of captives and the interactions it generated continued to make and remake the 
Mediterranean through linking the people populating it has gone unnoticed. It is this gap 
that the dissertation sought to fill. 
 
*   *   * 
 
This study contributes in several ways to our understanding of the seventeenth 
century Mediterranean, the relation between the Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Algiers, and 
Morocco, and captivity and ransom. It adds an important level of empirical data, 
revealing details about the life of captives and the links between ransom institutions and 
intermediaries and Mediterranean sovereigns. In methodological terms, the dissertation 
stressed two issues: writing as social action and the importance of failures both in shaping 
the archive and in pointing out the ways in which value was determined by non-economic 
forces such as politics, society and religion. Several chapters stressed the importance and 
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 Davis, Huntington, Dakhlia 
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usefulness of analyzing writing and textual artifices not only in terms of representation or 
authorial intent but also as unique forms of social action. By thinking about archival 
documents as traces of actions, rather than only as representations of captivity, the 
dissertation sheds new light both on repertoires of actions available to captives and on the 
ways in which the institution of slavery facilitated the relations on all levels between 
Spain, Algiers and Morocco. In so doing, the dissertation emphasized the importance of 
expanding the documentary basis of research on captives and on the Mediterranean 
beyond captivity narratives – which, while exceptionally rich, were written by a minority 
of captives always after the trial of captivity had ended – to small, everyday textual 
artifacts captives had produced. 
Focusing on failures was fruitful in two ways. First, while there are references to 
ransom deals executed by small-scale ransom intermediaries, such deals, when efficient, 
tended not to leave archival traces. In contrast, the records of institutional ransom, 
carefully archived and organized in neat documentary series, created the illusion of a 
Spanish bureaucratic state forming itself through the monopolization of “humanitarian 
action” at the expense of non-institutional actors. It is only by a search for failed cases 
scattered across numerous bundles of records in various sections of the archive that I was 
able to reconstruct the system analyzed in chapter five and reconstruct the complex ways 
in which political centralization was intertwined with processes of de-centralization. It 
was the failures, then, that facilitated the reconstruction of the norms, practices and 
procedures which governed the work of small-scale longue durée networks of ransom. 
Second, focusing exclusively on the few ransom deals which were executed successfully 
risks their reduction to mere economic transactions, thus de-historicizing the ways in 
which value was created and negotiated. In examining a multiplicity of deals negotiated 
but never executed, deals that failed from the perspective of a captive seeking his or her 
liberty, I was able to show how internal and international political power struggles, social 
institutions like marriage, and religion – factors allegedly external to the agreements 
negotiated – were crucial in shaping value and the market. 
I have reconstructed a process of Mediterraneanization from the perspective of the 
Habsburg Empire. To some extent, the richness of Spanish archives allowed me to 
account for the manner in which the process was perceived, experienced, and negotiated 
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from Algiers and Morocco. Further research in Algerian and Tunisian Ottoman archives 
is needed before its results can be synthesized into a study of this kind. Doubtlessly, such 
findings would help recalibrate the history I have charted. Nevertheless, I hope to have 
demonstrated the value of focusing on captivity and ransom, not only in order to study 
captivity and ransom as such, but also as phenomena which shed light on some of the 
larger processes through which the western Mediterranean was shaped throughout the 
seventeenth century. It is only by further exploring the interactions between maritime 
movements, connections, and articulations that we can understand the process of 
Mediterraneanization. 
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